Martin Dufwenberg

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Chapters

• Dufwenberg, M. (2015). “Maxims for Experimenters”. In Methods of Modern Experimental Economics.
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  Book edited by G. Frechette and A Schotter of NYU
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013). Information Disclosure in Auctions: An Experiment. In The Handbook of Market Design.

Journals/Publications

• Dufwenberg, M. (2021). Tra i Leoni: Revealing the Preferences Behind a Superstition. Journal of Economic Psychology.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2022). Tax Evasion with a Conscience. Journal of Public Economic Theory.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2020). Social Norms with Private Values. Games & Economic Behavior.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2019). Frustration, Aggression & Anger in Leader-Follower Games. Games and Economic Behavior.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2019). Promises, Expectations & Causation. Games and Economic Behavior.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2019). Sealed Envelope Submissions Foster Research Integrity. Revue économique.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2019). The Sound of Silence: A License to be Selfish. Economics Letters.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2017). Honesty and Informal Agreements. Games & Economic Behavior, 102, 269-85.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Patel, A. (2017). “Reciprocity Networks & the Participation Problem,”. Games & Economic Behavior.
• Dufwenberg, M., Kohlin, G., Martinsson, P., & Medhin, H. (2016). “Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict”. Journal of Environmental Econ & Management.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015). “Banking on Experiments?”. Journal of Economic Studies.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Spagnolo, G. (2015). “Legalizing Bribe Giving,”. Economic Inquiry.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2014). “How Werner Güth’s Ultimatum Game Shaped our Understanding of Social Behavior”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
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  We are actually 17 coauthors on this one, including two Nobel Laureates. Georg K and I wrote one of many sections, so I listed Georg.
• Dufwenberg, M., Battigalli, P., & Charness, G. (2013). “Deception: The Role of Guilt,”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.
• Dufwenberg, M., Smith, A., & Essen, M. V. (2013). Hold-up: With a vengeance. Economic Inquiry, 51(1), 896-908.
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  Abstract: When contracts are incomplete or unenforceable, inefficient levels of investment may occur because of hold-up. If individuals care for negative reciprocity, these problems may be reduced, as revenge becomes a credible threat. However, negative reciprocity has this effect only when the investor holds the rights of control of the investment proceeds. We explore this issue analytically, deriving predictions for hold-up games which differ as regards assignment of rights of control. We also test and support these predictions in an experiment. © 2011 Western Economic Association International.
• Chang, L. J., Smith, A., Dufwenberg, M., & Sanfey, A. G. (2011). Triangulating the Neural, Psychological, and Economic Bases of Guilt Aversion. Neuron, 70(3), 560-572.
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  PMID: 21555080;PMCID: PMC3114404;Abstract: Why do people often choose to cooperate when they can better serve their interests by acting selfishly? One potential mechanism is that the anticipation of guilt can motivate cooperative behavior. We utilize a formal model of this process in conjunction with fMRI to identify brain regions that mediate cooperative behavior while participants decided whether or not to honor a partner's trust. We observed increased activation in the insula, supplementary motor area, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and temporal parietal junction when participants were behaving consistent with our model, and found increased activity in the ventromedial PFC, dorsomedial PFC, and nucleus accumbens when they chose to abuse trust and maximize their financial reward. This study demonstrates that a neural system previously implicated in expectation processing plays a critical role in assessing moral sentiments that in turn can sustain human cooperation in the face of temptation. Video Abstract: © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
• Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2011). Participation. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1211-1237.
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  Abstract: We show experimentally that whether and how communication achieves beneficial social outcomes in a hidden-information context depends crucially on whether low-talent agents can participate in a Pareto-improving outcome. Communication is effective (and patterns of lies and truth quite systematic) when this is feasible, but otherwise completely ineffective. We examine the data in light of two potentially relevant behavioral models: cost-of-lying and guilt-fromblame. © The Nobel Foundation 2010.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2011). Game theory. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 2(2), 167-173.
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  Abstract: Game theory is a toolkit for examining situations where decision makers influence each other. I discuss the nature of game-theoretic analysis, the history of game theory, why game theory is useful for understanding human psychology, and why game theory has played a key role in the recent explosion of interest in the field of behavioral economics. © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Dufwenberg, M., Gächter, S., & Hennig-Schmidt, H. (2011). The framing of games and the psychology of play. Games and Economic Behavior, 73(2), 459-478.
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  Abstract: Psychological game theory can provide rational-choice-based framing effects; frames influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivations. We explain this theoretically and explore empirical relevance experimentally. In a 2×2 design of one-shot public good games we show that frames affect subject's first- and second-order beliefs and contributions. From a psychological game-theoretic framework we derive two mutually compatible hypotheses about guilt aversion and reciprocity under which contributions are related to second- and first-order beliefs, respectively. Our results are consistent with either. © 2011 Elsevier Inc.
• Dufwenberg, M., Heidhues, P., Kirchsteiger, G., Riedel, F., & Sobel, J. (2011). Other-regarding preferences in general equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies, 78(2), 613-639.
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  Abstract: We study competitive market outcomes in economies where agents have other-regarding preferences (ORPs). We identify a separability condition on monotone preferences that is necessary and sufficient for one's own demand to be independent of the allocations and characteristics of other agents in the economy. Given separability, it is impossible to identify ORPs from market behaviour: agents behave as if they had classical preferences that depend only on own consumption in competitive equilibrium. If preferences, in addition, depend only on the final allocation of consumption in society, the Second Welfare Theorem holds as long as any increase in resources can be distributed in a way that makes all agents better off. The First Welfare Theorem generally does not hold. Allowing agents to care about their own consumption and the distribution of consumption possibilities in the economy, the competitive equilibria are efficient given prices if and only if there is no Pareto-improving redistribution of income. © The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of Economic Studies Limited.
• Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2010). Bare promises: An experiment. Economics Letters, 107(2), 281-283.
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  Abstract: Is truth-value of a statement what lying aversion is all about? We propose an experimental test and find only limited support. In this context with 'bare promises', we also test for guilt aversion and again find only limited support. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
• Dufwenberg, M., Sundaram, R., & Butler, D. J. (2010). Epiphany in the Game of 21. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 75(2), 132-143.
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  Abstract: Does performance in strategic settings depend on whether players realize that an optimal way to play is feasible? We introduce a zero-sum game of perfect information, simple enough to allow computation of optimal play yet sufficiently complicated that most participants initially fail. This borderline solvability-by-humans makes it a suitable research tool for experimentally evaluating if play is affected by whether it dawns on a subject that an analytic solution may be possible. Our design includes a way to control for such insight. We also examine how learning transfer across games affects subsequent learning towards optimization. Applications include the facilitation of learning how to plan ahead when actions are needed today but the consequences are temporally distant. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.
• Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2009). Dynamic psychological games. Journal of Economic Theory, 144(1), 1-35.
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  Abstract: The motivation of decision makers who care for various emotions, intentions-based reciprocity, or the opinions of others may depend directly on beliefs (about choices, beliefs, or information). Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti [J. Geanakoplos, D. Pearce, E. Stacchetti, Psychological games and sequential rationality, Games Econ. Behav. 1 (1989) 60-79] point out that traditional game theory is ill-equipped to address such matters, and they pioneer a new framework which does. However, their toolbox - psychological game theory - incorporates several restrictions that rule out plausible forms of belief-dependent motivation. Building on recent work on dynamic interactive epistemology, we propose a more general framework. Updated higher-order beliefs, beliefs of others, and plans of action may influence motivation, and we can capture dynamic psychological effects (such as sequential reciprocity, psychological forward induction, and regret) that were previously ruled out. We develop solution concepts, provide examples, explore properties, and suggest avenues for future research. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Harrison, G. W. (2008). Peter Bohm: Father of field experiments. Experimental Economics, 11(3), 213-220.
• Apesteguia, J., Dufwenberg, M., & Selten, R. (2007). Blowing the whistle. Economic Theory, 31(1), 143-166.
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  Abstract: Leniency clauses, offering cartelists legal immunity if they blow the whistle on each other, is a recent anti-trust innovation. The authorities wish to thwart cartels and promote competition. This effect is not evident, however; whistle-blowing may enforce trust and collusion by providing a tool for cartelists to punish each other. We examine the impact of leniency law, and other rules, experimentally. © Springer-Verlag 2007.
• Battigalli, P., & Dufwenberg, M. (2007). Guilt in games. American Economic Review, 97(2), 170-176.
• Dufwenberg, M., Gneezy, U., Goeree, J. K., & Nagel, R. (2007). Price floors and competition. Economic Theory, 33(1), 211-224.
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  Abstract: A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this can matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. According to traditional theory, a higher floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits. Behaviorally, the opposite result obtains with two (but not with four) competitors. An error model, which builds on Luce (Individual Choice Behavior, 1959), can adequately describe supra-Nash pricing with a low-floor, but then fails to capture the overall pro-competitive effect of a high-floor seen for duopolies. © 2006 Springer-Verlag.
• Charness, G., & Dufwenberg, M. (2006). Promises and partnership. Econometrica, 74(6), 1579-1601.
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  Abstract: We examine experimentally the impact of communication on trust and cooperation. Our design admits observation of promises, lies, and beliefs. The evidence is consistent with people striving to live up to others' expectations so as to avoid guilt, as can be modeled using psychological game theory. When players exhibit such guilt aversion, communication may influence motivation and behavior by influencing beliefs about beliefs. Promises may enhance trustworthy behavior, which is what we observe. We argue that guilt aversion may be relevant for understanding strategic interaction in a variety of settings, and that it may shed light on the role of language, discussions, agreements, and social norms in these contexts.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Gender composition in teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61(1), 50-54.
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  Abstract: How does gender composition influence team decisions? Our evidence from a group dictator game is: (i) groups are more generous and equalitarian when women are in majority, but (ii) the most generous groups are those with two men and one woman. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Muren, A. (2006). Generosity, anonymity, gender. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61(1), 42-49.
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  Abstract: We examine experimentally how a person's generosity depends on the degree of anonymity between giver and recipient, as well as on the parties' sexes. Less is given when the giver is paid on stage rather than in private; men receive less than women; fewer men than women give non-zero amounts. The results suggest that it may be problematic to organize experimental data in terms of social distance. © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Dufwenberg, M., Lindqvist, T., & Moore, E. (2005). Bubbles and experience: An experiment. American Economic Review, 95(5), 1731-1737.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268-298.
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  Abstract: Many experimental studies indicate that people are motivated by reciprocity. Rabin [Amer. Econ. Rev. 83 (1993) 1281] develops techniques for incorporating such concerns into game theory and economics. His theory is developed for normal form games, and he abstracts from information about the sequential structure of a strategic situation. We develop a theory of reciprocity for extensive games in which the sequential structure of a strategic situation is made explicit, and propose a new solution concept - sequential reciprocity equilibrium - for which we prove an equilibrium existence result. The model is applied in several examples, and it is shown that it captures very well the intuitive meaning of reciprocity as well as certain qualitative features of experimental evidence. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Asheim, G. B., & Dufwenberg, M. (2003). Admissibility and common belief. Games and Economic Behavior, 42(2), 208-234.
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  Abstract: The concept of 'fully permissible sets' is defined by an algorithm that eliminates strategy subsets. It is characterized as choice sets when there is common certain belief of the event that each player prefer one strategy to another if and only if the former weakly dominates the latter on the set of all opponent strategies or on the union of the choice sets that are deemed possible for the opponent. The concept refines the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and captures aspects of forward induction. © 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
• Asheim, G. B., & Dufwenberg, M. (2003). Deductive reasoning in extensive games. Economic Journal, 113(487), 305-325.
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  Abstract: We justify the application to extensive games of a model of deductive reasoning based on three key features: 'caution', 'full belief of opponent rationality', and 'no extraneous restrictions on beliefs'. We apply the model to several examples, and show that it yields novel economic insights. The approach supports forward induction, without necessarily promoting backward induction.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2002). Marital investments, time consistency and emotions. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48(1), 57-69.
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  Abstract: A benchmark model of a married couple's educational investment yields an inefficient outcome due to the possibility of opportunistic divorce. Motivated by findings in social psychology, I use psychological game theory to incorporate belief-dependent guilt feelings. Multiple equilibria become possible. Some marriages have inefficient under-investment. Some have efficient outcomes and preclude divorce. If guilt is sufficiently important, a life-long efficient marriage is implied because a spouse may signal a trust so strong as to force the partner to hold beliefs that make divorce unattractive. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2002). Information disclosure in auctions: An experiment. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48(4), 431-444.
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  Abstract: We report experimental results on the importance of information disclosure policy in first-price sealed-bid auctions. Interaction takes place in 10 periods according to a random-matching protocol, and we control the level of information feedback bidders receive after each period. When bidders are informed about the losing bids in previous periods, prices are higher than the theoretical prediction. However, when this information is not revealed the bidding becomes more competitive, and the bids come close to the theoretical prediction. We suggest that a signaling phenomenon may be important for explaining these results. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Stegeman, M. (2002). “Existence and Uniqueness of Maximal Reductions under Iterated Strict Dominance,”. Econometrica.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2001). Direct vs Indirect Reciprocity: An Experiment. Homo Oeconomicus.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2001). Review: Ariel Rubinstein’s Modeling Bounded Rationality. Economics & Philosophy.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2001). Teaching Cournot without derivatives. Journal of Economic Education, 32(1), 36-40.
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  Abstract: The author presents a simple technique for teaching the Cournot model to first-year students. The approach involves demonstrating to the students that out of all rectangles with a common perimeter, the square has the greatest area. No use is made of derivatives. The same approach can be used to understand some other market forms.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Lundholm, M. (2001). Social norms and moral hazard. Economic Journal, 111(473), 506-525.
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  Abstract: We examine the impact of social rewards in an unemployment insurance context. A social norm requires effort in proportion to perceived talent, but individuals cunningly choose effort so as to manipulate the perception of their talent. The model predicts that low talented individuals increase effort in response to more generous unemployment insurance. The welfare consequences of the social rewards are ambiguous. Social rewards boost effort, but for individuals with low talent more than any real economic concern can justify. Moreover, the distribution of social respect is slanted in favour of the more talented.
• Dufwenberg, M., Norde, H., Reijnierse, H., & Tijs, S. (2001). The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 54(1), 119-131.
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  Abstract: We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000). Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game. Games and Economic Behavior, 30(2), 163-182.
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  Abstract: We measure beliefs in an experimental game. Player 1 may take x
• Dufwenberg, M., & Gneezy, U. (2000). Price competition and market concentration: An experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 18(1), 7-22.
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  Abstract: The classical price competition model (named after Bertrand), prescribes that in equilibrium prices are equal to marginal costs. Moreover, prices do not depend on the number of competitors. Since this outcome is not in line with real-life observations, it is known as the 'Bertrand Paradox.' In experimental price competition markets we find that prices do depend on the number of competitors: the Bertrand solution does not predict well when the number of competitors is two, but (after some opportunities for learning) predicts well when the number of competitors is three or four. A bounded rationality explanation of this is suggested. © Elsevier Science B.V.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Güth, W. (2000). Why do you hate me?: On the survival of spite. Economics Letters, 67(2), 147-152.
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  Abstract: Spite involves harming others without good reasons. It may survive in small populations or on markets with strategic substitutes. We consider situations where selfishness helps efficiency. Here spite endangers efficiency, but is wiped out by evolutionary forces. © Elsevier Science S.A.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Kirchsteiger, G. (2000). Reciprocity and wage undercutting. European Economic Review, 44(4-6), 1069-1078.
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  Abstract: It is well documented that employers refuse to hire workers who offer their services at less than the prevailing wage. The received explanation is that workers are motivated by reciprocity - they desire to reward kindness and punish hostility. To refuse an outsider's underbid is viewed as a kind choice that is met with good effort; a low wage is viewed as an insult that is met with shirking. We have developed a general theory of reciprocity which in this paper is applied to a wage-setting game played by an employer and two workers. We show that when workers are motivated by reciprocity, equilibrium behaviour accords well with the aforementioned stylized facts. (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
• Voorneveld, M., Grahn, S., & Dufwenberg, M. (2000). Ideal equilibria in noncooperative multicriteria games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 52(1), 65-77.
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  Abstract: Pareto equilibria in multicriteria games can be computed as the Nash equilibria of scalarized games, obtained by assigning weights to the separate criteria of a player. To analysts, these weights are usually unknown. This paper therefore proposes ideal equilibria, strategy profiles that are robust against unilateral deviations of the players no matter what importance is assigned to the criteria. Existence of ideal equilibria is not guaranteed, but several desirable properties are provided. As opposed to the computation of other solution concepts in noncooperative multicriteria games, the computation of the set of ideal equilibria is relatively simple: an exact upper bound for the number of scalarizations is the maximum number of criteria of the players. The ideal equilibrium concept is axiomatized. Moreover, the final section provides a non-trivial class of multicriteria games in which ideal equilibria exist, by establishing a link to the literature on potential games.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Güth, W. (1999). Indirect evolution vs. strategic delegation: A comparison of two approaches to explaining economic institutions. European Journal of Political Economy, 15(2), 281-295.
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  Abstract: Two major methods of explaining economic institutions are compared for the case of a homogenous quadratic duopoly market. In the indirect evolutionary approach, sellers may evolve to care for sales, in addition to profit. In the strategic delegation approach, sellers may design incentives so that their agents care for sales. The two approaches model different phenomena, but both allow certain kinds of commitment. We investigate under what circumstances the two approaches lead to similar market outcomes. The results underscore the technical similarities as well as the conceptual differences between the two approaches.
• Dufwenberg, M. (1997). Some relationships between evolutionary stability criteria in games. Economics Letters, 57(1), 45-50.
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  Abstract: The relations between several evolutionary stability criteria are studied.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Lindén, J. (1996). Inconsistencies in extensive games: Common knowledge is not the issue. Erkenntnis, 45(1), 103-114.
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  Abstract: In certain finite extensive games with perfect information, Cristina Bicchieri (1989) derives a logical contradiction from the assumptions that players are rational and that they have common knowledge of the theory of the game. She argues that this may account for play outside the Nash equilibrium. She also claims that no inconsistency arises if the players have the minimal beliefs necessary to perform backward induction. We here show that another contradiction can be derived even with minimal beliefs, so there is no paradox of common knowledge specifically. These inconsistencies do not make play outside Nash equilibrium plausible, but rather indicate that the epistemic specification must incorporate a system for belief revision. Whether rationality is common knowledge is not the issue. © 1996 Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Presentations

• Dufwenberg, M. (2021, January). Regret Games. Seminar at the Berlin Behavioral Economics Seminar Series (Zoom).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2021, October). Regret Games. Seminar at U Iowa (Zoom).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2020, August). Peer Evaluation Tournaments. Middlebury U (MiddExLab Virtual Seminar Series; Zoom).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2020, January). Regret Games. South Western Economic Theory (SWET).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2020, November). Regret Games. Seminar at Duke/UNC.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2017, August). Frustration & Anger in Games. 68°North Conference on Behavioral Economics. Lofoten Islands, Norway.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2017, July). Frustration & Anger in Games. 2nd Workshop + Summer School on Psychological Game Theory, Co-Organizer & Invited Special Lecturer. University of East Anglia.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2017, May). Promises, Expectations, and Causation. 2nd BEG Workshop on Behavioural and Experimental Economics,. University of Gothenburg.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2017, October). Lies in Disguise – A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating. University of Southern California Economics Department Seminar. Los Angeles, CA.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2018, January). Frustration & Anger in Games. Georgia State University. Atlanta, GA.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2018, October). Lies in Disguise – A Theoretical Analysis of Cheating. UC Merced Economics Department Seminar. Merced, CA.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Fall). King of the Hill. Bocconi University seminar talk.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Fall). King of the Hill. CESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics. Munich, Germany.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Spring). King of the Hill. 1st BEGG Workshop on Behavioural & Experimental Economics. University of Gothenburg.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Spring). Triggering Cooperation. Gary’s Experimental Economics Conference. UC Santa Barbara.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Gothenburg Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2016, Summer). Tax Evasion with a Conscience. 1st Workshop on Psychological Game Theory (Co-Organizer). University of Gothenburg.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Fall). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Michigan (SBEE seminar: social, behavioral, experimental economics).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Fall). Reciprocity Networks & the Participation Problem. CESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics. Munich, Germany.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. Tilburg University Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. UC Santa Barbara Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Amsterdam.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Lancaster.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Milan-Statale.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). Providing Incentives for Sound Scientific Practice: The Case for Sealed-Envelope-Submissions. Science Communication and Information. Bocconi University.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. University of Vienna.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games and Honesty & Informal Agreements. SITE: Psychology & Economics & Experimental Econ. Stanford University.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. Uppsala University Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Summer). Triggering Cooperation. Einaudi Institute for Economics & Finance (EIEF). Rome.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2015, Summer). Triggering Cooperation. Stockholm School of Economics, SITE.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. ECARES, Universitè Libre de Bruxelles Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Fall). Frustration & Anger in Games. Carlos III University of Madrid Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Fall). Reciprocity Networks & the Participation Problem. University of Marseille Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Fall). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. University of Verona Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. European University Institute, Florence, Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). Blowing the Whistle. Bocconi University, Dept of Legal Studies Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. Advances in Behavioral Economics. Sapienza University of Rome.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. Einaudi Institute for Economics & Finance (EIEF).
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Zürich Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). Legalizing Bribe Giving. University of Gothenburg Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Geir Asheim’s Birthday Conference. University of Oslo.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Institutions, Games & Experiments. Max Planck Institute.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. 10th CSEF-IGIER Symposium on Economics & Institutions. Anacapri.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Leicester.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Nottingham Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Summer). Frustration & Anger in Games. University of Oxford Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2014, Summer). Leadership in the Lab. Festival Economia, “Growth of the Ruling Class". Trento.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Fall). ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Maastricht University Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Fall). Hold-Up: With a Vengeance. University of Gothenburg Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. South Western Economic Theory (SWET) Conference. Honolulu, HI.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). Psychological Games. Rady School of Management, UCSD, Lecture.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Indiana University Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. South Western Economic Theory (SWET). Honolulu, HI.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Spring). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Southern Methodist University Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2013, Summer). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. University of Gothenburg Seminar.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2012, Fall). Banking on Experiments. Seminar on Banking Issues, Norwegian Ministry of Finance. Oslo.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2012, Fall). Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict. CESifo Area Conference on Behavioural Economics. Munich, Germany.
• Dufwenberg, M. (2012, Fall). “ABC on Deals” [title on paper later changed to “Honesty & Informal Agreements”]. Economic Science Association Conference. Tucson, AZ.

Others

• Dufwenberg, M. (2020, December). Den skyddande effekten av munskydd är stor. Dagens Medicin.
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  This is an op-ed published in a Swedish periodical read by healthcare professionals (j/w a 9 coauthors from medicine, biology, and economics) criticizing the Swedish public health authority for its recommendations as regards the (non-)use of face macks in the COVID-19 pandemic.
• Dufwenberg, M., & Ockenfels, A. (2014, YES). "Introduction". Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 108, 290-1. [Special issue: Institutions, Games & Experiments, in Werner Güth’s Honor].
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