Christopher T Robertson
- Adjunct Professor, Law
Contact
- (520) 621-1373
- College of Law Building, Rm. 243
- Tucson, AZ 85721
- chris.robertson@law.arizona.edu
Degrees
- J.D. Law
- Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
- Ph.D. Philosophy
- Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, USA
- Global Political Justice: The Creation of Solidarity to Prevent Harms to Persons
Work Experience
- Harvard Law School (2013 - 2014)
- Harvard Law School (2008 - 2010)
Licensure & Certification
- Member, American Bar Association (2007)
- Member, American Law & Economics Association (2011)
- Member, American Society of Law, Medicine, & Ethics (2009)
- Member, Society for Empirical Legal Studies (2009)
- Mississippi Bar (2008)
Interests
Teaching
Torts, Health Law, Empirical Legal Research Methods
Research
Health Law, Health Policy, Bioethics, Empirical Legal Scholarship, Corruption, Conflicts of Interests, Regulatory Science
Courses
2019-20 Courses
-
Honors Thesis
LAW 498H (Spring 2020) -
Distinguished Schol Colloquium
LAW 695C (Fall 2019) -
Honors Thesis
LAW 498H (Fall 2019) -
Independent Study
LAW 599 (Fall 2019) -
Torts
LAW 604C (Fall 2019)
2018-19 Courses
-
Bioethics and Law
LAW 654A (Spring 2019) -
Independent Study
LAW 699 (Spring 2019) -
Substantial Paper Smnr
LAW 696N (Spring 2019) -
Distinguished Schol Colloquium
LAW 695C (Fall 2018) -
Torts
LAW 604C (Fall 2018)
2017-18 Courses
-
Distinguished Schol Colloquium
LAW 695C (Spring 2018) -
Distinguished Schol Colloquium
LAW 695C (Fall 2017) -
Torts
LAW 604C (Fall 2017)
2015-16 Courses
-
Independent Study
LAW 699 (Spring 2016) -
Regulatory Science
LAW 695D (Spring 2016) -
Substantial Paper Smnr
LAW 696N (Spring 2016)
Scholarly Contributions
Books
- Robertson, C. T., & Kesselheim, A. S. (2016). Blinding as a Solution to Bias: Strengthening Biomedical Science, Forensic Science, and Law. Elsevier.
- Robertson, C. T., Cohen, I. G., & Lynch, H. F. (2016). NUDGING HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH LAW.
Chapters
- Malanga, S. E., Loe, J. D., Robertson, C. T., & Ramos, K. S. (2016). Big data neglects populations most in need of medical and public Health Research and interventions. In Big Data and Health Law.
- Robertson, C. T. (2016). Deciding for Patients and Letting Patients Decide for Themselves (Introduction to Part VI),. In NUDGING HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH LAW.
- Robertson, C. T. (2016). Selection Bias and Disclosure Discretion for Blinded Experts. In BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW.
- Robertson, C. T. (2016). Why Blinding? And How? A Theory of Blinding Applied to Institutional Corruption. In BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW.
- Robertson, C. T., & Rodwin, M. (2016). Money Blinding as a Solution to Industry Influence in Biomedical Science. In BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW.
- Robertson, C. T., & Yokum, D. V. (2016). Cost-Sharing as Choice-Architecture. In NUDGING HEALTH: BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND HEALTH LAW.
- Robertson, C. T., Wright, M. S., & Yokum, D. V. (2016). Mock Juror and Jury Assessments of Blinded Expert Witnesses. In BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO BIAS: STRENGTHENING BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND LAW.
Journals/Publications
- Robertson, C. T. (2017). Access to Investigational Drugs -- A Wrong Turn and a Better Way. JAMA Internal Medicine.
- Robertson, C. T. (2017). Why Courts Fail to Protect Privacy: Race, Age, Bias, and Technology. California Law Review, 106.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018). Will Courts Allow States to Regulate Drug Prices?. New England journal of Medicine, 1000.
- Robertson, C. T., & Bateman-House, A. (2018). The Federal Right to Try Act of 2017 - A Wrong Turn for Access to Investigational Drugs and the Path Forward. JAMA Internal Medicine, 178(321).
- Robertson, C. T., & Laurion, V. (2018). Ideology Meets Reality: What Works and What Doesn’t in Patient Exposure to Health Care Costs. INDIANA HEALTH LAW REVIEW, 15(43).
- Robertson, C. T., Eyal, N., & Romain, P. (2018). Can Rationing Through Inconvenience Ever Be Ethical?. Hastings Center Report, 48(10).
- Robertson, C. T., Malanga, S. E., Loe, J. D., & Ramos, K. S. (2018). Who's Left out of Big Data? How Big Data Collection, Analysis, and Use Neglect Populations Most in Need of Medical and Public Health Research and Interventions. Big Data, Health Law, and Bioethics, 98.
- Robertson, C. T. (2017). Time is Money? An Empirical Measure of Noneconomic Damages Arguments. WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 95, 1.
- Loe, J. D., Winkelman, D. A., & Robertson, C. T. (2016). An assessment of the human subjects protection review process for exempt research. The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 44(3), 481--491.
- Robertson, C. T. (2016). Vaccinations and Airline Travel: A Federal Role to Protect the Public Health. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LAW & MEDICINE.
- Robertson, C. T., & Loe, J. (2016). Federal Government’s Proposed Expansion of Regulation of Biospecimen Research Should be Reconsidered. BIOPRESERVATION AND BIOBANKING.
- Robertson, C. T., Campbell, J. E., -, B. -., -, C. -., & Yokum, D. V. (2016). Countering the Plaintiff's Anchor: Jury Simulations to Evaluate Damages Arguments. IOWA L. REV. 543.
- Robertson, C. T., Saks, M., & Thompson, W. (2015). Do Observer Effects Matter? A Comment on Langenburg, Bochet, and Ford,. 6 FORENSIC SCIENCE POLICY & MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 1.
- Robertson, C. T., Winkelman, A., & Loe, J. (2016). Regulation of Exempt Human Subjects Research: A Review of the Policies of 50 Universities. JOURNAL OF LAW MEDICINE, AND ETHICS.
- Robertson, C. T., Winkelman, A., Bergstrand, K., & Modzelewski, D. (2016). The Appearance and Reality of Quid Pro Quo Corruption: An Empirical Investigation. JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS.
- Robertson, C. T., sah, S., & Baradaran, S. (2016). Blinding prosecutors to defendants’ race: A policy proposal to reduce unconscious bias in the criminal justice system. BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE POLICY.
- Robertson, C., & Kesselheim, A. S. (2016). Regulating off-label promotion—a critical test. New England Journal of Medicine, 375(24), 2313--2315.
- Robertson, C., & Robertson, J. C. (2016). Reducing Wasteful Incarcerations. Regulation, 39, 20.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015). New DTCA Guidance — Enough to Empower Consumers?. NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015). Preserving Public Trust and Demanding Accountability (Introduction to Part II). FDA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015). Should Patient Responsibility for Costs Change the Doctor-Patient Relationship?. WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015). The FDCA as the Test for the Truth of Promotional Claims. FDA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING DRUGS AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES.
- Robertson, C. T., & Joiner, K. A. (2015). Scaling and Splitting, New Approaches to Health Insurance. REGULATION 40.
- Robertson, C. T., Cutshaw, C., Woolhandler, S., & Himmelstein, D. (2015). Medical Causes and Consequences of Home Foreclosures. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH SERVICES.
- Robertson, C. T., Loe, J., & Winkelman, A. (2015). Cascading Consent for Research on Biobank Specimens. AMERICAN JOURNAL OF BIOETHICS.
- Robertson, C. T., Malanga, S., Sprissler, R., & Joiner, K. (2015). A Problem Not Yet Manifest: Gaps in Insurance Coverage of Medical Interventions After Genetic Testing. JOURNAL OF LAW AND BIOSCIENCES 1.
- Robertson, C. T., Papailiou, A., & Yokum, D. (2015). The Novel New Jersey Eyewitness Instruction Induces Skepticism But Not Sensitivity. PLOS ONE.
- Kesselheim, A. S., Robertson, C. T., Siri, K., Batra, P., & Franklin, J. M. (2013). Distributions of industry payments to Massachusetts physicians. New England Journal of Medicine, 368(22), 2049-2052.More infoPMID: 23635021;
- Robertson, C. (2013). The split benefit: The painless way to put skin back in the health care game. Cornell Law Review, 98(4), 921-964.More infoAbstract: This Essay proposes a solution to the growth of health care costs, focusing on the sector of expensive, and often unproven, treatments. Political, legal, and market limits prevent insurers and physicians from rationing care or putting downward pressure on prices. Because the insurer bears the cost, the patient is also not sensitive to price, and thus consumes even low-value but high-cost treatments. The traditional cost-sharing solution is onerous for patients with limited wealth. When treatments can cost $25,000 or more, one cannot expect the median patient to pay a significant portion thereof. Instead, patients often enjoy supplemental insurance or exhaust their cost-sharing limits, and thus enjoy full insurance when making such a consumption decision. Raising the limits is a painful solution, since it would reduce access to care and cause medical bankruptcies. A new solution emerges from the recognition that insurance currently provides only an "in-kind" benefit, paid to the provider rather than the beneficiary. Instead, under a "split benefit," for expensive treatments (costing, say, $100,000), the insurer should consider satisfying its coverage obligation by paying a portion (say, $10,000) directly to the patient. The patient then decides whether to spend that portion on the treatment. If so, the insurer pays the balance ($90,000) to the provider, thereby insuring access. If the patient instead declines the care, he or she can save or spend the money on anything else. The insurer saves the balance ($90,000).
- Kesselheim, A. S., Robertson, C. T., Myers, J. A., Rose, S. L., Gillet, V., Ross, K. M., Glynn, R. J., Joffe, S., & Avorn, J. (2012). A randomized study of how physicians interpret research funding disclosures. New England Journal of Medicine, 367(12), 1119-1127.More infoPMID: 22992075;PMCID: PMC3538846;Abstract: BACKGROUND: The effects of clinical-trial funding on the interpretation of trial results are poorly understood. We examined how such support affects physicians' reactions to trials with a high, medium, or low level of methodologic rigor. METHODS: We presented 503 board-certified internists with abstracts that we designed describing clinical trials of three hypothetical drugs. The trials had high, medium, or low methodologic rigor, and each report included one of three support disclosures: funding from a pharmaceutical company, NIH funding, or none. For both factors studied (rigor and funding), one of the three possible variations was randomly selected for inclusion in the abstracts. Follow-up questions assessed the physicians' impressions of the trials' rigor, their confidence in the results, and their willingness to prescribe the drugs. RESULTS: The 269 respondents (53.5% response rate) perceived the level of study rigor accurately. Physicians reported that they would be less willing to prescribe drugs tested in low-rigor trials than those tested in medium-rigor trials (odds ratio, 0.64; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.46 to 0.89; P = 0.008) and would be more willing to prescribe drugs tested in high-rigor trials than those tested in medium-rigor trials (odds ratio, 3.07; 95% CI, 2.18 to 4.32; P
- Robertson, C. T., & Yokum, D. V. (2012). The Effect of Blinded Experts on Juror Verdicts. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 9(4), 765-794.More infoAbstract: "Blind expertise" has been proposed as an institutional solution to the problem of bias in expert witness testimony in litigation (Robertson). At the request of a litigant, an intermediary selects a qualified expert and pays the expert to review a case without knowing which side requested the opinion. This article reports an experiment that tests the hypothesis that, compared to traditional experts, such "blinded experts" will be more persuasive to jurors. A national sample of mock jurors (N=275) watched an online video of a staged medical malpractice trial, including testimony from two medical experts, one of whom (or neither, in the control condition) was randomly assigned to be a blind expert. We also manipulated whether the judge provided a special jury instruction explaining the blinding concept. Descriptively, the data suggest juror reluctance to impose liability. Despite an experimental design that included negligent medical care, only 46 percent of the jurors found negligence in the control condition, which represents the status quo. Blind experts, testifying on either side, were perceived as significantly more credible, and were more highly persuasive, in that they doubled (or halved) the odds of a favorable verdict, and increased (or decreased) simulated damages awards by over $100,000. The increased damages award appears to be due to jurors hedging their damages awards, which interacted with the blind expert as a driver of certainty. Use of a blind expert may be a rational strategy for litigants, even without judicial intervention in the form of special jury instructions or otherwise. © 2012, Cornell Law School and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
- Robertson, C., Rose, S., & Kesselheim, A. S. (2012). Effect of Financial Relationships on the Behaviors of Health Care Professionals: A Review of the Evidence. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 40(3), 452-466.More infoPMID: 23061573;Abstract: This paper explores the empirical evidence regarding the impact financial relationships on the behavior of health care providers, specifically, physicians. We identify and synthesize peer-reviewed data addressing whether financial incentives are causally related to patient outcomes and health care costs. We cover three main areas where financial conflicts of interest arise and may have an observable relationship to health care practices: (1) physicians' roles as self-referrers, (2) insurance reimbursement schemes that create incentives for certain clinical choices over others, and (3) financial relationships between physicians and the drug and device industries. We found a well-developed scientific literature consisting of dozens of empirical studies, some that allow stronger causal inferences than others, but which altogether show that such financial conflicts of interests can, and sometimes do, impact physicians' clinical decisions. Further research is warranted to document the causal relationship of such changes on health outcomes and the cost of care, but the current base of evidence is sufficiently robust to motivate policy reform. © 2012 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Inc.
- Robertson, C. T. (2011). The money blind: How to stop industry bias in biomedical science, without violating the first amendment. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 37(2-3), 358-387.More infoPMID: 21847885;Abstract: The pharmaceutical and medical device industries use billions of dollars to support the biomedical science that physicians, regulators, and patients use to make healthcare decisions-the decisions that drive an increasingly large portion of the American economy. Compelling evidence suggests that this industry money buys favorable results, biasing the outcomes of scientific research. Current efforts to manage the problem, including disclosure mandates and peer reviews, are ineffective. A blinding mechanism, operating through an intermediary such as the National Institutes of Health, could instead be developed to allow industry support of science without allowing undue influence. If the editors of biomedical journals fail to mandate that industry finders utilize such a solution, the federal government has several regulatory levers available, including conditioning federal funding and direct regulation, both of which could be done without violating the First Amendment. © 2011 American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics.
- Robertson, C., & Robertson, C. T. (2011). The money blind: how to stop industry bias in biomedical science, without violating the First Amendment. American journal of law & medicine, 37(2-3).More infoThe pharmaceutical and medical device industries use billions of dollars to support the biomedical science that physicians, regulators, and patients use to make healthcare decisions--the decisions that drive an increasingly large portion of the American economy. Compelling evidence suggests that this industry money buys favorable results, biasing the outcomes of scientific research. Current efforts to manage the problem, including disclosure mandates and peer reviews, are ineffective. A blinding mechanism, operating through an intermediary such as the National Institutes of Health, could instead be developed to allow industry support of science without allowing undue influence. If the editors of biomedical journals fail to mandate that industry funders utilize such a solution, the federal government has several regulatory levers available, including conditioning federal funding and direct regulation, both of which could be done without violating the First Amendment.
- Robertson, C. T. (2010). Blind expertise. New York University Law Review, 85(1), 174-257.More infoAbstract: The United States spends many billions of dollars on its system of civil litigation, and expert witnesses appear in a huge portion of cases. Yet litigants select and retain expert witnesses in ways that create the appearance of biased hired guns on both sides of every case, thereby depriving factfinders of a clear view of the facts. As a result, factfinders too often arrive at the wrong conclusions, thus undermining the deterrence and compensation functions of litigation. Court appointment of experts has been widely proposed as a solution, yet it raises legitimate concerns about accuracy and has failed to gain traction in the American adversarial system. Drawing on the notion of blind research from the sciences and on the concept of the veil of ignorance from political theory, this Article offers a novel and feasible reform that will make it rational for self interested litigants to present unbiased experts to factfinders. The idea is to use an intermediary to select qualified experts who will render litigation opinions without knowledge of which party is asking. The result will be greater accuracy of both expert opinions and litigation outcomes compared to both the status quo and litigation with court appointed experts. A game theory analysis shows that the current attorney work product protections make this"blind expert" procedure a low cost and no risk rational strategy for litigants. This Article argues that blind expertise is a worthwhile reform for the system of medical malpractice liability in particular and may have wider application wherever laypersons must rely upon the advice of potentially biased experts. Copyright © 2010 by Christopher Tarver Robertson.
- Robertson, C. T. (2009). Why intuitions and metaphysics are the wrong approach for health law: A commentary on Delaney and Hershenov. American Journal of Bioethics, 9(8), 18-19.More infoPMID: 19998151;
- Robertson, C. (2008). Making pragmatism practicable for the institutional review board. American Journal of Bioethics, 8(4), 49-51.More infoPMID: 18576258;
- Robertson, C. T., Egelhof, R., & Hoke, M. (2008). Get sick, get out: the medical causes of home mortgage foreclosures.. Health matrix (Cleveland, Ohio : 1991), 18(1), 65-104.More infoPMID: 19161126;
- Robertson, C. (2006). The consequences of qualified confidentiality. American Journal of Bioethics, 6(2), 31-32.More infoPMID: 16500846;
- Robertson, C. (2005). Organ advertising: desperate patients solicit volunteers.. The Journal of law, medicine & ethics : a journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics, 33(1), 170-174.More infoPMID: 15934675;
- Robertson, C. (2005). Recent developments in the law and ethics of embryonic research: Can science resolve the ethical problems it creates?. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 33(2), 384-388.More infoPMID: 16083097;
- Robertson, C. (2005). Who is really hurt anyway? The problem of soliciting designated organ donations. American Journal of Bioethics, 5(4), 16-17.More infoPMID: 16109684;
- Robertson, C. (2004). Framing the organ system: Altruism or cooperation?. American Journal of Bioethics, 4(4), 46-48.More infoPMID: 16192205;
Creative Productions
- Robertson, C. T. (2019. Journal of General Internal Medicine; American Journal of Public Health; JAMA Network Open; Social Philosophy & Policy.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. A Big Pharma-funded charity that helps patients pay for drugs just sued the government. Washington Post.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. Arizona Sues Maker of Oxycontin. Arizona Public Media news. https://news.azpm.org/p/news-topical-politics/2018/9/20/137587-arizona-sues-maker-of-oxycontin/More infoInterviewed in "Arizona Sues Maker of Oxycontin."
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. Clean Break: Kennedy Supreme Court Exit Could Upend Environmental Safeguards. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/clean-break-kennedy-supreme-court-exit-could-upend-environmental-safeguards/More infoQuoted.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Michigan - presentation.More infoPeer reviewed paper presentation at Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, Michigan
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. House Passes Right-to-Try on Second Try. Politico. https://www.politico.com/story/2018/03/21/drugs-right-to-try-congress-434677More infoQuoted.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. Libertarian Groups Eye Off-Label Drug Promotion Laws. BloombergLaw. https://bnanews.bna.com/pharma-and-life-sciences/libertarian-groups-eye-off-label-drug-promotion-lawsMore infoQuoted.
- Robertson, C. T. (2018. New Efforts Taking Root to Ease Off-Label Promotion. MedScape. https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/896664More infoQuoted.
- Robertson, C. T. (2016. Be Profoundly Worried about Campaign Finance. Marketplace. https://law.arizona.edu/robertson-marketplace-be-profoundly-worried-about-campaign-finance
- Robertson, C. T. (2016. Interview with Christopher Robertson. The Week in Health Law Podcast.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015. Interview with Dr. Christopher Robertson on the FDA’s new draft guidelines on direct-to-consumer pharmaceutical advertising. N Engl J Med.
- Robertson, C. T. (2015. Unearth Industry Funding of Science. http://link.brightcove.com/services/player