Michael S McKenna

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• McKenna, M. S. (2021). Forgiveness and its Moral Dimensions. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M., & Pereboom, D. (2016). Free Will: An Introduction. Routledge.
  More info

  Derk Pereboom and I are coauthoring an advanced introductory text on free will. It is under contract with Routledge.
• McKenna, M., Smith, A., & Clarke, R. (2015). The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
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  Edited a collection of 12 articles on the nature of moral responsibility. ;Other collaborative: Yes;Please specify if you select "Other collaborative" : Angie Smith, Washington & Lee College; Randolph Clarke, Florida State University;Full Citation: Actually it is under contract but the papers are not all drafted yet. This is a collection we are eiditing. ;Status: Under contract with OUP
• McKenna, M. S. (2012). Conversation & Responsibility. New York: OUP.
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  I defend a new theory of moral responsibility.;Your Role: Author.;Full Citation: 2012. Conversation & Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press.;

Chapters

• McKenna, M. S. (2022). Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket. In Fittingness. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2022). Guilt & Self-Blame within a Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility. In Self-blame and Moral Responsibility(pp 151-74). Cambridge University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2022). Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism. In Oxford Handbook on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2022). Reasons-Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability. In Oxford Handbook on Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2019). Watsonian Compatibilism. In Oxford Studies in Agnecy and Responsibility, Vol. 5. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2018). Power, Social Inequities, and the Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility. In Social Dimensions of Moral Responsbility. Oxford University Press.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017). Reasons-Responsive Theories of Freedom. In Routledge Handbook on Free Will. Routledge.
  More info

  This was a review piece for a handbook. It was devoted to explaining reasons-responsive theories of freedom.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017). Theories of Moral Responsibility and the Responsibility Barter Game. In Of Morals and Merels: Essays Inspired by the Work of Peter A. French. Springer.
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  I defended my theory of moral responsibility in light of Peter French's anti-theoretical view about moral responsibility.
• McKenna, M. S. (2015). In Defense of a Challenge to Moral Responsibility Skepticism: A Reply to Levy. In Agency and Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillian.
  More info

  This is a small, 1200 word reply to an article by Neil Levy critically assessing my 2012 book.
• McKenna, M. S., & Kozuch, B. (2015). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness. In Philosophy and Psychiatry. Routledge.
• McKenna, M. S., & Van Schoelandt, C. (2015). Crossing a Mesh Theory with a Reasons- Responsive Theory. In Agency and Responsibility. Palgrave Macmillian.
• McKenna, M. S. (2014). Compatibilist Ultimacy: Resisting the Threat of Kane's U Condition.. In New Debates on Libtertarian Free Will. New York: OUP.
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  I contribute to a Festschrift for Robert Kane and argue that there is a notion of ultimacy that compatibilists can defend, something Kane denies.;Your Role: Author.;
• McKenna, M. (2013). Directed Blame and Conversation. In Blame: Its Nature and Norms(pp 119-40). New York: OUP.
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  In this paper, I apply my theory of moral responsibility to the nature of what I called directed blame, which is overt blame intentionally directed at the blamed party.;
• McKenna, M. S. (2013). Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms. In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility(pp 151-84). OUP.
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  I defend a new version of a reasons-responsive theory of moral responsibility. This will appear in a collection on Agency & Responsibility edited by D. Shoemaker.;Your Role: Author.;
• McKenna, M., & Warmke, B. (2013). Moral Responsibility, Forgiveness, and Conversation. In Free Will and Moral Responsibility(pp 189-212). New Castle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Series.
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  Brandon Warmke and I coauthored a piece on the nature forgiveness for a Cambridge Scholars Series book edited by I. Haji and J. Coquette. In it we defend a communicative theory of forgiveness.;Your Role: Co-author;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;
• McKenna, M. (2011). Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories. In The Oxford Handbook on Free Will(pp 175-198). New York: OUP.
  More info

  An article on a range of theories in the free will debate.;Full Citation: 2011. Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories. In R. Kane, ed., 2011, Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press): 175-98.

Journals/Publications

• McKenna, M. S. (2021). On Manipulation and History-Sensitive Compatibilism. Criminal Law and Philosophy, 15, 285-98.
• McKenna, M. S. (2021). Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theories. The Monist, 104(4), 510-25.
• McKenna, M. S. (2020). A Lost Lesson in Keith Lehrer’s Reply to the Consequence Argument. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 97(4), 545-58.
• McKenna, M. S. (2020). Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering. Public Affairs Quarterly.
• McKenna, M. S. (2019). Basically Deserved Blame and its Value.. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 15(3), 255-82.
• McKenna, M. S. (2019). Further Reflections on the Free Will Debate and Basic Desert: A Reply to Nelkin and Pereboom.. Journal of Ethics.
  More info

  This was a brief paper written as a reply to two critics, Dana Nelkin and Derk Pereboom, who responded to my paper "The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert." My original paper, their critical replies to me, and my reply to both of them appeared in the same issue.
• McKenna, M. S. (2019). The Free Will Debate and Basic Desert. Journal of Ethics.
• McKenna, M. S. (2018). A Critcal Assessment of Pereboom's Frankfurt-Style Argument. Philosophical Studies.
• McKenna, M. S. (2018). Resisting Todd's Moral-Standing Zygote Argument. Philosophical Quarterly.
• McKenna, M. S. (2018). Shoemaker's Responsibility Pluralism. Philosophical Studies.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017). Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?". Journal of Moral Philosophy.
• McKenna, M. S. (2016). A Modest Historical Theory of Moral Responsibility. Journal of Ethics.
  More info

  In this paper, I explore an historical theory of moral responsibility after for years defending a nonhistorical one.;
• McKenna, M. S. (2016). Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.. Criminal Law and Philosophy.
  More info

  I wrote a critical review of Derk Pereboom's 2014 book (a full journal article).
• McKenna, M. S. (2016). Quality of Will, Private Blame and Conversation: Reply to Driver, Shoemaker, and Vargas.. Criminal Law and Philosophy.
  More info

  I responded to critics in a symposium on my 2012 book on moral responsibility.
• McKenna, M. (2014). A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
  More info

  I have criticized Derk Pereboom's Four-Case Argument with a hard-line reply. He has replied, and I have now countered in a manner that calls into question the credibility of his appeal to fanciful manipulation cases.;I also reported this as published in 2013 when it was 2014 (this is due to the way journals will release on-line versions prior to the official publication date).
• McKenna, M. (2014). Defending Conversation and Responsibility: A Reply to Dana Nelkin and Holy Smith. Philosophical Studies.
  More info

  I included this last year listing 2013 as the year of publication. I was mistaken. It is 2014. I don't want it to be counted twice in my evaluation.
• McKenna, M. (2013). Source Compatibilism and that Pesky Ability to do Otherwise: Ccomments on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility. Philosophical Studies, 162, 1050116.
• McKenna, M. S. (2013). Seven Questions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility. Methode: Analytic Perspectives, 2(3), 98-111.
• McKenna, M. S. (2012). Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers. Philosophical Issues.
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  I defend the thesis that a compatibilist theory of freedom does not require a historical condition. I do so in response to Haji & Cuypers, who argue against me.;Your Role: Author.;Full Citation: 2012. “Defending Nonhistorical Compatibilism: A Reply to Haji and Cuypers.”Philosophical Issues, vol. 22: 264-80.;
• McKenna, M. S. (2012). Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. Journal of Ethics.
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  I defend the thesis that a compatibilist theory of freedom does not require a historical condition. I do so in response to Mele, who argues against me.;Your Role: Author.;Full Citation: 2012. “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism.” Journal of Ethics.;
• McKenna, M. S. (2014). The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Ballaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Question. Philosophical Studies.
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  I assess Mark Balaguer's book and resist his argument that the compatibilism/incompatibilism question is not an interesting metaphysical one. NOTE: Don't have easy access to the publication version, but it is already in print.;Your Role: Author.;Full Citation: 2012. “The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question: Comments on Mark Ballaguer's Free Will as an Open Scientific Question.” Philosophical Studies Online 3/14/2012.;
• McKenna, M. S., & Haji, I. (2011). Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 400-414.
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  My coauthor and I argue against a view that the extended-mind thesis can be used to show that agents in Frankfurt examples lose freedom-conferring abilities.;Your Role: equally contributing co-author;Full Citation: 2011 with Ishtiyaque Haji. Disenabling Levy's Frankfurt-style Enabling Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92: 400-14.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Ish Haji, Professor of Philosophy at U of Calgary;
• McKenna, M. S. (2010). Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? Getting the Dialectic Right.. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  Kadri Vihvelin and I disagree about compatibilism's dialectical burdens and which incompatibilist arguments are worthy of serious attention. I wrote an article defending my position in opposition to hers. ;Full Citation: 2010. “Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments? Getting the DialecticRight.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88.3: 429-43. ;

Presentations

• McKenna, M. S. (2021, April). Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket?. Murphy Institute, Center for Ethics and Public Affairs. New Orleans, LA: Murphy Institute, Center for Ethics and Public Affairs.
• McKenna, M. S. (2021, January). Fittingness as a Pitiful Intellectualist Trinket?. Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project. Lund, Sweden: Lund-Gothenburg Responsibility Project.
• McKenna, M. S. (2021, June). Commentator on Shawn Wang's "Blame Conflict". LATAM Free Will, Agency, and Responsibility Project. Universidad de los Andes, Bogota, Columbia: LATAM Free Will, Agency, and Responsibility Project, Universidad de los Andes.
• McKenna, M. S. (2020, January). Guilt and Self-blame within a Conversation Theory of Moral Responsibility. University of Michigan Mind and Moral Psychology Conference. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Dept of Philosophy.
  More info

  This was a keynote address.
• McKenna, M. S. (2018, April/Spring). Free Will by Way of Responsiveness to Reasons. Colloquium presentation. Houston, TX: Rice University, Department of Philosophy.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017, 01/Winter). Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering. Colloquium Talk. Portland, Oregon: Department of Philosophy, University of Portland.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017, 03/Spring). Accountability and Pluralism. Author-meets-critics Session on David Shoemaker's *Responsibility from the Margins*. Kansas City, KS: American Philosophical Azzociation, Central Division.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017, 04/Spring). Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering. Colloquium Talk. Milwaukess, WI: Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017, 05/Spring). Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering. Workshiop on Responsbility, Conversation, and Communication. Gothenberg, Sweded: Gothenberg University, Philosophy Department.
• McKenna, M. S. (2017, 10/Fall). Punishment and the Value of Deserved Suffering. FSU Graduate Student Conference. Tallahassee, FL: Department of Philosophy, Florida State University.
• McKenna, M. S. (2016, August 2016). "Basic Desert, Blame, and Free Will" Keynote lecture. Gorhenberg Responsibility Conference 2016. Gothenberg, Sweden: Gothenberg University.
• McKenna, M. S. (2016, July / 2016). "Resisting Todd's Manipulation Argument". Manipulation and Moral Responsibility in Ethics and Philosophy of Religion. Edinburgh, Scotland.
• McKenna, M. S. (2016, June / 2016). "Punishmnent and the Value of Deserved Sufferning". Justice without Retriubution Conference. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Dept of Philosophy.
  More info

  I gave a talk defending retributivist theories of punishment to a bunch of wussies who are against it. Man did I make them pay!
• McKenna, M. S. (2016, March/Spring). Crossing a Mesh and a Reasons-Responsive Theory. New Orleans Invitational Seminar in Ethics. New Orleans: Tulane University.
  More info

  I defended my new hybrid theory of free will and responsibility.
• McKenna, M. S. (2016, November/ 2016). "Watsonian Compatibilism". Gary Watson Conference (a conference celebrating the work of Gary Watson). New Orleans, LA: Murphy Institute, Tulane Unviversity.
• McKenna, M. S. (2015, Octgober/Fall). How Free Are We? A Compatibilist View. Mid-Hudson Undergraduate Philosophy Conference. Poughkeepsie, NY: Marist College.
  More info

  I gave a keynote address at an undergraduate conference. That was cool.
• McKenna, M. S. (2014, April). Comments on Seth Shabo's "Is the Problme of Luck the Compatibilists' Problem Too?". APA Pacific meetings. San Diego: American Philosophical Association.
• McKenna, M. S. (2014, February). Comments on Manuel Vargas's "Less than Fully Responsible". APA Central Meetings. Chicago, IL: Society for the Philosophy of Agency.
• McKenna, M. S. (2014, March). Comments on David Shoemaker's "Ecumenical Responsibility". New Orleans Invitational Seminar in Ethics. New Orleans: Murphy Institute at Tulane.
• McKenna, M. S. (2014, September). How Free Are We? A Compatibilist View. Midwest Philosophy Colloquium. Morris, MN: Department of Philosophy, U of Minnesota, Morris.
• McKenna, M. (2013, March). Basic Desert, Blame, and Free Will. Moral Responsibility and Free Will. Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Department of Philosophy.
• McKenna, M. (2013, March). Defending Conversation and Responsibility: Reply to Nelkin, Sher, and Smith. APA Pacific Meetings, Author-meets-critics session. San Francisco, CA: APA.
• McKenna, M. (2013, November). Reasons-Responsiveness and the Sources of Agency. Tennessee Value and Agency 2013 Conference. Knoxville, TN: Department of Philosophy, U Tennessee, Knoxville.
  More info

  I was a keynote speaker. It was an honor.
• McKenna, M. S. (2013, September). The Conversational Theory of Moral Responsibility and the Conditions of Agency. Departmental Talk. El Paso, Texas: Department of Philosophy, UT El Paso.
• McKenna, M. S. (2012, 2012-03-01). A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Bowling Green Workshop in Applied Ethics. Bowling Green, OH.
  More info

  I presented my most recent criticism of Derk Pereboom's manipulation argument. ;Refereed: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• McKenna, M. S. (2012, 2012-04-01). Defending Conversation & Responsibility,. Murphy Institute at Tulane. New Orleans, LA.
  More info

  I gave a talk on the main themes of my book. Then I spent to days at Jazzfest. That was cool.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2012, 2012-04-01). Resisting Nelkin's Asymmetrical Compatibilist Proposal,. American Philosophical Association. Seatle, WA.
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  I presented a paper as a critic of Dana Nelkin's book on free will.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• McKenna, M. S. (2012, 2012-09-01). Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin. Dept Philosophy, VCU. Richmond, VA.
  More info

  I gave a talk on my dispute with Derk Pereboom over the Manipulation Argument;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2012, 2012-11-01). Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms. Conference on Alternatives, Belief, and Action, University of Valencia. Valencia, Spain.
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  Presented my paper defending my reasons-responsive theory of freedom.I also gave a distinct presentation on my book C&R. I'll not list this as a distinct entry.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-03-01). A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Dept of Philosophy, U if TN. Knoxville, TN.
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  Talk presented to the full philosophy department.;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-03-01). “Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History”. Dept of Philosophy, Research Group. Knoxville, TN.
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  I did an extensive seminar/presentation on my views about the historical-nonhistorical debate regarding responsibility. Two published articles came out of this (and one under review).;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-04-01). A Compatibilist Account of Freedom and Responsibility. Public Debate with Free Will Skeptic. Salisbury, Maryland.
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  I defended free will and naturalism against Derk Pereboom's skeptical view that on one has free will. This was at a public forum sponsored by Salisbury College.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-04-01). The Metaphysical Importance of the Compatibility Question. APA, Pacifc Division Meetings. San Diego, CA.
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  I was a critic for Mark Balaguer's book symposium, and I argued that the compatibility question is an interesting metaphysical one.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Professional Organization;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-09-01). A Hardliner Takes it on the Chin: Resisting Pereboom's Four-Case Manipulation Argument. Dept of Philosophy, CSULA. Los Angeles, CA.
  More info

  I presented my reply to Derk Pereboom.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-09-01). Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms. Dept of Philosophy, UT. Austin, TX.
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  I presented my agent-based theory of reasons-responsiveness.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2011-11-01). Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents, and Mechanisms. New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility. New Orleans, LA.
  More info

  I presented my views on an agent-based theory of responsiveness to reasons.;Submitted: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• McKenna, M. S. (2011, 2012-02-01). Intuitions Near and Far: The Dubious Status of Manipulation Cases in Arguments for Incompatibilism. Brown Bag. U of A.
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  I gave a brief presentation on status of intuitions in arguments for incompatibilism.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2010, 2010-04-01). Holding Morally Responsible & the Moral Emotions. Univ of AZ.
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  I gave a talk to the Brown Bag series for the Philosophy Department while visiting Tucson (was planning my relocation at the time). ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• McKenna, M. S. (2010, 2010-09-01). Freedom, Responsibility, History. Univ. of AZ.
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  I gave a paper to the department for our speaker's series. ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;