Jonathan M Weinberg

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Books

• Weinberg, J. M., & Alexander, J. (2025). Standing Up for Philosophy: Armchairs, Experiments, and the Case for Methodological Reform. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/9780191947704.001.0001
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  In Standing Up for Philosophy, Jonathan Weinberg and Joshua Alexander seek to radically reformulate the debate over the method of cases, and whether results in experimental philosophy have shown that the armchair version of that method should perhaps be abandoned. Experimental philosophy (“X-phi”) seems to indicate that our verdicts about thought experiments are vulnerable to demographic variation and unconscious contextual influences. Yet experimental philosophers have long struggled to articulate clearly the pessimistic upshot from these vulnerabilities to error. Weinberg and Alexander argue that the central questions involved in these debates have been misframed by relying on traditional epistemic terminology, such as: are intuitions about cases reliable enough to provide knowledge? Instead they ask: what methodological advantages can experimental philosophy bring to the method of cases that cannot be gained while we remain seated in our philosophical armchairs? Answering this question requires turning our attention from questions of epistemic normativity to questions of methodological rationality. When philosophers start engaging seriously with the ways that experimental methods can augment more traditional philosophical methods, and perhaps must do so if we are to avoid various sorts of errors, then we can hope for real philosophical progress. Weinberg and Alexander argue that this is what standing up for philosophy is all about: giving ourselves a richer set of methodological resources that can be used to answer the kinds of questions that philosophers have been interested in asking all along.
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2014). The “unreliability” of epistemic intuitions. Taylor and Francis. doi:10.4324/9780203122884
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  Debate over the status of intuitions in philosophical practice is marred by an ambiguity about “unreliability.” Many authors, including Boyd and Nagel in this volume, have defended the reliability of intuitions in the baseline accuracy sense of “on balance, right more often than wrong.” We agree that intuitions should likely be considered reliable in that sense. But that is not the sense in which their reliability has been under attack. Rather, the sense of reliability most relevant for understanding experimentalist critiques of intuitions is trustworthiness, for which baseline accuracy is perhaps a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition.
• Allen, C., Todd, P. M., & Weinberg, J. M. (2012). Reasoning and Rationality. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0003
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  The article explores five parts of Cartesian thought that include individualism, internalism, rationalism, universalism, and human exceptionalism demonstrating the philosophical and psychological theories of rationality. Ecological rationality comes about through the coadaptation of minds and their environments. The internal bounds comprising the capacities of the cognitive system can be shaped by evolution, learning, or development to take advantage of the structure of the external environment. The external bounds, comprising the structure of information available in the environment, can be shaped by the effects of minds making decisions in the world, including most notably in humans the process of cultural evolution. The internal constraints on decision-making including limited computational power and limited memory in the organism and the external ones include limited time push toward simple cognitive mechanisms for making decisions quickly and without much information. Human exceptionalism is one of the strands of Residual Cartesianism that puts the greatest focus on language and symbolic reasoning as the basis for human rationality. The invention of symbolic systems exhibits how humans deliberately and creatively alter their environments to enhance learning and memory and to support reasoning. Nonhuman animals also alter their environments in ways that support adaptive behavior. Stigmergy, an important mechanism for swarm intelligence, is the product of interactions among multiple agents and their environments. It is enhanced through cumulative modification, of the environment by individuals.

Chapters

• Gjesdal, A., & Weinberg, J. M. (2025).

  Aesthetic Debunking Arguments

  . In Art & Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. (2024). Practices Make Perfect: On Minding Methodology When Mooting Metaphilosophy. In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol 5. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/9780198918905.003.0013
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  This chapter argues that debates over philosophical methodology would be well-served by a greater attention to the specifics of philosophical practice. Intuition deniers such as Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen have claimed that philosophers do not generally rely on intuitions, but simply make arguments, perhaps elliptical ones. Their claims turn out to be inconsistent with, for example, the sorts of dialectical moves that are licensed in philosophical practice when mooting a case; and with much of the historical evidence about the reception of Gettier’s classic paper. Others, like Joshua Knobe, have argued that intuitions are so stable and uniform that a proper reading of the empirical evidence indicates that no methodological concerns should arise. Yet such arguments do not adequately consider just how much current philosophical practices, especially inferential practices, are susceptible to even fairly modest sources of error.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2023). What’s Epistemology for? The Case for Neopragmatism in Normative Metaepistemology. In Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2018). Are Aestheticians’ Intuitions Sitting Pretty?. In Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Aesthetics(pp 267-288). Bloomsbury.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2018). Knowledge, Noise, and Curve-fitting: A methodological argument for JTB?. In Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem(pp 253-272). Oxford University Press.
• Barnard, R., Barnard, R., Ulatowski, J., Ulatowski, J., Weinberg, J. M., & Weinberg, J. M. (2017). Thinking About The Liar, Fast and Slow. In Reflections on the Liar(pp 39-70). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  In the past, experimental philosophers have explored the psychological underpinning of a number of notions in philosophy, including free will, moral responsibility, and more. But prior to this chapter, although a number of philosophers have speculated on how ordinary folks might, or should, think about the liar paradox, no one had systematically explored the psychological underpinnings of the Liar itself. The authors take on this task. In particular, the chapter investigates the status of a liar sentence, L = ‘Sentence L is false’. The thesis, arrived at by interpreting the data the authors have accrued, is that reflective thinkers (some of whom possess a modicum of philosophical expertise) judge L to be neither true nor false (as opposed to false or true), and the authors see this as some evidence for the claim that L is neither true nor false.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2016). Intuitions. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology(pp 287-308). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  : This article examines the philosophical methodology of intuitions beginning with an argument developed by Max Deutsch and Herman Cappelen over the descriptive adequacy of what Cappelen calls “methodological rationalism”, and their own preferred view, “intuition nihilism”. Based on inadequacies in both accounts, it offers a descriptive take on intuition-deploying philosophical practice today via what it calls “Protean Crypto-Rationalism”. It then describes the epistemic profile of the appeal to intuition, listing four key aspects of the basic shape of intuition-deploying philosophical practice: primacy of cases, flexibility of report format, freedom of stipulation, and interpretation-hungry. It also considers several sources of error for intuitions featured in at least the informal methodological lore of philosophy, namely: misconstruals, modal confusions, pragmatics/semantics confusion, and “tin ear”. Finally, it explores the problem of methodological ignorance and inferential demand, particularly the typical practices of philosophical inference that operate on the premises delivered by appeal to intuitions.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017). Knowledge, noise, and curve-fitting: A methodological argument for justified true belief?. In Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198724551.003.0016
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  Could considerations of simplicity ultimately lead us to prefer the theory that knowledge is justified true belief, over rival theories that accommodate the standard view that Gettier cases are justified true belief but not K? I consider one source of simplicity considerations: when one engages in a modeling project relying on noisy data, then the more noise that one expects, the more one should prefer to select simpler curves. And the general noisiness of our epistemic verdicts about cases puts such considerations into play.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017). What is negative experimental philosophy good for. In The Cambridge Companion to Philosophical Methodology(pp 161-183). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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  My objective here is to make a case for the positive philosophicalcontribution of the ‘negative programme’ in experimental philosophy,and head off a few common misconceptions about it along the way.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2016). Experimental Philosophy, Noisy Intuitions, and Messy Inferences. In Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology(pp 11-33). London: Bloomsbury.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2016). Going Positive by Going Negative: On Keeping X-Phi Relevant and Dangerous. In The Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy(pp 71-86). Oxford UK: Wiley-Blackwell.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2015). Humans As Instruments, or The Inevitabilty of Experimental Philosophy. In Experimental Philosophy, Rationalism, and Naturalism: Rethinking Philosophical Method. Routledge.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2015). Humans as instruments: Or, the inevitability of experimental philosophy. In Method, Rationalism, and Naturalism: The Impact of Experimental Philosophy. Taylor and Francis Inc.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2015). Regress-Stopping for Neopragmatists. In Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
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  David Henderson and John Greco, eds.
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2014). The "Unreliability" of Epistemic Intuitions. In Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. Routledge.
• Alexander, J., Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2014). Accentuate the Negative. In Experimental Philosophy, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199927418.003.0002
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  There are two ways of understanding experimental philosophy's process of appealing to intuitions as evidence for or against philosophical claims: the positive and negative programs. This chapter deals with how the positivist method of conceptual analysis is affected by the results of the negative program. It begins by describing direct extramentalism, semantic mentalism, conceptual mentalism, and mechanist mentalism, all of which argue that intuitions are credible sources of evidence and will therefore be shared. The negative program challenges this view by questioning if there can be in fact a shared intuition about a specific hypothetical case, as conflicting intuitions are as likely to arise. The chapter then discusses other issues raised by the negativists such as the limits of surveys and the proper domain problem.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014). All Your Desires in One Box. In Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind. OUP.
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  To appear in _Aesthetics and the Sciences ofthe Mind_, G. Currie, A. Meskin, M. Kieran, and J. Robson, eds., Oxford University Press.;Your Role: Author;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014). The Challenge of Sticking With Intuitions Through Thick and Thin. In Intuitions. OUP.
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  to appear in A. Booth and D. Rowbottom, eds., _Intuitions_, Oxford University Press;Your Role: Co-author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Co-author is a former student at IU, now an assistant professor at Siena College;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014). The Promise of Experimental Philosophy and the Inference to Signal. In Advances in Experimental Epistemology. J. Beebe, ed., _Advances in Experimental Philosophy_: Continuum.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013). The Prospects for an Experimentalist Rationalism or Why It's OK if the A Priori Is Only 99.44 Percent Empirically Pure. In The A Priori In Philosophy.
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  to appear in _The A Priori In Philosophy_, A. Casullo and J. Thurow (eds), Oxford: OUP.;Your Role: Author;
• Weinberg, J., Nichols, S., & Stich, S. (2013). Normativity and epistemic intuitions. In Die Experimentelle Philosophie in der Diskussion. Taylor and Francis. doi:10.4324/9780203774908
• Meskin, A., & Weinberg, J. M. (2012). Imagination Unblocked. In The Aesthetic Mind. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691517.003.0014
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  Some things are very hard to imagine, and not necessarily because they are complicated or hard to understand. This phenomenon of "imaginative resistance" has been examined by many philosophers in recent years, and we presented an account of its cognitive architecture in an earlier work. This paper explores an interesting aspect of this psychological phenomenon that has thus far garnered little attention: some authors, in the right circumstances, can deploy techniques that render what would typically be unimaginable into the imagined stuff of fiction. In this paper we extend our earlier account of the cognitive architecture of imaginative resistance to accommodate, and offer an empirically-motivated explanation for, the various ways in which authors may circumvent or overcome blocks to the imagination.
• Nichols, S., Stich, S., Weinberg, J. M., & Nichols, S. L. (2012). Meta-Skepticism: Meditations in Ethno-Epistemology. In The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0010
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  Throughout the twentieth century, an enormous amount of intellectual fuel was spent debating the merits of a class of skeptical arguments which purport to show that knowledge of the external world is not possible. These arguments played an important role in the work of some of the leading philosophers of the twentieth century, including Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein. Typically, these arguments make use of one or more of the premises which the philosophers proposing them take to be intuitively obvious. Beyond an appeal to intuition, little or no defense is offered, and in many cases it is hard to see what else could be said in support of these premises. A number of authors have suggested that the intuitions undergirding these skeptical arguments are universal—shared by everyone (or almost everyone) who thinks reflectively about knowledge. This chapter offers some evidence indicating that they are far from universal. Rather, the evidence suggests that many of the intuitions epistemologists invoke vary with the cultural background, socio-economic status, and educational background of the person offering the intuition. And this is bad news for the skeptical arguments that rely on those intuitions.
• Weinberg, J. M., , C. A., & , P. T. (2012). Reasoning and Rationality. OUP.
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  ;Full Citation: Allen, C., Todd, P., and Weinberg, J. (2012) “Reasoning and Rationality” Oxford Handbook ofPhilosophy & Cognitive Science, E. Margolis, S. Stich, and R. Samuels, eds. Oxford UniversityPress.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Co-authors are both cognitive science faculty at Indiana University.;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2008). Configuring the Cognitive Imagination. In New Waves in Aesthetics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. doi:10.1057/9780230227453_11
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  My goal here is to advocate for a naturalistic theory of the imagination that concerns the ways that different parts of our mind can be configured to interact with the imagination. This account will serve as a framework for investigating a range of imaginative phenomena of interest to aestheticians, including genre, imaginative blockage, and the range of conative states we take on in engaging with various fictions. But to tell this story about how the imagination interacts with various parts of the mind, I first need to tell the tale of what those parts are, and indeed what the imagination is such that it makes sense to talk about such interactions.
• Weinberg, J. M., & Meskin, A. (2006). Puzzling over the Imagination: Philosophical Problems, Architectural Solutions. In The Architecture of the Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility, and Fiction. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199275731.003.0010
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  Abstract This chapter addresses three distinct philosophical issues concerning the imagination: the puzzle of emotions and fiction, imaginative resistance, and the distinction between imagination and supposition. Standard approaches to these issues, which restrict themselves to the resources of folk psychology and metaphysics, are shown to be inadequate. Instead, an alternative approach rooted in careful exploration of the cognitive architecture of the imagination is developed. This approach transforms the aforementioned puzzles about the imagination into explananda apt for a scientifically-informed explanation. The result is an account of the imagination which, in addition to explaining these three key imaginative phenomena, shows promise for solving other related issues such as the epistemic value of modal intuitions. Moreover, it is a vindication of a certain kind of naturalistic approach to philosophy, not just in the philosophy of mind but also in aesthetics and epistemology.
• Faucher, L., Mallon, R., Nazer, D., Nichols, S., Ruby, A., Stich, S. P., Weinberg, J. M., Nazer, D. H., & Nichols, S. L. (2002). 18 The baby in the lab-coat: why child development is not an adequate model for understanding the development of science. In The Cognitive Basis of Science. doi:10.1017/cbo9780511613517.019
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  Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a novel account of the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are identical. We argue that Gopnik's bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to a neglect of norms and the processes of social transmission which have an important effect on scientific cognition and cognition more generally.

Journals/Publications

• Meskin, A., & Weinberg, J. M. (2025). Middlebrow Aesthetics: An Explanation and Defense. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. doi:10.1111/papq.70007
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  We offer a philosophical account of the middlebrow as a theoretical category to do explanatory and critical work in aesthetics. On our account, the middlebrow ought to be understood as aspirational popular art. That is, it is art which aspires both to be popular (in a distinctive sense), and at the same time to be something more than popular. Although, as we will discuss, there are many different sorts of “something more” to which middlebrow art may aspire, and this suggests that there are different kinds of middlebrow art, the aspiration itself provides the category with substantial unity.
• Weinberg, J. M., & Meskin, A. (2025). Easy to imagine – or Hard to Believe?. Philosophia (United States). doi:10.1007/s11406-025-00861-6
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  In Religion as Make-Believe, Neil Van Leeuwen offers a novel and attractive hypothesis for why religious “beliefs” act so differently from paradigm beliefs — namely, that they are a fundamentally different kind of mental attitude. Van Leeuwen argues that these religious attitudes are better understood as akin to the imaginative states associated with make-believe. We argue, contra Van Leeuwen, that religious beliefs really are a species of belief, fundamentally of the same sort as ordinary beliefs; but they are sustained by different, less evidence-sensitive processes than ordinary beliefs.
• Gjesdal, A., & Weinberg, J. M. (2020). Aesthetic Debunking and the Transcendental Argument of the Novel. Aesthetic Investigations.
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  For a special issue on "Empirical Aesthetics"
• Weinberg, J. M. (2022). Supplementing Herder’s naturalism: Expanding the senses and transcending cultures. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, tbd.
• Barnard, R., Ulatowski, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2022). The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work. Filozofia Nauki (The Polish Journal of the Philosophy of Science), 29(2), 77-113.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2022). Review of William Seeley, Attentional Engines: A Perceptual Theory of the Arts. Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80(1), 121-124.
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2021). You Just Can’t Count on (Un)Reliability. Analysis, 80(4), 737-751. doi:10.1093/analys/anaa053
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  Edouard Machery (2017) argues that many traditional philosophical questions are beyond our capacity to answer. Answering them seems to require using the method of cases, a method that involves testing answers to philosophical questions against what we think about real or imagined cases. The problem, according to Machery, is that this method has proved unreliable; what we think about these kinds of cases is both problematically heterogeneous and volatile. His bold solution: abandon the method of cases altogether and with it many of the questions that we have come to associate with philosophy itself. Many of the critical responses to Machery’s book have focused on whether empirical work on judgements about philosophical cases supports his claim that the method of cases is unreliable. Our problem with these responses is that they accept that reliability is the right way to frame empirically informed concerns about the method of cases, and we think that it is not. The reason is simple: the kind of unreliability thesis that Machery needs proves to be empirically intractable, at least by anything like the current methods used by experimental philosophers, or so we shall argue here. While we have empirical grounds for thinking that unreliability arguments don’t give us reason to abandon the method of cases, we do think that there are empirical grounds for thinking that it needs to be reformed. There are other standards that we expect our methods to meet beyond mere reliability, especially standards of practical rationality, which are too often forgotten in metaphilosophical discussions that tend to focus exclusively on epistemological considerations. Methodological considerations, after all, are not just matters of epistemic normativity, but practical rationality as well. What’s more, considerations of practical rationality become particularly important when we move from the kind of extreme scepticism that Machery endorses to the kind of progressive reformation that we think should be pursued. And so we conclude by arguing that thinking about philosophical inquiry in terms of standards of practical rationality allows us both to better understand what kinds of problems recent empirical work on philosophical cognition raises for the method of cases and also how that work can point the way to reforming it.
• Barnard, R., Ulatowski, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2021). THE FOURFOLD ROUTE TO EMPIRICAL ENLIGHTENMENT EXPERIMENTAL PHILOSOPHY’S ADOLESCENCE AND THE CHANGING BODY OF WORK. Filozofia Nauki, 29(Issue 2). doi:10.14394/filnau.2021.0012
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  The time has come to consider whether experimental philosophy’s (“x-phi”) early arguments, debates, and conceptual frameworks, that may have worn well in its early days, fit with the diverse range of projects undertaken by experimental philosophers. Our aim is to propose a novel taxonomy for x-phi that identifies four paths from empirical findings to philosophical consequences, which we call the “fourfold route.” We show how this taxonomy can be fruitfully applied even at what one might have taken to be the furthest edges of possible applications of x-phi in metaphysics and formal philosophy. Ultimately, the fourfold route helps us understand a different kind of empirical fact: the development of x-phi itself.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2021). Attentional Engines: A Perceptual Theory of the Arts. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 80(1), 121-124. doi:10.1093/jaac/kpab069
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  William Seeley is well known to the aesthetics community as a real triple threat: philosopher, sculptor, and cognitive scientist. It is unsurprising, then, that his Attentional Engines neatly synthesizes his mastery of multiple debates in aesthetics; a keen and learned eye for the arts; and a thorough background in the psychology and neuroscience of perception, categorization, and especially, attention. Seeley aims to demonstrate the positive value of bringing these different fields together; that is the stated conclusion of the book’s arguments, but the book’s existence itself serves as evidence for the fruitfulness of this particular sort of interdisciplinary synthesis. The success of such a synthesis is by no means guaranteed, and Seeley takes seriously a diagnosis offered by Alva Noë for a fatal blindspot typical of scientific work on the arts: that the scientific work fails to locate art. Not in the geographical sense, of course—presumably the scientists can find...
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2020). You just can't count on (un)reliability. Analysis, 80(4), 737-751.
• Weinberg, S. E., & Weinberg, J. M. (2020). Hard domains, biased rationalizations, and unanswered empirical questions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, 42-43. doi:10.1017/S0140525X1900222X
• Weinberg, J. M. (2016). What is the A Priori, That Thou Art Mindful of It?. Philosophical Studies, 173(6), 1695-1703. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0592-0
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  Phil Studies published this book symposium on Casullo's book from a prior Pacific APA.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2015). The Methodological Necessity of Experimental Philosophy. Discipline filosofiche, 25, 23-42.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2015). What is the a priori, that thou art mindful of it? A comment on Albert Casullo, Essays on a priori justification and knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 1-9. doi:10.1007/s11098-015-0592-0
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014). Cappelen Between Rock and a Hard Place. Philosophical Studies.
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  In a book symposium on Herman Cappelen's _Philosophy Without Intuitions_
• Weinberg, J. M., , S. C., Gonnerman, C., , J. M., , S. S., & Vandewalker, I. (2012). Intuition & Calibration.
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  ;Your Role: Lead author;Full Citation: Weinberg, J., Crowley, S., Gonnerman, C., McCrary, J., Swain, S., Vandewalker, I., “Intuition &Calibration” (2012), Essays in Philosophy, 13, 256-283.;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;
• Weinberg, J. M., Alexander, J., Gonnerman, C., & Reuter, S. (2012). Restriction & Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected?.
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  Special issue on experimental philosophy;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Weinberg, J. M., Alexander, J., Gonnerman, C., & Reuter, S. (2012). Restrictionism and Reflection. The Monist, 95(2), 200-222;Collaborative with undergraduate student: Yes;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Co-authored with former students at IU; also, Joshua Alexander is now assistant professor at Siena College.;
• Weinberg, J. M., Alexander, J., Gonnermna, C., & Reuter, S. (2012). Restriction & Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected?. Monist.
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  Special issue on experimental philosophy;Your Role: Co-author;Collaborative with undergraduate student: Yes;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Co-authored with former students at IU; also, Joshua Alexander is now assistant professor at Siena College;
• Weinberg, J. M., Crowley, S., Gonnerman, C., Vandewalker, I., & Swain, S. (2011). Intuitions and Calibration. Essays in Philosophy.
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  Weinberg, Jonathan M.; Crowley, Stephen; Gonnerman, Chad; Vandewalker, Ian; and Swain, Stacey (2012) "Intuition & Calibration," Essays in Philosophy: Vol. 13: Iss. 1, Article 15. Available at: http://commons.pacificu.edu/eip/vol13/iss1/15;Your Role: Lead co-author;Electronic: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Co-authors are all former graduate students of mine from IU; Crowley is currently an associate professor at Boise State;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2011). What is evaluative normativity, that we (maybe) should avoid it?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 34(5), 274-275. doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000604
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  AbstractElqayam & Evans (E&E) argue that we should avoid evaluative normativity in our psychological theorizing. But there are two crucial issues lacking clarity in their presentation of evaluative normativity. One of them can be resolved through disambiguation, but the other points to a deeper problem: Evaluative normativity is too tightly-woven in our theorizing to be easily disentangled and discarded.
• Alexander, J., Buckner, C., Gonnerman, C., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Are philosophers expert intuiters. Philosophical Psychology, 23(3), 331-355. doi:10.1080/09515089.2010.490944
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  Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers’ training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse thi...
• Alexander, J., Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1(2), 297-314. doi:10.1007/s13164-009-0015-2
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  Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
• Alexander, J., Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Competence: What's in? What's out? Who knows?. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(4), 329-330. doi:10.1017/s0140525x10001652
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  Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
• Crowley, S. J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Loose Constitutivity and Armchair Philosophy. Software - Practice and Experience, 2(2), 177-195. doi:10.12697/spe.2009.2.2.10
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  Standard philosophical methodology which proceeds by appeal to intuitions accessible "from the armchair" has come under criticism on the basis of empirical work indicating unanticipated variability of such intuitions. Loose constitutivity---the idea that intuitions are partly, but not strictly, constitutive of the concepts that appear in them---offers an interesting line of response to this empirical challenge. On a loose constitutivist view, it is unlikely that our intuitions are incorrect across the board, since they partly fix the facts in question. But we argue that this ratification of intuitions is at best rough and generic, and can only do the required methodological work if it operates in conjunction with some sort of further criteria of theory selection. We consider two that we find in the literature: naturalness (Brian Weatherson, borrowing from Lewis) and charity (Henry Jackman, borrowing from Davidson). At the end of the day, neither provides the armchair philosopher complete shelter from extra-armchair inquiry.
• Gonnerman, C., & Weinberg, J. (2010). Two uneliminated uses for concepts: Hybrids and guides for inquiry. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 33(2-3). doi:10.1017/S0140525X1000035X
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  Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry. Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010.
• Gonnerman, C., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Two uneliminated uses for "concepts": hybrids and guides for inquiry.. The Behavioral and brain sciences, 33(2-3), 211-2. doi:10.1017/s0140525x1000035x
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  Machery's case against hybrids rests on a principle that is too strong, even by his own lights. And there are likely important generalizations to be made about hybrids, if they do exist. Moreover, even if there were no important generalizations about concepts themselves, the term picks out an important class of entities and should be retained to help guide inquiry.
• Wang, E., & Weinberg, J. M. (2010). Naturalism’s Perils, Naturalism’s Promises: A Comment on Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics. Neuroethics, 3(3), 215-222. doi:10.1007/s12152-010-9065-5
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  In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as dynamic, in a way that may preserve many key aspects of eudaimonistic ethics from the situationists’ challenge. With regard to intuition, we address Appiah’s worry that naturalistic explanations of the sources of our intuitions may leave us feeling that those intuitions have been thereby debunked. We suggest that it may be that feeling of debunking that should itself be debunked.
• Crowley, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2009). The x-phi(les): unusual insights into the nature of inquiry. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 40(2), 227-232. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2009.03.016
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  Abstract Experimental philosophy is often regarded as a category mistake. Even those who reject that view typically see it as irrelevant to standard philosophical projects. We argue that neither of these claims can be sustained and illustrate our view with a sketch of the rich interconnections with philosophy of science.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2009). On doing better, experimental-style. Philosophical Studies, 145(3), 455-464. doi:10.1007/s11098-009-9405-7
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  Timothy Williamson devotes significant effort in his The Philosophy of Philosophy to arguing against skepticism about judgment. One might think that the recent “experimental philosophy” challenge to the philosophical practice of appealing to intuitions as evidence is a possible target of those arguments. However, this is not so. The structure of that challenge is radically dissimilar from that of traditional skeptical arguments, and the aims of the challenge are entirely congruent with the spirit of methodological improvement that Williamson himself exemplifies in the Afterword of his book.
• Alexander, J., Swain, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2008). The instability of philosophical intuitions: Running hot and cold on truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1), 138-155. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2007.00118.x
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  A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought-experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non-knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.
• Bueno, O., Hales, S. D., Jackman, H., & Weinberg, J. M. (2008). Book symposium: Steven D. Hales, relativism and the foundations of philosophy (mit press, 2006). International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16(2).
• Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2008). Living with innateness (and environmental dependence too). Philosophical Psychology, 21(3), 415-424. doi:10.1080/09515080802201203
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  Griffiths and Machery contend that the concept of innateness should be dispensed with in the sciences. We contend that, once that concept is properly understood as what we have called ‘closed process invariance’, it is still of significant use in the sciences, especially cognitive science.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2008). Naturalism and Intuitions: Commentary on Steven Hales, Relativism and the Foundations of Philosophy. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16(2), 263-270. doi:10.1080/09672550802008773
• Alexander, J., & Weinberg, J. M. (2007). Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy. Philosophy Compass, 2(1), 56-80. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00048.x
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  It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement –experimental philosophy– has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that holds between experimental philosophy and the future of standard philosophical practice (what we call, the proper foundation view and the restrictionist view), discuss some of the more interesting and important results obtained by proponents of both views, and examine the pressure these results put on analytic philosophers to reform standard philosophical practice. We will also defend experimental philosophy from some recent objections, suggest future directions for work in experimental philosophy, and suggest what future lines of epistemological response might be available to those wishing to defend analytic epistemology from the challenges posed by experimental philosophy.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2007). How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 31(1), 318-343. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.2007.00157.x
• Weinberg, J. M. (2007). Moderate Epistemic Relativism and Our Epistemic Goals. Episteme, 4(1), 66-92. doi:10.3366/epi.2007.4.1.66
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  Although radical forms of relativism are perhaps beyond the epistemological pale, I argue here that a more moderate form may be plausible, and articulate the conditions under which moderate epistemic relativism could well serve our epistemic goals. In particular, as a result of our limitations as human cognizers, we find ourselves needing to investigate the dappled and difficult world by means of competing communities of highly specialized researchers. We would do well, I argue, to admit of the existence of unresolvable disputes between such communities, but only so long as there is a sufficient amount of fruitful exchange between them as well. I close with some speculation about when it is or is not legitimate to make an "appeal to discipline": responding to another's argument by saying something like, "we should do it this way, because we are philosophers (/linguists/psychologists/...), and that's just what we do".
• Mallon, R., & Weinberg, J. M. (2006). Innateness as Closed Process Invariance. Philosophy of Science, 73(3), 323-344. doi:10.1086/515414
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  Controversies over the innateness of cognitive structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as cognitive science, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains in dispute. The invariantist approaches of Stich and Sober face counterexample cases of traits that, though developing invariantly across different environments, nonetheless are not held by nativism partisans to count as innate. Appeals to canalization (Ariew) or to psychological primitiveness (Samuels) fail to handle this liberalism problem. We suggest a novel approach to innateness: closed process invariantism.
• Meskin, A., & Weinberg, J. M. (2003). Emotions, fiction, and cognitive architecture. British Journal of Aesthetics, 43(1), 18-34. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.18
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  Recent theorists suggest that our capacity to respond affectively to fictions depends on our ability to engage in simulation: either simulating a character in the fiction, or simulating someone reading or watching the fiction as though it were fact. We argue that such accounts are quite successful at accounting for many of the basic explananda of our affective engagements in fiction. Nontheless, we argue further that simulationist accounts ultimately fail, for simulation involves an ineliminably ego-centred element that is atypical of our experience of fiction. We then draw on recent work in philosophical psychology to articulate a more psychologically plausible account of our emotional engagement with fiction.
• Prinz, J. J., Ramscar, M., Ryder, D., Weinberg, J. M., & Yarlett, D. (2003). Jesse J. Prinz, Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and their Perceptual Basis. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. Metascience, 12(3), 279-303. doi:10.1023/b:mesc.0000005815.50832.47
• Nichols, S., Stich, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29(1), 191-222. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199733477.003.0008
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  In this paper we propose to argue for two claims. The first is that a sizeable group of epistemological projects – a group which includes much of what has been done in epistemology in the analytic tradition – would be seriously undermined if one or more of a cluster of empirical hypotheses about epistemic intuitions turns out to be true. The basis for this claim will be set out in Section 2. The second claim is that, while the jury is still out, there is now a substantial body of evidence suggesting that some of those empirical hypotheses are true. Much of this evidence derives from an ongoing series of experimental studies of epistemic intuitions that we have been conducting. A preliminary report on these studies will be presented in Section 3. In light of these studies, we think it is incumbent on those who pursue the epistemological projects in question to either explain why the truth of the hypotheses does not undermine their projects, or to say why, in light of the evidence we will present, they nonetheless assume that the hypotheses are false. In Section 4, which is devoted to Objections and Replies, we’ll consider some of the ways in which defenders of the projects we are criticizing might reply to our challenge. Our goal, in all of this, is not to offer a conclusive argument demonstrating that the epistemological projects we will be criticizing are untenable. Rather, our aim is to shift the burden of argument.
• Stich, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2001). Jackson's Empirical Assumptions*. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(3), 637-643. doi:10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00081.x
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  Frank Jackson has given us an elegant and important book. It is, by a long shot, the most sophisticated defense of the use of conceptual analysis in philosophy that has ever been offered. But we also we find it a rather perplexing book, for we can't quite figure out what Jackson thinks a conceptual analysis is. And until we get clearer on that, we're not at all sure that conceptual analysis, as Jackson envisions it, is possible. The main reason for our perplexity is that Jackson seems to be making some empirical assumptions about people's intuitions and the psychological mechanisms that give rise to them, though it is far from clear exactly what these empirical assumptions are. Moreover, on what is perhaps the most natural reading, he is making at least one assumption about which many cognitive scientists who study concepts have serious doubts. In the first of our two sections, we will elaborate this theme. Our goal, in that section, is not so much to criticize as to seek clarification. It is a great virtue of this journal's multiple review format that critics can pose questions to authors, and the authors get to reply. So we hope that in his reply Jackson will help us understand his defense of conceptual analysis by explaining more clearly what his empirical assumptions are; and if he is indeed making an assumption that many cognitive scientists would challenge, we hope he will tell us why he thinks that challenge is misguided. In the second section, our stance will be more critical. There is one empirical assumption about which Jackson is admirably clear and explicit. However, we think there is now good reason to think that this assumption is false.
• Weinberg, J. M. (1998). John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), xxiv + 191 pp.. Noûs, 32(2), 247-264. doi:10.1111/0029-4624.00099
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  NoûsVolume 32, Issue 2 p. 247-264 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1996), xxiv + 191 pp. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Jonathan M. Weinberg Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this author Jonathan M. Weinberg, Jonathan M. Weinberg Rutgers UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 17 December 2002 https://doi.org/10.1111/0029-4624.00099AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume32, Issue2June 1998Pages 247-264 RelatedInformation

Proceedings Publications

• Weinberg, J. (2022). Supplementing Herder's Naturalism: Expanding the Senses and Transcending Cultures. In American Society for Aesthetics, 80.

Presentations

• Weinberg, J. M. (2025, July).

  “Fictional Characters Are Just Like You and Me (At Least So Far as Our Brains Are Concerned)”

  . American Society for Aesthetics, Rocky Mountain Division. Santa Fe, NM: American Society for Aesthetics.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2025, June).

  “Fictional Characters Are Just Like You and Me (At Least So Far as Our Brains Are Concerned)”

  . Workshop on Narratives Across Fiction & Non-Fiction. Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Universitet.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2025, March).

  Fictional Characters Are Just Like You and Me (At Least So Far as Our Brains Are Concerned)

  . Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, TN: Rhodes College.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2025, September).

  Fictional Characters are Just Like You and Me (At Least So Far as Our Brains are Concerned)

  . Southern Aesthetics Workshop. University of Georgia, Athens, GA: American Society for Aesthetics.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2023). Calling Fouls in Philosophy. Graduate Seminar in Aesthetics, Guest Lecturer. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2023, Fall). Comment on Stephanie Patridge, "Playing Together: Against the Achievement Model of Games". Southern Aesthetics Workshop IV. Greenville, SC: American Society for Aesthetics.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2023, Summer). Imagination, Affect, and Hanging Up on the [In the fiction] Operator. Society for Philosophy and Psychology. University of Pittsburgh: Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2023, Summer). Sincere Fictional Desires. American Society for Aesthetics, Rocky Mountain Division. Santa Fe, New Mexico: American Society for Aesthetics.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2019, Fall). Emersonian Epistemology, Naturalized?. Invited departmental colloquium. UNLV, Las Vegas, Nevada.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2019, Fall). Emersonian Epistemology, Naturalized?. Invited departmental colloquium. University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2019, Spring). Emersonian Epistemology, Naturalized?. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, Tennessee.
• Weinberg, J. M., & Alexander, J. (2019, Fall). How to Burn an Armchair. Invited departmental colloquium. Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts.
• Weinberg, J. M., & Alexander, J. (2019, Fall). How to Burn an Armchair. Werkmeister Experimental Philosophy Conference. Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2018, December). Off Base: The Case Against Epistemic Basing Relations. Invited departmental colloquium. University of California - Riverside: University of California - Riverside.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2018, March). Off Base: The Case Against Epistemic Basing Relations. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee.
• Nichols, S., & Weinberg, J. M. (2017, June). Experimenting on Essences. Society for Philosophy and Psychology Annual Meeting. Baltimore, Maryland: Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017, July). How to Burn an Armchair: On the Proper Construal of the Restrictionist Challenge in Experimental Philosophy. Australasian Experimental Philosophy Conference. Hamilton, New Zealand: University of Waikato.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017, July). Justification by faith? A (limited) defense of undefended beliefs. Invited colloquium. University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand: University of Auckland.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017, July). Justification by faith? A (limited) defense of undefended beliefs. Invited colloquium. Victoria University, Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2017, September). Philosophical _Déformation professionelle_ and the burden of proof. Conference on Intuitions and the Expertise Defense. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University.
• Weinberg, J. M., & Gjesdal, A. (2017, March). Aesthetic Debunking Arguments. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, Tennessee.
• Nichols, S. B., & Weinberg, J. M. (2016, February). Experimentation on the Autonomy of Essences. The Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Rhodes College, Memphis, TN: The Midsouth Philosophy Conference.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2016, May). Evolutionary Debunking Arguments in Environmental Ethics and Aesthetics. Environmental Ethics and Aesthetics: At the Intersection. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, April). What Can Philosophy Learn From Doing Experiments? A Report on The 'X-Phi' Movement. University of Southern Mississippi "Philosophical Fridays" public colloquium. Hattiesburg, MS: University of Southern Mississippi.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, December). Justification in an Epistemically Fallen World. Colloquium. Riverside, CA: UC Riverside.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, February). All Your Desires in One Box. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, TN.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, June). All Your Desires in One Box. Society for Philosophy & Psychology. Vancouver, BC: Society for Philosophy and Psychology.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, June). Hope as a (methodological) virtue. Colloquium. Cologne, Germany: Department of Philosophy, University of Cologne.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, May). How to Go Positive By Going Negative: Putting Experimental Philosophy to Work. "We Need to Talk": Language & Philosophical Methods. Vienna, Austria: Vienna Forum for Analytic Philosophy.
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  Keynote address
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, September). Are Aesthetic Intuitions Looking Good?. British Society for Aesthetics Annual meeting. Oxford, UK: British Society for Aesthetics.
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  (I wasn't sure how best to describe the "peer review type": the panel proposal had been refereed by the program committee, but once it was accepted, the specific contributions by the three philosophers was not further evaluated.)
• Weinberg, J. M. (2014, Spring). What is the a priori, that thou art mindful of it? (Author Meets Critics on Albert Casullo). Pacific APA. San Diego, CA: American Philosophical Association.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013, Fall). Imagination & Belief, Fiction & Non-Fiction. American Society for Aesthetics National meeting. San Diego, CA.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013, February). The Challenge of Sticking With Intuitions Through Thick and Thin. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, Tennessee.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013, June). What Can Experiments Do For Philosophy?. Philosophies of Philosophy. Dublin, Ireland: University College Dublin & The International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013, Spring). Intuition Nihilism vs. Protean Crypto-Rationalism. Knowledge & Intuitions Workshop. Institute of Philosophy, London, UK.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2013, Spring). What We Can Learn from What We Can’t Imagine. Invited colloquium speaker. Siena College, New York.
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2012-03-01). Epistemic Norms from the Design Stance. Conference in Honor of John Pollock. Tucson.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2012-04-01). Humans as Instruments: Or, The Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy. colloquium at Williams College. Williamstown, MA.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2012-06-01). Humans as Instruments: Or, The Inevitability of Experimental Philosophy. Workshop on Philosophical Insights. London, UK.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2013-04-01). Can Disgust Be Food For Thought?. Pacific Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association. Seattle, WA.
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  Invited speaker for symposium, Aesthetics & Disgust.The interdisciplinary component was a substantial reliance on recent research on the psychology of disgust.;Invited: Yes;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2013-04-01). Can Pragmatism Restore What Experimental Philosophy Destroys?. Midsouth Philosophy Conference. Memphis, TN.
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  ;Your Role: Keynote address;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Weinberg, J. M. (2012, 2013-04-01). Hope as a (methodological) virtue. Perspectives on Philosophical Methodology Workshop. Arche, St. Andrews, UK.
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  Capstone workshop for multiyear Arche project on philosophical methodology;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;

Others

• Weinberg, J. M., Buckwalter, W., Knobe, J., Nichols, S., Pinillos, A., Robbins, P., Sarkissian, H., & Weigel, C. (2012, October). Experimental Philosophy. Oxford Bibliographies Online.
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  ;Your Role: Sole author of section "Metaphilosophy";Electronic: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Each co-author was responsible for one section of the overall bibliography.;Type of Publication: Annotated bibliography;