Jason Turner

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• Turner, J. (2016). The Facts in Logical Space. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682812.001.0001

Chapters

• Turner, J. (2020). Recent Work on Ontological Pluralism. In The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. Routledge.
• Turner, J. (2017). Can We Do Without Fundamental Individuals?. In Current Controversies in Metaphysics(pp 24-42). Routledge.
• Turner, J. (2017). Experimental Philosophy, Conceptual Analysis, and Metametaphysics. In Experimental Metaphysics. Bloomsbury.
• Turner, J. (2017). Experimental Philosophy, Conceptual Analysis, and Metasemantics. In Experimental Philosophy(pp 47-74). Bloomsbury.
• Turner, J., & Dasgupta, S. (2017). Postscript to "Can We Do without Fundamental Individuals?". In Current Controversies in Metaphysics(pp 40-42). Routledge.

Journals/Publications

• Turner, J. (2016). Curbing Enthusiasm about Grounding. Philosophical Perspectives, 1(1), 366-396. doi:10.1111/phpe.12087
  More info

  Note: Publication date is 2016, but did not actually appear in print until early 2017.
• Turner, J. (2016). Metaontology. Oxford Handbook Online. doi:0.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.25
• Turner, J. (2015). The Construction of Logical Space and the Structure of Facts. Philosophical Studies, 172(10), 2609-2616. doi:10.1007/2Fs11098-014-0427-4
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  In The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo defends trivialism, according to which number-involving truths are trivially equivalent to other, non-number-involving truths; picturesquely, ‘I have five fingers on my hand’ and ‘the number of fingers on my hand is five’ express the same fact, but carved up in different ways. A single fact thus has multiple structures. I distinguish two ways this might go: on the deflationary picture, facts get their structures from our linguistic practices, while on an inflationary picture, facts have multiple structures independently of language. I argue that Rayo’s view is best interpreted as deflationary. Thus interpreted, it blocks off an attractive solution to the old problems of intensionality. I further argue a that a semi-deflationary variant of Rayo’s view can make use of the attractive solution—but it thereby sacrifices the supposed mathematical benefits of trivialism.
• Turner, J. (2015). What's So Bad about Second-order Logic?. Synthese, 373(1), 463-487. doi:2F978-3-319-18362-6
  More info

  Second-order logic is generally thought problematic by the philosophical populace. Philosophers of mathematics and logic may have sophisticated reasons for rejecting second-order logic, but ask the average philosopher-on-the-street what’s wrong with second-order logic and they will probably mumble something about Quine, ontological commitment, and set theory in sheep’s clothing. In this paper, I try to get more precise about exactly what might be behind these mumblings. I offer four potential arguments against second-order logic and consider several lines of response to each. Two arguments target the coherence of second-order quantification generally, and stem from concerns about ontological commitment. The other two target the expressive power of ‘full’ (as opposed to ‘Henkin’) second-order logic, and give content to the concern that second-order logic is in fact “set theory in sheep’s clothing”. My aim is to understand the dialectic, not take sides; still, second-order logic comes through looking more promising than we might have initially thought.

Presentations

• Turner, J. (2017, 7 April). Expressive Power Arguments in Metaphysics. Yale University Metaphysics and Semantics Workshop. New Haven, CT: Yale University.
• Turner, J. (2017, 8 August). Expressive Power Arguments in Metaphysics. Leeds University Colloquium Talk. Leeds, UK: The University of Leeds Centre for Metaphysics and Mind.
• Turner, J. (2021, October). On Doing Without Ontology. Rutgers University Metaphysics Reading Group. New Jersey (via Zoom): Rutgers University Philosophy Department.
• Turner, J. (2019, April). Credal Luminosity. The Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Organization. Vancouver, BC: The American Philosophical Organization.
• Turner, J. (2019, March). Holists Just Won't Learn: A Problem for (Global) Ontological Nihilism. Texas Tech Colloquium Series.. Lubbock TX: Texas Tech Philosophy Department.
• Turner, J. (2019, May). Functional Logical Pluralisms. Boston University Logic Workshop. Boston, MA: Boston University Philosophy Department.
• Turner, J. (2018, February). Expressive Power Arguments in Metaphysics. MIT Colloqium Series. Cambrige, MA: Massachussets Institute of Technology.
• Turner, J. (2018, January). Comments on Kit Fine, "The Metaphysics of Contrary-to-Duty Obligations". 2018 Ranch Metaphysics Workshop. Tucson, AZ.
• Turner, J. (2018, January). On Karen Bennett's Making Things Up (Author-Meets-Critic). 2018 APA Eastern Division Meeting. Savannah, GA: The American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2018, March). On Kris McDaniel's The Fragmentation of Being (Author Meets Critic). 2018 APA Pacific Division Meeting. San Diego, CA: American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2017, 12 April). Author meets Critics: The Facts in Logical Space. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting. Seattle, WA: American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2017, 25 July). Grounding and Ontological Commitment. Laws of Metaphysics Workshop. Hamburg, Germany: The University of Hamburg.
• Turner, J. (2016, June). Everettian Evils. Multiverse, Theodicy, and Fine-Tuning Conference. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University.
• Turner, J. (2016, March). On Doing Without Infinitely Many Individuals. Central Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Chicago, IL: American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2016, March). Theodicy and Hermeneutics. Embodied Religious Experiences Workshop. Princeton, NJ: The Templeton Foundation.
• Turner, J. (2015, April). Coments on "The Source of Necessity". American Philosohical Association, Pacific Division Meeting. Vancouver, BC, Canada: American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2015, February). Ontological Nihilism and Tractarian Factalism. American Philosophical Assocation, Central Division Meeting. St Louis, MO: American Philosophical Association.
• Turner, J. (2015, January). Ontological Nihilism and Tractarian Factalism. White Stallion Ranch Workshop in Metaphysics. Tucson, AZ: N/A.
• Turner, J. (2015, September). Ontological Nihilism and Tractarian Factalism. University of Pittsburgh Faculty Colloquium Series. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Philosophy Department.