Andreas Blume

Interests

Teaching

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Communication in Games, Language in Games

Research

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Communication in Games, Language in Games

Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Chapters

• Blume, A., Lim, W., & Lai, E. K. (2019). Strategic Information Transmission: A Survey of Experiments and Theoretical Foundations. In Handbook of Experimental Game Theory.
• Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., & Maier, M. (2005). Cognition in Spatial Dispersion Games. In Experimental Business Research, Volume III: Marketing, Accounting and Cognitive Perspectives.
• Blume, A., & Riezman, R. G. (1994). Dynamic Tariff Games with Imperfect Observability. In Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity(pp 185--205). Springer Netherlands.

Journals/Publications

• Blume, A., Lai, E., & Lim, W. (2023).

  Mediated Talk: An Experiment

  . Journal of Economic Theory, 33.
• Blume, A., Noussair, C., & Ye, B. (2024).

  Fragile Meaning - An Experiment

  . Journal of Economic Theory, 26.
• Blume, A., & Park, I. (2022). Quid pro Quo: Friendly Information Exchange between Rivals. Theoretical Economics, 41.
• Blume, A., Deimen, I., & Inoue, S. (2022).

  Incomplete Contracts Versus Communication

  . Journal of Economic Theory, 42.
• Blume, A., Franco, A. M., & Heidhues, P. (2021). Dynamic Coordination via Organizational Routines. Economic Theory, 72(4), 1001-1047.
• Blume, A. (2018). Eliciting Private Information with Noise: The Case of Randomized Response. Games and Economic Behavior.
• Blume, A. (2018). Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common- Interest Communication Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 109, 132-155.
• Blume, A., Kriss, P. H., & Weber, R. A. (2017). Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction. EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 20(2), 368-395.
• Blume, A., Kriss, P. H., & Weber, R. A. (2016). Coordination with Decentralized Costly Communication. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
• Blume, A., & Board, O. (2014). Intentional Vagueness. Erkenntnis, 1-45.
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  Abstract: This paper analyzes communication with a language that is vague in the sense that identical messages do not always result in identical interpretations. It is shown that strategic agents frequently add to this vagueness by being intentionally vague, i.e. they deliberately choose less precise messages than they have to among the ones available to them in equilibrium. Having to communicate with a vague language can be welfare enhancing because it mitigates conflict. In equilibria that satisfy a dynamic stability condition intentional vagueness increases with the degree of conflict between sender and receiver. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht.
• Blume, A., & Board, O. (2013). Language Barriers. Econometrica, 81(2), 781-812.
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  Abstract: Different people use language in different ways. We capture this by making language competence-the set of messages an agent can use and understand-private information. Our primary focus is on common-interest games. Communication generally remains possible; it may be severely impaired even with common knowledge that language competence is adequate; and, indeterminacy of meaning, the confounding of payoff-relevant information with information about language competence, is optimal. © 2013 The Econometric Society.
• Blume, A. (2012). A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games. Games and Economic Behavior, 75(2), 510-517.
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  Abstract: This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by Goltsman et al. (2009) in the leading example of the Crawford-Sobel model can be obtained with strategy-correlated equilibria, thus preserving privacy vis-à-vis the mediator. More generally, all equilibrium outcomes of the ε-noise model of Blume et al. (2007), including outcomes with an uncountable infinity of equilibrium actions, can be obtained via strategy-correlated equilibria of the noise-free game. The occasional mismatch between the encoding and decoding rules used by sender and receiver in a strategy-correlated equilibrium can be interpreted as uncertainty about language use. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.
• Blume, A., & Gneezy, U. (2010). Cognitive forward induction and coordination without common knowledge: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 68(2), 488-511.
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  Abstract: This paper investigates optimal play in coordination games in which cognition plays an important role. In our game logically omniscient players would be able to identify a distinct coordination opportunity from other obvious facts. Real players may be unable to make the required inference. Our main experimental results are that in a coordination task with a cognitive component (1) players play differently when playing against themselves rather than against another player, and (2) given the opportunity, players signal cognition by choosing the coordination task over an outside option, a phenomenon which we refer to as cognitive forward induction. © 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., Duffy, J., & Temzelides, T. (2010). Self-organized criticality in a dynamic game. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(8), 1380-1391.
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  Abstract: We investigate conditions under which self-organized criticality (SOC) arises in a version of a dynamic entry game. In the simplest version of the game, there is a single location-a pool-and one agent is exogenously dropped into the pool every period. Payoffs to entrants are positive as long as the number of agents in the pool is below a critical level. If an agent chooses to exit, he cannot re-enter, resulting in a future payoff of zero. Agents in the pool decide simultaneously each period whether to stay in or not. We characterize the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of the resulting dynamic game. We then introduce local interactions between agents that occupy neighboring pools and demonstrate that, under our payoff structure, local interaction effects are necessary and sufficient for SOC and for an associated power law to emerge. Thus, we provide an explicit game-theoretic model of the mechanism through which SOC can arise in a social context with forward looking agents. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
• Blume, A., Duffy, J., & Franco, A. M. (2009). Decentralized organizational learning: An experimental investigation. American Economic Review, 99(4), 1178-1205.
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  Abstract: We experimentally study decentralized organizational learning. Our objective is to understand how learning members of an organization cope with the confounding effects of the simultaneous learning of others. We test the predictions of a stylized, rational agent model of organizational learning that provides sharp predictions as to how learning members of an organization might cope with the simultaneous learning of others as a function of fundamental variables, e.g., firm size and the discount factor. While the problem of learning while others are learning is quite difficult, we find support for the comparative static predictions of the model's unique symmetric equilibrium. (JEL C72, D23, D83).
• Blume, A., Heidhues, P., Lafky, J., Münster, J., & Zhang, M. (2009). All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction. Games and Economic Behavior, 66(2), 729-741.
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  Abstract: This paper completely characterizes the set of equilibria of the Vickrey auction for multiple identical units when buyers have non-increasing marginal valuations and there are at least three potential buyers. There are two types of equilibria: In the first class of equilibria there are positive bids below the maximum valuation. In this class, above a threshold value all bidders bid truthfully on all units. One of the bidders bids at the threshold for any unit for which his valuation is below the threshold; the other bidders bid zero in this range. In the second class of equilibria there are as many bids at or above the maximum valuation as there are units. The allocation of these bids is arbitrary across bidders. All the remaining bids equal zero. With any positive reserve price equilibrium becomes unique: Bidders bid truthfully on all units for which their valuation exceeds the reserve price. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., & Heidhues, P. (2008). Modeling tacit collusion in auctions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 164(1), 163-184.
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  Abstract: We study tacit collusion, which we interpret as collusion without communication about strategies, in repeated auctions in which bidders can only observe past winners and not their bids. Strategies cannot discriminate among initially nameless bidders until they have become named through winning an auction. We obtain two classes of results: (1) Completely refraining from using names rules out collusion altogether, and even if naming is permitted, as per our definition of tacit collusion, the lack of communication limits collusive strategies and payoffs among impatient bidders. (2) Sufficiently patient bidders can overcome the attainability constraints imposed by lack of communication and obtain approximately the same collusive gain as absent communication. © 2008 Mohr Siebeck.
• Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2008). Chapter 63 The Effect of Message Space Size on Learning and Outcomes in Sender-Receiver Games. Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1(C), 572-584.
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  Abstract: As documented in the dynamics (figures) and outcomes (tables), agents learn to attach meaning to "a priori" meaningless messages. For the common interest game, Game 1, we observe the efficient separating outcome, although the learning process is gradual. For the partial common interest game, Game 2, the outcomes and dynamics vary with the size of the message space. With two messages, we observe a partial pooling outcome with a minimal amount of non-equilibrium play. Again, the dynamic adjustment (learning) process is gradual. For three and four messages, the highest frequency of play is the fully separating equilibrium, although there is a significant amount of partial pooling play in both treatments and, consistent with theory, there is more partial pooling play in the four message treatment than in the three message treatment. Finally, while there is less non-equilibrium play in the four message treatment than in the three message treatment, the dynamic adjustment (learning) process in both treatments is gradual and incomplete. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., & Franco, A. M. (2007). Decentralized learning from failure. Journal of Economic Theory, 133(1), 504-523.
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  Abstract: We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through Crawford and Haller's [Learning how to cooperate: optimal play in repeated coordination games, Econometrica 58 (1990) 571-595] attainability constraints on strategies. We analyze a repeated game with imperfectly observable actions. A fixed subset of action profiles are successes and all others are failures. The location of successes is unknown. The game is played until either there is a success or the time horizon is reached. We partially characterize optimal attainable strategies in the infinite horizon game by showing that after any fixed time, agents will occasionally randomize while at the same time mixing probabilities cannot be uniformly bounded away from zero. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., & Ortmann, A. (2007). The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 274-290.
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  Abstract: Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in experimental order-statistic games. This result is roughly consistent with theoretical predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play. The evidence concerning the mechanisms that theory appeals to is mixed: Frequent agreement of messages and actions is consistent with messages being viewed as self-committing. Risk in the underlying game and the absence of self-signaling messages may explain why message profiles are not unanimous. Time-varying message profiles can be interpreted as evidence for players trying to negotiate equilibria and/or trying to rely on secret handshakes. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., Board, O. J., & Kawamura, K. (2007). Noisy talk. Theoretical Economics, 2(4), 395-440.
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  Abstract: We investigate strategic information transmission with communication error, or noise. Our main finding is that adding noise can improve welfare. With quadratic preferences-and a uniform Pipe distribution, welfare can be raised for almost every bias level by introducing a sufficiently small amount of noise. Furthermore, there eidsts a level of noise that makes it possible to achieve the best payoff that can be obtained by means of any communication device. As in the-model Without noise, equilibria are interval partitional; with noise, however, coding (the measure of the message space used by each interval of the equilibrium partition of the type space) becomes critically important. Copyright © 2007 Andreas Blume, Oliver J. Board, and Kohei Kawamura.
• Blume, A., & Heidhues, P. (2006). Private monitoring in auctions. Journal of Economic Theory, 131(1), 179-211.
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  Abstract: We study infinitely repeated first-price auctions in which a bidder only learns whether or not he won the object. While repetition of the stage-game equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in public strategies, with patient bidders there are simple Nash equilibria in private strategies that improve on bid rotation. Sequential rationality is appropriately captured by essentially perfect Bayesian equilibrium (EPBE), which ignores behavior after irrelevant histories. Our main result is the construction of EPBEa that improve upon bid rotation. Assuming symmetry, the exclusionary schemes of Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [Tacit collusion in repeated auctions, J. Econ. Theory 114 (2004), 153-169], including asymptotically efficient ones, are supported as EPBEa. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A. (2004). A Learning-Efficiency Explanation of Structure in Language. Theory and Decision. doi:10.1007/s11238-005-0280-1
• Blume, A. (2004). A learning-efficiency explanation of structure in language. Theory and Decision, 57(3), 265-285.
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  Abstract: This paper proposes a learning-efficiency explanation of modular structure in language. An optimal grammar arises as the solution to the problem of learning a language from a minimal number of observations of instances of the use of the language. Agents face symmetry constraints that limit their ability to make a priori distinctions among symbols used in the language and among objects (interpreted as facts, events, speaker's intentions) that are to be represented by messages in the language. It is shown that if it is commonly known that the object space is modular and messages are strings, then modularity of the language is sufficient and (essentially) necessary for learning efficiency. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. © Springer 2005.
• Blume, A., & Arnold, T. (2004). Erratum: "Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games" (Games and Economic Behavior (2004) vol. 46 (240-259) S0899825603001209 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00120-9). Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 453-.
• Blume, A., & Arnold, T. (2004). Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 240-259.
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  Abstract: We study learning in communication games. Our main finding is that a simple forward-looking learning rule leads to communication in a large class of games. This class is characterized by a partial-common-interest condition. In contrast, we show that a variety of purely backward looking dynamics may fail to guarantee communication. Memory is a partial substitute for looking forward: With long memory, backward-looking learning leads to communication in a class of games with perfect incentive alignment. © 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
• Blume, A., & Heidhues, P. (2004). All equilibria of the Vickrey auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 114(1), 170-177.
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  Abstract: This paper characterizes the set of Nash equilibria in the second-price sealed-bid auction with independent private values and three or more bidders. In addition, we show that any effective reserve price implies uniqueness. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
• Blume, A. (2003). Bertrand without fudge. Economics Letters, 78(2), 167-168.
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  Abstract: This paper reexamines Bertrand competition with homogeneous products and different marginal costs. It is shown that the conventional outcome is supported by an equilibrium in the original game under the standard rationing rule. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., & Temzelides, T. (2003). On the geography of conventions. Economic Theory, 22(4), 863-873.
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  Abstract: We study an evolutionary model in which heterogenous boundedly rational agents interact locally in order to play a coordination game. Agents differ in their mobility with mobile agents being able to relocate within a country. We find that mobile agents enjoy a higher payoff and always benefit from increased mobility, while immobile agents benefit from increased mobility at low levels of mobility only. This wedge in payoffs weakly increases as mobility increases. Some extensions are discussed.
• Blume, A., Dejong, D. V., Neumann, G. R., & Savin, N. E. (2002). Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: An econometric investigation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 17(3), 225-247.
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  Abstract: This paper compares stimulus response (SR) and belief-based learning (BBL) using data from experiments with sender-receiver games. The environment, extensive form games played in a population setting, is novel in the empirical literature on learning in games. Both the SR and BBL models fit the data reasonably well in games where the preferences of senders and receivers are perfectly aligned and where the population history of the senders is known. The test results accept SR and reject BBL in games without population history and in all but one of the games where senders and receivers have different preferences over equilibria. Estimation is challenging since the likelihood function is not globally concave and the data become uninformative about learning once equilibrium is achieved. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2001). Evolution of communication with partial common interest. Games and Economic Behavior, 37(1), 79-120.
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  Abstract: We experimentally investigate communication in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We consider both a priori meaningless messages and messages with pre-established meanings. Under four canonical incentive conditions, we get communication outcomes. However, it is by no means a fait accompli. We observe significant deterioration and recoding of a priori meanings, sucker behavior by receivers, and focal point and initial condition effects. A conservative partial common interest (PCI) condition generally is a reliable, albeit coarse predictor of the form of communication. Equilibrium selection criteria sometimes improve on the PCI prediction but neither influentiality, ex ante efficiency, nor Farrell's neologism-proofness refinement is reliable across all games, and equilibria are not always obtained. Considering comparative statics, equilibrium selection criteria are helpful but imperfect predictors of how equilibrium frequencies respond to incentives, whereas the less ambitious PCI prediction is never rejected by the data. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92, D82. © 2001 Academic Press.
• Blume, A. (2000). Coordination and Learning with a Partial Language. Journal of Economic Theory, 95(1), 1-36.
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  Abstract: This paper explores how efficiency promotes the use of structure in language. It starts from the premise that one of language's central characteristics is to provide a means for saying novel things about novel circumstances, its creativity. It is reasonable to expect that in a rich and changing environment, language will be incomplete. This encourages reliance on structure. It is shown how creative language use emerges from common knowledge structures, even if those structures are consistent with an a priori absence of a common language. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C60, C72. © 2000 Academic Press.
• Blume, A., & Gneezy, U. (2000). An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 90(1), 161-172.
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  Abstract: This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guarantee that it will be used. Optimal learning can be impeded by both irrelevant information and the complexity of the coordination task. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C92 © 2000 Academic Press.
• Blume, A. (1998). Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 22(2), 171-202.
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  Abstract: This paper uses curb sets to study the evolution of effective pre-play communication in games where a single communication round precedes a simultaneous-move, complete-information game. It is shown that the effectiveness of one-sided pre-play communication is inversely related to risk in the underlying game, and to the size of the message space. If messages have somea prioriinformation content, then multi-sided communication is more effective than one-sided communication; i.e., risk and the size of the message space play no role.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C72. © 1998 Academic Press.
• Blume, A. (1998). Contract renegotiation with time-varying valuations. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 7(3), 397-433.
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  Abstract: The paper characterizes optimal renegotiation-proof rental contracts in a model with adverse selection and hidden information. It generalizes the work of Hart and Tirole (1988) to the case of time-varying valuations. The paper considers a durable-goods monopolist who serves a nonanonymous buyer with time-varying valuation for the seller's good. The buyer's valuation has a persistent and a transient component; both are private information. The paper shows that for some range of prior beliefs the seller strictly prefers leasing to selling.
• Blume, A., DeJong, D. V., Kim, Y., & Sprinkle, G. B. (1998). Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games. American Economic Review, 88(5), 1323-1340.
• Blume, A. (1996). Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games. Games and Economic Behavior, 13(1), 2-25.
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  Abstract: This paper characterizes robust outcomes in sender-receiver games. An equilibrium (a retract) is perturbed message persistent (PMP) if it is the limit (Hausdorff limit) of persistent equilibria(persistent retracts) in perturbed games. In strict common interestgames separating equilibria are PMP and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. With partial common interest, there exists a PMP retract which partially separates types and message invariant equilibria are not PMP. Under a rich language condition only partially separating equilibria are PMP in partial common interest games, and there are further results on refinements and games where the sender has a preferred equilibrium. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D82. © 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
• Blume, A., & Sobel, J. (1995). Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 65(2), 359-382.
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  Abstract: We define communication-proof equilibria in simple games of communication. These equilibria satisfy a stability condition guaranteeing that they would not be affected if new opportunities to communicate arose. We look for partitions of possible equilibria into sets of good and bad equilibria. The good equilibria are those that cannot be destabilized by another good equilibrium. The remaining equilibria are bad. An equilibrium for the original game is communication proof if its is a good equilibrium in a partition of this form. We prove that communication-proof equilibria exist and, for a class of common-interest games, communication-proof outcomes are efficient. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D80. © 1995 Academic Press. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A. (1994). Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games. Journal of Economic Theory, 64(1), 66-77.
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  Abstract: This paper examines the effectiveness of perturbation refinements in sender-receiver games. It is shown that babbling equilibria are always perfect and even proper. However, they need not be strategically stable. An example is given where the only strategically stable pooling equilibria are pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, there exist examples in which none of the pooling equilibria is strategically stable. Persistence is effective in games with small message spaces. It rules out pooling equilibria in games which have strict separating equilibria but its effectiveness is not confined to these games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72. © 1994 Academic Press. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A. (1994). Intraplay Communication in Repeated Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 6(2), 181-211.
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  Abstract: The paper examines repeated games where players have the (possibly costly) option of initiating bargaining over continuation payoffs between plays of the stage game. A solution concept for these augmented games, renegotiation perfectness, is used to characterize concepts like subgame perfectness and Pareto perfectness in the underlying repeated game and to extend Pareto perfectness to infinite horizon games. When bargaining is costly, renegotiation may be indispensable off the equilibrium path for supporting renegotiation-perfect outcomes. Sufficient conditions for a renegotiation-perfect profile to support payoffs which are not supported by and not dominated by some subgame-perfect profile are developed in the infinite horizon case. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C70. © 1994 Academic Press. All rights reserved.
• Blume, A., Kim, Y., & Sobel, J. (1993). Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication. Games and Economic Behavior, 5(4), 547-575.
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  Abstract: This paper identifies evolutionarily stable outcomes in games in which one player has private information and the other takes a payoff-relevant action. The informed player can communicate at little cost. Outcomes satisfying a set-valued evolutionary stability condition must exist and be efficient in common-interest games. When there is a small cost associated with using each message the outcome preferred by the informed player is stable. The paper introduces a nonequilibrium, set-valued stability notion of entry resistant sets. For games with partial common interest, the no-communication outcome is never an element of an entry resistant set. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72,D82. © 1993 Academic Press. All rights reserved.

Presentations

• Blume, A. (2024).

  Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding

  . Conference on Mechanism and Institution Design. Budapest, Hungary.
• Blume, A. (2023). Meaning in Communication Games. Invited Seminar at the Paris School of Economics.
• Blume, A. (2022). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. Invited seminar at New York University.
• Blume, A. (2021, October). Meaning in Communication Games. Seminar at the University of California - Riverside. Department of Economics, University of California - Riverside: University of California - Riverside.
• Blume, A. (2021, October). Meaning in Communication Games. University of Arizona -- IBE/Theory Brownbag. University of Arizona.
• Blume, A., Lai, E., & Lim, W. (2021, Summer). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. 6th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (Budapest 2021). Budapest: Game Theory Society.
• Blume, A., & Deimen, I. (2020, January). Information Processing: Contracts Versus Communication. UCSD Theory Foundations Conference. University of California - San Diego.
• Blume, A., Deimen, I., & Sean, I. (2020, July). Information Processing: Contracts Versus Communication.". 31st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (Invited semi-plenary speaker, July 2020),. Stony Brook: 31st Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory.
• Blume, A., Lim, W., & Lai, E. (2020, October). "Mediated Talk: An Experiment".. Virtual East Asia Experimental and Behavioral Economics Seminar Series (October 2020). Osaka, Japan: ISER.
• Blume, A., Noussair, C., & Ye, B. (2020, Spring). Erosion of Meaning -- An Experiment. Santa Barbara Conference on Experimental and Behavioral Economics. University of California -Santa Barbara.
• Blume, A. (2019, July). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) International Conference. Ischia, Italy.
• Blume, A., Lim, W., & Kai, E. K. (2019, February). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. Southwest Economic Theory Meeting. Santa Barbara: University of California - Santa Barbara.
• Blume, A., Lim, W., & Lai, E. (2019, Spring). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. 4th annual Southwest Experimental and Behavioral Economics Workshop (SWEBE) at Claremont Graduate University. Claremont Graduate University.
• Blume, A., Lim, W., & Lai, E. K. (2019, March). Mediated Talk: An Experiment. Seminar at the University of Calgary. Calgary: University of Calgary.
• Inoue, S., Deimen, I., & Blume, A. (2019, Fall). Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication. Conference Organizational Economics (Berlin).
• Inoue, S., Deimen, I., & Blume, A. (2019, Spring). Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication. Conference QuantLaw (UofA).
• Inoue, S., Deimen, I., & Blume, A. (2019, fall). Information Processing: Contracts versus Communication. Seminar Erasmus University Rotterdam.
• Blume, A. (2017, July). Erosion of Meaning -- An Experiment. 26th European Summer Symposium in Economic Theory (ESSET) at the Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland (July 3 -- July 14, 2017). Study Center Gerzensee, Switzerland: Swiss Central Bank.
• Blume, A. (2017, May). Erosion of Meaning -- An Experiment. Seminar UC Irvine.
• Blume, A. (2017, September). Failure of Common Knowledge of Language in Common-Interest Communication Games. Seminar at UC Merced - Cognitive and Information Sciences. UC Merced.