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Albert H Smit
- Associate Professor, Philosophy
- Member of the Graduate Faculty
Contact
- (520) 626-0615
- Social Sciences, Rm. 213
- Tucson, AZ 85721
- smit@arizona.edu
Degrees
- Ph.D. Philosophy
- UCLA, Los Angeles, California
- Kant's Theory of Discursive Understanding
Work Experience
- University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona (1996 - Ongoing)
- Stanford University, Palo Alto, California (1994 - 1996)
Awards
- Fellowship at the Center for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters
- Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Summer 2015
- RSSS Research Fellowship
- What type of organization made the award?: The Australian National University;Description: This fellowship (by funding my travel and living expenses) allowed me to spend two months in the summer of 2008 at the Department of Philosophy at the Australian National University. ;, Fall 2008
Interests
No activities entered.
Courses
2024-25 Courses
-
Justice and the good life
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2025) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Spring 2025) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Spring 2025) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2024) -
Justice and the good life
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2024)
2023-24 Courses
-
Justice and the good life
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2024) -
Moral Thinking
PHIL 210 (Spring 2024) -
History of Phil-Recent
PHIL 596Q (Fall 2023) -
Justice and the good life
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2023) -
Survey of Philosophy
PHIL 595A (Fall 2023)
2022-23 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2023) -
Honors Thesis
PHIL 498H (Spring 2023) -
Justice and the good life
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2023) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471B (Spring 2023) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571B (Spring 2023) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2022) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2022) -
Honors Thesis
PHIL 498H (Fall 2022) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Fall 2022) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Fall 2022)
2021-22 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2022) -
Medieval Philosophy
PHIL 261 (Spring 2022) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471B (Spring 2022) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571B (Spring 2022) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2021) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2021) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Fall 2021) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Fall 2021) -
Survey of Philosophy
PHIL 595A (Fall 2021)
2020-21 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2021) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Spring 2021) -
History of Phil-Recent
PHIL 596Q (Spring 2021) -
Survey of Philosophy
PHIL 595A (Spring 2021) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2020) -
Medieval Philosophy
PHIL 261 (Fall 2020) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Fall 2020) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Fall 2020)
2019-20 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2020) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2019) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2019) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471B (Fall 2019) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571B (Fall 2019)
2018-19 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2019) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2019) -
Medieval Philosophy
PHIL 261 (Spring 2019) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2018) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2018) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Fall 2018) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Fall 2018)
2017-18 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2018) -
History of Phil-Recent
PHIL 596Q (Spring 2018) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2018) -
Survey of Philosophy
PHIL 595A (Spring 2018) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2017) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2017) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471B (Fall 2017) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571B (Fall 2017) -
Survey of Philosophy
PHIL 595A (Fall 2017)
2016-17 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2017) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Spring 2017) -
Medieval Philosophy
PHIL 261 (Spring 2017) -
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Fall 2016) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2016) -
Justice and Virtue
PHIL 160D1 (Fall 2016)
2015-16 Courses
-
Dissertation
PHIL 920 (Spring 2016)
Scholarly Contributions
Chapters
- Smit, A. H. (2022). Kant on Our Notion of Representation. In Rethinking Kant Volume 6(pp pp. 14-45). Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Smit, A. H. (2013). Kant on the Apriority and Discursivity of Philosophy. In Kant und die Philosophie in weltbuergerlicher Absicht(pp 739-750). New York: Walter de Gruyter.More infoThis article is a chapter a collection of essays. More specifically, the collection is the proceedings of the 11th International Kant Congress.
- Timmons, M. C., & Smit, A. H. (2013). Kant's Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue. In Kant on Practical Justification: New Interpretations, M. Timmons & S. Baiasu (eds.)(pp 229-268). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.More infoCollaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes.Full Citation: Kant's Grounding Project in the Doctrine of Virtue (with Houston Smit). In Kant on Practical Justification: New Interpretations. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baiasu, eds.Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2013: 229-258. Status: Chapter in print
- Smit, A. H. (2008). Kant on Apriority and the Spontaneity of Cognition. Journal of the History of Philosophy.More info;Your Role: sole author;Full Citation: Kant on Apriority and the Spontaneity of Cognition" in Metaphysics and the Good: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Merrihew Adams, eds. Samuel Newlands and Larry M. Jorgensen (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008).;
Journals/Publications
- Smit, A. H. (2019). "Kant and the Agential Approach to Self-Knowledg. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 43 pages, in manuscript.
- Smit, A. H., & Timmons, M. (2011). The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant's Ethics". The Southern Journal of Philosophy.More info;Your Role: Equal co-author;Full Citation: The Moral Significance of Gratitude in Kant's Ethics" (with Mark Timmons). The Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (2011): 295-320.;Collaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes;
Presentations
- Smit, A. H. (2023, October). Kant's Transcendental Idealism: Just What Does He Mean by 'Appearance'?. University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Department of Philosophy Colloquium. Milwaukee: University of Wisconsin Milwaukee Department of Philosophy.
- Smit, A. H. (2018, October). "Kant on Cognition, Understanding, and Truth: The Critical Turn and the Human Understanding". Colloquium Talk. Calvin College, Grand Rapids, MI: Calvin College.
- Smit, A. H. (2017, October). Kant on the Noumenal Grounds of Experience. Colloquium Talk at the Fribourg University. Fribourg, Switzerland: University of Fribourg.More infoI gave an invited talk to the Philosophy Department at the University of Fribourg on some of my current research on Kant's theoretical philosophy.
- Smit, A. H. (2017, October). Kant on the Noumenal Grounds of Experience. Colloquium Talk at the University of Turku. University of Turku: University of Turku.More infoI gave an invited talk to the Philosophy Department at the University of Turku on some of my current research on Kant's theoretical philosophy.
- Smit, A. H. (2016, May). Essence, Nature, and the Possibility of Metaphysics. Kleivstua Conference on the Possibility of Metaphysics. Oslo, Norway: Center for Advanced Study at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters.More infoThis paper aims to explain how, on the critical Kant’s meta-metaphysics, true metaphysics “is taken from the essence of our capacity of thinking itself” and “contains the pure acts of thinking” that make experience possible (4: 472). On the interpretation I offer this characterization of true metaphysics, and with it Kant’s Copernican revolution for metaphysics, turns crucially on his distinction between mere essence (Wesen) and nature (Natur): an essence is "the first inner principle of everything that belongs to the possibility of thing", whereas a nature is "the first inner principle of everything that belongs to the being of a thing" (4: 467). 'Our capacity of thinking itself' consists of a thing, on Kant's view. And, considers as what consists in this thing, 'our capacity of thinking itself' has a nature. But this capacity also has an essence -- a first inner principle of everything that belongs to the possibility of the thing that constitutes this capacity -- and true metaphysics is taken from the insight that transcendental philosophy achieves, in the Transcendental Analytic of the first critique, into how certain 'pure acts of thinking' -- the logical functions of thought -- as they constitute the categories prescribe a priori the principles of pure understanding to nature, and thereby make experience in general possible for us.
- Smit, A. H. (2012, 2012-04-01). Kant's Idea of a Person. American Philosophical Assocation Pacific Division. Seattle, Washington.More infoAbstractKant's idea of a person plays a central role in his critical philosophy. To be person is to have the rational capacity to determine one's thoughts and actions in such a way that those thoughts and actions are imputable to one. And central to Kant's critical philosophy is a conception of thought and cognition on which a subject of thought and cognition must have the rational capacity so to determine her thoughts and actions. But the exact content of this idea of a person is not easy to specify. Nor is it easy to specify just what roles Kant assigns it in his critical theoretical and practical philosophies, or just what status this idea must have to play these roles. The aim of the present paper is to clarify both Kant's idea of a person and the theoretical and practical uses to which, according to his critical philosophy, they are to be put.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
- Smit, A. H. (2011, 2011-03-01). Internalism and the Origin of Moral MotivationMotivation. Invited workshop on my paper. University of California, Riverside.More infoI gave a brief presentation of a paper I published some years ago to a group of faculty and students who had read and studied it ahead of time. I also presented some more recent views I have developed on this topic, and then fielded questions for an hour.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2011, 2011-05-01). Causal Laws, the Transcendental Object of Cognition, and the Mechanism of Nature. Graduate Seminar on Kant's Theory of Causality. University of Oslo, Norway.More infoThis was the first of three lectures I gave to an intensive one week international graduate seminar on Kant's Theory of Causality hosted by the University of Oslo. The seminar included several Norwegian faculty, two other US lecturers, and graduate students specializing in Kant from Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the US, as well as from Norway. Most of the material in this, and the other two lectures, is new, and all of it will go into the book manuscript I am currently writing (Kant's Theory of Cognition).;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2011, 2011-05-01). Kant's Reply to Hume. Graduate Seminar on Kant's Theory of Causality. University of Oslo, Norway.More infoThis was the second of three invited lectures (see description of 'Scholarly Presentation 2').;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2011, 2011-05-01). Kant's Transcendental Employment of the Dynamical Categories. Graduate Seminar on Kant's Theory of Causality. University of Oslo, Norway.More infoThis was the third of three invited lectures (see description of 'Scholarly Presentation 2');Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2010, 2010-05-01). Kant on the Apriority and Discursivity of Philosophy. International Kant Congress. Pisa, Italy.More infoThis paper develops a new reading of Kant's account of the nature of philosophical cognition. It focuses on Kant's puzzling claim that philosophical cognition, despite being synthetic a priori, is cognition 'out of concepts'. This paper builds on other work I have recently published on Kant -- in particular, on a paper on Kant's distinction between concepts and intuitions, and a paper on Kant's conception of apriority. It also complements a previous published piece of mine on Kant's account of the nature of philosophy. The material in this piece will go into the first section of my book manuscript _Kant's Theory of Cognitive Activity_. ;Refereed: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
- Smit, A. H. (2008, 2008-02-01). Comment on Longuenesse. Conference on Personal Identity. University of California, Riverside.More infoIn this paper, I work out a new interpretation of Kant's Third Paralogism in the A-Edition. In the course of doing so, I propose a novel interpretation of what, on Kant's account, the identity and unity of the subject of cognition consists in. I also propose a novel interpretation of the relation between our cognitive activity (in the sense of energia) and synthesis (conceived of as a kinesis, or process).The paper is quite substantive, and my work as a stand alone article that is of manageable length (alas, I rarely manage to write papers that fit this description).;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2008, 2008-06-01). Cognition and Things in Themselves. Australian National University.More infoThis is my very first power point presentation -- yes, I am that behind the times. (By the way, I'm still not sure that the effort involved was worth it.);Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2008, 2008-07-01). Cognition and Things in Themselves. University of Otago.More info;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2008, 2008-07-01). Cognition and Things in Themselves. University of Wellington.More info;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
- Smit, A. H. (2008, 2009-04-01). Cognition and Things in Themselves. University of Auckland.More info;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
Others
- Smit, A. H., & Timmons, M. (2012). Kant's Grounding Project in The Doctrine of Virtue.More info;Your Role: Mark and I are equal co-authors: our work was thoroughly collaborative.;Full Citation: Kant's Grounding Project in The Doctrine of Virtue." Kant on Practical Justification, ed. Mark Timmons and Sorin Baisau. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pages 229-268.;Collaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes;