Kirssa Cline Ryckman

Interests

Teaching

armed conflict, strategic nonviolent conflict, terrorism, human security, beginning statistics

Research

dynamics of non-state conflict, to include nonviolent actions such as protest and nonviolent movements as well as violent actions, including terrorism and civil war

Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• Ryckman, K. L. (2024). When Nonviolent Civil Resistance Campaigns Fail: Demobilized, Escalated and Negotiated Ends. Milton, UK: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003506119

Chapters

• Ryckman, K. L. (2021). Is Violence the Answer? A Pragmatic Approach. In Wicked Problems: The Ethics of Action for Peace, Rights, and Justice. Oxford University Press.
• Ryckman, K. L., & Henshaw, A. (2022). Data Visualization. In Teaching Political Methodology(pp TBD). Cheltenham, UK: Elgar Publishing.

Journals/Publications

• Ryckman, K. C., & Henshaw, A. L. (2025). Women without a tactical advantage: Boko Haram's female suicide bombers. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 42(Issue 6). doi:10.1177/07388942241305235
  More info

  Female suicide bombers are increasingly deployed by terror groups, which is often explained by their tactical advantage: women are more likely to reach their targets and tend to generate higher levels of fatalities. However, the women of Boko Haram – the most prolific user of female suicide attackers – lack this tactical advantage. To address this puzzle, we consider the ways in which alternative motivations to deploy female attackers, including logistical and publicity benefits, undercut this tactical advantage. Boko Haram deploys women, in part, because they are viewed as expendable, yet unwilling and undertrained attackers can lead to fewer fatalities. Women also enjoy a publicity benefit, yet greater media attention can diminish the benefits of being an unsuspected perpetrator over time, increasing the chances that women will be intercepted in when carrying out attacks.
• Ryckman, K. (2020). A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 64(2-3). doi:10.1177/0022002719861707
  More info

  Nonviolent resistance can be a powerful tool for ordinary civilians to transform their governments; however, not all nonviolent movements end in success and many ultimately escalate into violent conflicts. To understand this escalatory process, I begin with the premise that social movements are not unitary actors but a collection of groups with varied preferences on goals and tactics. I argue that escalation is likely when movements have violence-wielding groups among their varied factions, as these groups deal in violence, believe in its utility, and can make the strategic decision to engage in violence as needed. I argue this is particularly likely when the campaign fails to make progress using nonviolent channels, suggesting that nonviolent tactics will not be successful to achieve the group’s goals. Expectations are tested using the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes data and the case of Algeria’s escalation from a nonviolent movement to brutal civil war, and results are generally supportive.
• Ryckman, K. (2020). Lasting peace or temporary calm? Rebel group decapitation and civil war outcomes. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37(2). doi:10.1177/0738894217724135
  More info

  Existing research has found that killing or capturing rebel group leaders can lead to the termination of civil wars. This paper considers the quality of those terminations, examining how wars end and whether this produces a lasting peace or only a temporary reprieve from violence. Decapitation is expected to weaken rebel groups, shifting the balance of power to the government; however, results suggest that killing or capturing a rebel group leader tends to produce termination through inactivity rather than outright government victories. Decapitation is also found to have no effect on the chances of civil war recurrence. This suggests that the removal of rebel group leaders is effective primarily as a short-term strategy that does not tend to generate a lasting peace.
• Ryckman, K., & Braithwaite, J. (2020). Changing horses in midstream: Leadership changes and the civil war peace process. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 37(1). doi:10.1177/0738894217726762
  More info

  We examine the impact of governmental leadership changes on the civil war peace process. In line with the literature on leadership changes and interstate war, we argue that transitions can help overcome lags in the rational updating process, leading to negotiations and termination through negotiated settlements. However, while studies of interstate relations emphasize the role of “outsider” changes that produce new winning coalitions, we argue that owing to the critical nature of credible commitment problems within the civil war peace process, only “insider” changes can generate the benefits of leadership change while mitigating uncertainty generated by leadership turnover. Using existing and original data on changes in governmental leadership, we find support for our expectations. Leadership changes can produce conditions favorable to negotiations and settlements, but only changes from inside the existing regime should be encouraged to avoid prolonging the conflict.
• Ryckman, K. L. (2019). A Turn to Violence: The Escalation of Nonviolent Movements. Journal of Conflict Resolution.
• Ryckman, K. L. (2017). Lasting Peace or Temporary Calm? Rebel Group Decapitation and Civil War Outcomes. Conflict Management and Peace Science.
• Ryckman, K. L., & Maves Braithwaite, J. (2017). Changing Horses in Midstream: Leadership Changes and the Civil War Peace Process. Conflict Management and Peace Science.
• Ryckman, K. L., & Ryckman, M. (2017). All Politics Is Local: The Domestic Agenda of Terror Groups and the Study of Transnational Attacks. Journal of Global Security Studies, 2(1), 55-73. doi:10.1093/jogss/ogw026
• Ryckman, K. L. (2016). Ratification as accommodation? Domestic dissent and human rights treaties. Journal of Peace Research, 53(4), 582-596. doi:10.1177/0022343316630038

Reviews

• Ryckman, K. L. (2020. Review of Protest and Democracy, Arce and Rice (eds).
  More info

  Book review of Democracy and Protest, Arce and Rice (eds), for the journal Terrorism and Political Violence

Case Studies

• Ryckman, K. L. (2018. Using Theory to Transform Quantitative Datasets: Finding a Way to Distinguish Domestic From Transnational Terror Attacks(pp 1-10).

Others

• Maves Braithwaite, J., Earl, J., & Ryckman, K. L. (2020, June). Teach Police Nonviolence. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/teach-police-nonviolence-scholars-say-and-how-to-work-with-local-residents-141013
  More info

  Ryckman, Kirssa Cline, Jennifer Earl, Jessica Maves Braithwaite. 2020. “Teach police nonviolence.” Published with a creative commons license in The Conversation, available at: https://theconversation.com/teach-police-nonviolence-scholars-say-and-how-to-work-with-local-residents-141013 . Published June 24, 2020.
• Ryckman, K. L., Earl, J., & Maves Braithwaite, J. (2020, June). Why the Generals Should Still be Worried. Political Violence at a Glance. https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/06/26/why-the-generals-should-still-be-worried/
  More info

  Braithwaite, Jessica Maves, Jennifer Earl, Kirssa Cline Ryckman. 2020. “Why the Generals Should Still be Worried.” Published in Political Violence at a Glance, available at https://politicalviolenceataglance.org/2020/06/26/why-the-generals-should-still-be-worried/. Published June 25, 2020 .