Margaret Reimer

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Scholarly Contributions

Chapters

• Reimer, M. -. (2011). Davidsonian Holism in Recent Philosophy of Psychiatry. Oxford University Press.
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  This paper discusses the role of Davidsonian holism is recent philosophy of psychiatry and then adds to the discussion by drawing attention to overlooked psychiatric phenomena (including hebephrenic (aka "disorganized")schizophrenia that lend considerable credence to the Davidsonian view.;

Journals/Publications

• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Is the impostor hypothesis really so preposterous: Understanding the Capgras delusion. Philosophical Psychology/Taylor and Francis.
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• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Only a philosopher or a madman: Impractical delusions in philosophy and psychiatry. Philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology/Johns Hopkins University Press.
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• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Treatment adherence in the absence of insight: A puzzle and proposed solution. Philosophy, psychiatry, and psychology/Johns Hopkins University Press.
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• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Childhood trauma and the mentally ill parent: Reconciling moral and medical conceptions of "what really happened" (formerly Commentary on Thompson). Philosophy Psychiatry & Psychology.
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  ; Your Role: Sole Author; Type of Publication: Invited commentary on main article;
• Reimer, M. -. (2011). "Moral Disorder in the DSM-IV?". Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology (The Johns Hopikins University Press).
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  This paper provides an extended defense of the controversial view that the DSM "Cluster B" Personality Disorders (Antisocial, Borderline, Histrionic, Narcissistic)are genuine medical (vs. moral/social)disorders.;
• Reimer, M. -. (2011). Grice on Irony and Metaphor: Discredited by the Empirical Evidence?. International Review of Pragmatics (Brill).
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  An extended defense of Gricean accounts of irony and metaphor against recent claims that such accounts of undermined by empirical findings regarding the language processing of psychiatric patients (those diagnosed with schizophrenia and autism). I argue that the data in question supports Gricean accounts of the phenomena in question while discrediting Relevance accounts of those phenomena.;
• Reimer, M. -., & Day, B. (2012). Affective Dysfunction and the Cluster B Personality Disorders. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology/Johns Hopkins University Press.
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  This paper involves a defense of the view that the Cluster B Personality Disorders are genuine medical/psychiatric disorders rooted in neurologically-based affective dysfunction - in essence, a lack of empathy. It is a reply to two commentaries on my(singly authored)feature article, "Moral Disorder in the DSM-IV: the Cluster B Personality Disorders." However, it is more than just a reply insofar as it develops a positive account of the non-normative underpinnings of the antisocial traits characteristic of the Cluster B Personality Disorders. It is because of the non-normative nature of these underpinnings that the ostensibly moral Cluster B disorders are appropriately conceptualized as medical/psychiatric conditions for which the patient ought not be held accountable.The paper is interdisciplinary insofar as it combines traditional philosophy (including ethics and moral philosophy) with psychiatry, clinical psychology, and the neurosciences. As with all my papers in philosophy of psychiatry, this particular paper was revised in light of feedback from a neuroscientist (my brother).;Your Role: Primary author. Brandon and I read and discussed the commentaries on my original paper. I then put together a draft of a reply in light of our extensive discussion, which Brandon then read and commented on. I then revised the draft in light of Brandon's comments, after which I submitted it to the journal's editor, who reviewed and then accepted it.;Collaborative with undergraduate student: Yes;
• Reimer, M. -. (2011). A Davidsonian Perspective on Psychiatric Delusions.
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  In this paper, I argue against those who claim that Donald Davidson's rationalist conception of the mental is undermined by the delusional beliefs of psychiatric patients. I argue that, on the contrary, the psychiatric phenomena are perfectly in keeping with the Davidsonian view.;Full Citation: "A Davidsonian Perspective on Psychiatric Delusions," Philosophical Psychology 24(5), 659-677.;
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Childhood trauma and the mentally ill parent: Reconciling moral and medical conceptions of "what really happened".
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  This paper reflects on a memoir written by a young man raised by a mother suffering from bipolar disorder. In it, I attempt to reconcile a conflict at the heart of the memoir: Forgiving a parent for hurtful behavior that stemmed from genuine illness. (The conflict resides in the fact that there is something inappropriate in the idea of "forgiving" someone for something that, having stemmed from illness, was not really their fault to begin with.) ;Full Citation: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17(3);
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Distinguishing between the psychiatrically and philosophically deluded: Easier said than done. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
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  I respond to commentaries on my paper "Only a philosopher or a madman," arguing in favor of the idea that some philosophical "delusions" (such as theism) are difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish from psychiatric delusions.;Full Citation: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17(4);
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Moral aspects of psychiatric diagnosis: the Cluster B personality disorders. Neuroethics.
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  This paper discusses the intrusion of moral judgment in psychiatric diagnosis and invokes Gricean mechanisms in an attempt to explain how it might be avoided.;Full Citation: Neuroethics 3(2);
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Only a philosopher or a madman: Impratical delusions in philosophy and psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
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  I argue that our understanding of psychiatric delusions as genuine beliefs can be enhanced by comparing them to philosophical "delusions" such as libertarianism (with regard to free will), moral realism, and (Moorean) dogmatism.;Full Citation: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17(4);
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Reflections on Insight: Puzzles, paradoxes, and dilemmas. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology.
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  Response to commentaries on my "Treatment adherence in the absence of insight;Full Citation: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17(1), 85-89.;
• Reimer, M. -. (2010). Treatment adherence in the absence of insight: a puzzle and a proposed solution. Philosophy, Pychiatry, and Psychology.
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  In this paper, I draw attention to a puzzle: the fact that psychiatric patients without insight nevertheless adhere to treatment. I then solve the puzzle by appealing to benefits of treatment adherence that might be conceptualized in non-medical terms.;Full Citation: Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17(1), 65-75;
• Reimer, M. -. (2009). Is the Impostor hypothesis really so preposterous? Understanding the Capgras experience. Philosophical Psychology, Taylor and Francis.
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  ;Your Role: Sole Author;Full Citation: 2009. Philosophical Psychology. 226 (2). 669-689;
• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Metaphorical meanings: Do you see what I mean?. The Baltic International Yearbook of Logic and Communication/University of Latvia.
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  ;Full Citation: The Baltic International Yearbook of Logic and Communication, August 2008, vol. 3, pp. 1-20.;
• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Psychopathy without (the language of) disorder. Neuroethics/Springer.
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  ;Full Citation: Neuroethics, vol. 1, No. 3 (1 October 2008), pp. 185-198.;

Presentations

• Reimer, M. -. (2011, 2011-10-01). Drawing, Seeing, Referring: Reflections on Macbeht's Dagger. Conference in Honor of Richard L. Cartwright. Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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  I combine my interests in psychosis (philosophy of psychiatry) and reference (philosophy of language) by proposing an account of reference to hallucinations. The account is based on analogies between drawing, seeing, and referring.;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Reimer, M. -. (2009, 2009-11-01). Moral Disorder in the DSM-IV: the Cluster B Personality Disorders. Philosophy Club Meeting. University of Arizona.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: Philosophy Club;
• Reimer, M. -., & non, . (2009, 2009-11-01). Moral judgment in psychiatric diagnosis: the Cluster B personlity disorders. Moral Judgment Workshop. University of Arizona.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;

Others

• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Reflections on insight: Dilemmas, paradoxes, and puzzles.
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  ;Type of Publication: reply to 2 commentaries on my original paper on insight;
• Reimer, M. -. (2009). A Davidsonian perspective on psychiatric delusions.
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  ;Please specify if you select "Other collaborative" : In my other (forthcoming) paper on psychiatric delusions, the central point is that Davidson's rationalist conception of intentional agency is not threatened by psychiatric delusions. In this paper, the position is much stronger: I claim that Davidson's rationalist conception of intentional agency does much to illuminate the underlying *rationality* of paradigm psychiatric delusions. ;Full Citation: There is no full citation as the paper has yet to be published;Status: Under Revision (Revise and Resubmit);
• Reimer, M. -. (2012). Drawing, seeing, referring: Reflections on Macbeth's Dagger.
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  This paper develops a theory of reference with respect to hallucinations by exploring,in detail, analogies between drawing, seeing, and referring. By focusing on reference to hallucinations it manages to combine a traditional issue in the philosophy of language (the nature of reference) with a phenomenon of special interest to those working in philosophy of psychiatry: hallucinations. The volume in which the paper is slated to appear has already received two favorable reviews and Oxford is awaiting a third. Neither reviewer suggested any revisions for my paper, indicating they believed it to be publishable as is.;Full Citation: M. Reimer. (2012). Drawing, seeing, referring: Reflections on Macbeth's dagger. In Andrea Bianchi (ed.)New Essays on Reference.;Status: Submitted But Not Yet Accepted;
• Reimer, M. -. (2012). Singular Thought.
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  This paper, which will focus on the role of mental files in singular thought/reference, is in the earliest stages of development. One of the factors behind my shift from philosophy of language to philosophy of psychiatry was the appeal of the interdisciplinary nature of the latter. However, philosophy of language is becoming increasingly interdisciplinary at least to the extent that is responsive to relevant work in cognitive science. State of the art research regarding singular thought and reference is a case in point, and I look forward to doing more work in this area - beginning with this paper! It is to appear in a volume on singular thought, edited by Rachel T. Goodman (of Franklin and Marshall College). Chris Howard (who attended my seminar/reading group on metaphor and reference and was especially interested in the latter) will be joining me as co-author.;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;Full Citation: "Singular Thought," by Marga Reimer and Chris Howard;Status: Paper in Preparation;
• Reimer, M. -. (2008). Reference (revision).
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  This is a Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, published in 2003, that is being revised in light of a correspondence I have been having with Ruth Barcan Marcus over the past two years. The article is being revised to accommodate her important, but under-appreciated, work on reference.;Full Citation: Reference, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy;Status: Submitted But Not Yet Accepted;
• Reimer, M. -. (2012). Davidsonian Holism in Recent Philosophy of Psychiatry.
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  This paper involves an extensive evaluation of Davidsonian holism in light of empirical data from psychiatry that allegedly discredit it. I argue that, contrary to what a number of theorists have suggested, psychiatric delusions not only fail to undermine Davidson's views, they actually lend them considerable credence. In making this argument, I manage to blend traditional analytic philosophy with contemporary philosophy of psychiatry and therewith the various disciplines whose integration defines the latter, including: philosophy, psychiatry, psychology (clinical as well as empirical), and cognitive neuroscience.The volume in which the paper appears was reviewed last month by Jose Luis Bermudez, who identified two of the volume's dozen papers (mine and Peter Pagin's) as the most "interesting" and "invigorating" papers in the volume, praising both for "bring[ing] Davidson into dialogue with other areas of philosophy and the human sciences.";Your Role: Sole author;Full Citation: Reimer, M.(2012) Davidsonian holism in recent philosophy of psychiatry. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.) Donald Davidson on Truth, Meaning, and the Mental. Oxford: Oxford University Press.;Type of Publication: Original article in an edited volume on Donald Davidson;