Paul Joseph Schuler

Interests

Research

Politcal behavior in authoritarian regimes, political institutions, Vietnamese politics.

Teaching

Comparative politics, authoritarian regimes, East and Southeast Asia

Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• Schuler, P. J. (2020). United Front: Projecting Solidarity Through Deliberation in Vietnam’s Single-Party Legislature. Stanford University Press.

Chapters

• Schuler, P. J. (2018). Political Representation. In Handbook of Vietnamese Politics.

Journals/Publications

• Schuler, P. J. (2022). Gender and Clientelism: Do Expectations of Patronage Penalize Women Candidates in Legislative Elections?” . Comparative Political Studies, xxx.
• Schuler, P. J., & Westerland, C. L. (2023). Reconsidering the Rubber Stamp Thesis: A Consolidation Theory of Expropriations and Legislatures in Party-based Autocracies. Studies in Comparative International Development.
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  resubmitted to Studies in Comparative International Development after R&R
• Cunha, R., Schuler, P. J., & Williamson, S. (2022). Signal Received? Authoritarian Elections and the Salience of Autocrats. Electoral Studies, XXX.
• Schuler, P. J., & Westerland, C. L. (2022). Reconsidering the Rubber Stamp Thesis: A Consolidation Theory of Oil Expropriations and Legislatures in Party-based Autocracies. Studies in Comparative International Development, xxxx.
• Schuler, P. J., & Truong, M. (2021). The Salience of Northern and Southern Identity in Vietnam. Asian Politics and Policy.
• Gueorguiev, D., & Schuler, P. J. (2020). Collective Charisma: Elite-Mass Relations in China and Vietnam. Problems of Post-Communism.
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  Single-party regimes are regarded as being more durable than their personalistic or narrow coalition counterparts. But how do single-party regimes maintain collective, party-based institutional control. Put differently, how do single-party regimes prevent the rise of strongmen from within their ranks? In this paper, we highlight norms and procedures surrounding promotion that ought to help deter the entry and ascendance of personalistic cadre in the single-party setting. Specifically, we focus on norms concerning elite-mass linkages, cadre rotation, and procedures for intra-party democracy. We probe our theory through in-depth review of promotion patterns and practices in China and Vietnam. While the two regimes employ distinct methods for managing both elite-mass linkages and intra-party promotion, incumbents in both employ methods to thwart the rise personalistic cadre, and we observe and increasing convergence in their methods.
• Lee, D., & Schuler, P. J. (2020). ‘China Model’ of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Autocracies Promote More Competent Ministers than Democracies?”. Comparative Political Studies, 53(3-4), 531-566. doi:10.1177/0010414019858962
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  Proponents of the “China Model” suggest that autocracies, particularly in East Asia, reward competence more than democracies. However, a competing literature argues that autocracies are less likely to reward competence because autocrats fear that competent officials could challenge for power. We argue that autocracies do not fear technical competence; they fear political competence. As such, autocracies may promote ministers with technical competence but punish the politically competent. Democracies, by contrast, place a premium on political competence when deciding whom to promote. We provide the first test of this theory on how ministerial behavior is rewarded using a unique dataset of political performance and promotions in nine East Asian countries. Our findings show that autocracies promote officials with technical competence as long as the ministers limit their political behavior. In democracies, parliamentary and presidential democracies promote those displaying political competence.
• Malesky, E., & Schuler, P. J. (2020). Autocratic Incumbency Advantage: A Conjoint Survey Analysis of Public Support for Single-Party Regimes.”. Journal of East Asian Studies, 20(1), 25-52. doi:DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2019.40
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  Why do voters in single-party regimes express support for the ruling party in such large numbers? Prevailing work argues that support is manipulated by regime leaders, falsified by frightened voters, or due to “performance legitimacy.” In this paper, we argue that an overlooked reason why voters select candidates from the ruling party is because of the structural advantages that accrue to representatives the ruling party. These include: 1) greater voter certainty over policy positions; 2) attraction of higher quality candidates; and 3) better access to state resources and ability to deliver public services and rents. We test our theory against the two prevailing alternatives by using a unique survey experiment on nearly 28,000 Vietnamese citizens that reduces the threat of preference falsification and allows us to isolate voters’ preferences. We find strong support for our extreme incumbency advantage theory, which is driven primarily by candidates’ better access to state resources.
• Schuler, P. J., & Bakkensen, L. (2020). A Preference for Power: Willingness to Pay for Energy Reliability Versus Fuel Type in Vietnam. Energy Policy.
• Schuler, P. J., & Truong, M. T. (2020). Connected Countryside: The Inhibiting Effect of Social Media on Rural Social Movements.”. Comparative Politics, 52(3). doi:https://doi.org/10.5129/001041520X15743805571380
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  While much research focuses on social media and urban movements, almost no research explores its potentially divergent effects in rural areas. Building on recent work emphasizing the multidimensional effects of online communication on vertical and horizontal information, we argue that while the Internet may facilitate urban movements, it inhibits rural movements. Because social media increases vertical information flows between government and citizens, the central government responds quickly to rural protests, preventing such protests from developing into a large-scale movement. By contrast, social media does less to change the vertical information flows in urban areas. We explore the plausibility of our argument by process tracing the evolution of protests in urban and rural areas in Vietnam in the pre-and post-Internet eras. Our theory addresses a critically overlooked effect of social media within authoritarian regimes.
• Gueorguiev, D., Ostwald, K., & Schuler, P. J. (2019). Rematch: Islam, Status, and Region in the Indonesian Presidential Election.. Political Science. doi:10.1080/00323187.2019.1584733
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  Indonesia; election; Islam; democracy; turnoutABSTRACTIndonesia’s 2019 presidential election brings a rematch between incumbent Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, though against a backdrop of increasingly active conservative Islamic movements. Analyses of this contest – as well as of contemporary Indonesian politics more generally – are often based on assumptions around which constituencies matter and which political factions they support. This paper examines those assumptions using an original dataset of fine-grained returns and census data, including a latent variable to capture the independent effect of Islamic conservatism. We find that conservative Muslim areas overwhelmingly sup- ported Prabowo in 2014, but turned out in relatively low numbers. By contrast, rural poor areas turned out heavily for Widodo. This suggests that the conservative vote was under-mobilised and has a greater electoral potential than previously demonstrated. Given the recent mobilisation by conservative segments in society, observers should be prepared for significant shifts in the Indonesian electorate in 2019 and beyond.
• Ostwald, K., Schuler, P. J., & Chong, J. M. (2019). Triple Duel: The Impact of Coalition Fragmentation and Three-Corner Fights on the 2018 Malaysian Election. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 37(3), 31-55. doi:10.1177/186810341803700303
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  Malaysia's previously hegemonic Barisan Nasional (BN) government was unexpectedly defeated in the 2018 general election despite a fragmented opposition and widespread three-corner fights that theory states should inhibit turnover. Why? We argue that the opposition-split hypothesis rests on three core assumptions: third parties split only the anti-incumbent vote; coalition/party support is relatively uniform across the country; and opposition parties are not “elite splits” in disguise. The Malaysian context challenges all three of these assumptions. Counterfactual election simulations ultimately suggest that the opposition split neither dramatically helped nor hurt the BN. While this does not upend conventional wisdom on opposition coordination, it does demonstrate that the theory manifests only when its assumptions accord with local realities. More substantively, our analysis also provides insights into why the new opposition will likely seek to increase the salience of ethno-religious issues in a bid to recapture electoral ground.
• Schuler, P. J., & Truong, M. T. (2019). Leadership Reshuffle and the Future of Vietnam’s Collective Leadership. ISEAS Perspective.
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  On 23 October 2018, Vietnam’s National Assembly confirmed General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong, as president, following the sudden death of the President Tran Dai Quang. Trong is the first person to hold both titles since 1986. Some argue that the merger is either temporary or will not bring about substantive changes to the country’s politics. Others suggest that by merging the posts of the president and the party secretary, Vietnam is following the one-man rule model found in China under President Xi Jinping. The implications are more likely to be somewhere in between. The surprising leadership reshuffle was not merely a matter of temporary convenience. Documents and ideological views expressed within the party presaged this change. At the same time, the merger will not automatically produce a strongman for Vietnam due to the continued institutional power of the prime minister position. The change will have the most impact if Nguyen Xuan Phuc becomes the next General Secretary, as he will be able to combine his influence within the state sector with control over the party machinery. The blurring of the division between party and government will decrease the power of Vietnam’s National Assembly, which is one of the most active in the Communist world past or present. This will be accelerated if Phuc becomes the general secretary in 2021.
• Schuler, P. J. (2018). Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures. Comparative Political Studies, 1-32. doi:10.1177/0010414018758765
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  Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state.
• Huang, K. P., & Schuler, P. J. (2018). A Status Quo Theory of Generalized Trust: Why Trust May Reduce the Prospects for Democratic Transition in East Asia. Comparative Politics, 51(1), 121-139. doi:10.5129/001041518824414601
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  Does generalized trust lead to democratic transitions? Despite the voluminous literature on trust and democracy, very little examines the link between trust and democratic regime change. We theorize that generalized trust should lead to support for the status quo rather than support for regime change. In democracies, this means that citizens in effect support the democratic regime. However, in autocracies this status quo bias means that trusting individuals support the autocracy. We test this argument using data from the Asian Barometer Survey. Our simultaneous equation model shows that generalized trust has a negative impact on support for regime change regardless of regime type. This suggests that generalized trust—if anything—constitutes a headwind against democratic regime change rather than a facilitating factor.
• Schuler, P. J. (2018). Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures. Comparative Political Studies. doi:10.1177/0010414018758765
  More info

  Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state.
• Schuler, P. J. (2020). Female Autocrats as Role Models? The Effect of Female Leaders on Political Knowledge and Engagement in Vietnam. Journal of Politics, 81(4), 1546-1550. doi:10.1086/704786
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  Research shows that the presence of more female politicians can reduce gender gaps in political knowledge. Despite these findings, no study examines whether the role model effect applies to autocracies. This is an important oversight given the role political knowledge plays in increasing the use of non-electoral forms of accountability. To test whether female political role models increase knowledge in autocracies, this study uses unique survey data from Vietnam occurring before and after a leadership change. In the transition, all the top leaders changed from males to male except for legislative speaker, which transitioned from male to female. Results show that her selection led to a greater increase in name recognition for her position amongst women compared to men and that women were more likely to pay attention to legislative proceedings after her selection. These findings suggest that the role model effect travels to autocracies, although to a lesser degree.
• Schuler, P. J., & Huang, K. (2017). A Status Quo Theory of Generalized Trust: Why Trust May Reduce the Prospects for Democratization in East Asia.”. Comparative Politics.
• Schuler, P. J., & Gueorguiev, D. (2016). Keeping Your Head Down: Public Profiles and Promotion Under Autocracy. Journal of East Asian Studies, 87-116. doi:https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2015.1
• Schuler, P. J., & Ostwald, K. (2015). Context and Comparison in Southeast Asia: The Practical Side of the Area Studies-Discipline Debate. Pacific Affairs, 88(4), 871-888.
• Schuler, P. J., & Ostwald, K. (2015). Myanmar’s Landmark Election: Unresolved Questions. ISEAS Perspective, 68.

Presentations

• Schuler, P. J. (2019, Spring 2019). Vietnam as China’s Path Not Taken: Explaining the Roots of Authoritarian Legislative Institutionalization. Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association. Austin, TX: Souther Political Science Association.
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  From similar starting points, Vietnam and China’s legislatures have evolved differently. Where legislatures in both countries rarely met, Vietnam’s meets more than two months a year, conducts votes of confidence in government leaders, and holds biannual query sessions. The Chinese National People’s Congress, on the other hand, performs none of these functions. Despite the growing interest in authoritarian institutions, existing theory cannot explain these divergent trends. Using a paired comparison of these cases, I argue that the divergence results from an underappreciated distinction in authoritarian regimes – the degree of delegation from the party to the state. This paper contributes to general comparative theory on autocracies by highlighting importance of autocratic-executive delegation in explaining the evolution of quasi-democratic institutions. It also shows how those pushing for legislative reforms are often not “reformers”, but perhaps counterintuitively, those typically seen as more resistant to reforms in the party establishment.
• Schuler, P. J. (2015, August). Authoritarian Agenda Control: The Boundaries of Legislative Debate in Vietnam. Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. San Francisco: American Political Science Association.

Reviews

• Schuler, P. J. (2020. Vietnam's Foreign Policy Under Doi Moi. Edited by Le Hong Hiep and Anton Tsvetov.