Simone Maria Sepe

Interests

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Journals/Publications

• Sepe, S. M. (2019). Is the Staggered Board Debate Really Settled? (with K.J. M. Cremers and Saura Masconale). 167 U. PA. L. REV. Online 9.
• Sepe, S. M. (2017). CEO Pay Redux. Texas Law Review, 96.
• Sepe, S. M. (2017). Investors' Time Preferences and Corporate Governance. Seattle University Law Review, 41.
• Sepe, S. M., Cremers, M., & Litov, L. (2017). Staggered Boards and Firm Value, Revisited. Journal of Financial Economics.
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  Finance article
• Sepe, S. M. (2016). 1. Activist Hedge Funds and the Corporation. WASH. U. L. REV, 94.
• Sepe, S. M. (2016). Board and Shareholder Power, Revisited. Minnesota Law Review, 101.
• Sepe, S. M. (2016). Commitment and Entrenchment in Corporate Governance. NW. U. L. REV..
• Sepe, S. M. (2016). Staggered Boards: Practice, Theory and Evi. RESEARCH HANDBOOOK ON MERGERS AND ACQUISITION.
• Sepe, S. M. (2016). The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards. STAN. L. REV..
• Sepe, S. M. (2015). Academic Cast Doubt Over Value of Hedge Fund Activism. FINANCIAL NEWS.
• Sepe, S. M. (2015). Paying for Risk: Bankers, Compensation, and Competition. 100 CORNELL L. REV.
• Sepe, S. M. (2015). Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investments, and Innovation. B.U. L. REV..
• Sepe, S. M. (2015). Whither Delaware? Limited Commitment and the Financial Value of Corporate Law. THE HARVARD L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
• Sepe, S. M. (2014). Lawyers and Fools: Lawyer-Directors in Public Corporations (with L. Litov and C. Whitehead). 102 GEO. L. J. 413.
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  Reproduced in T.H. MAYNARD & D. M. WARREN, BUSINESS PLANNING: FINANCING THE START-UP BUSINESS AND VENTURE CAPITAL FINANCING (2014).
• Sepe, S. M. (2014). Urban Decay, Austerity, and the Rule of Law (with B. White and S. Masconale). 64 EMORY L. J. 1 (lead article.
• Belloc, F., Nicita, A., & Sepe, S. M. (2013). Disentangling liberalization and privatization policies: Is there a political trade-off?. Journal of Comparative Economics.
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  Abstract: We empirically investigate the political determinants of liberalization and privatization policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries (1975-2007). We unbundle liberalization and privatization reforms and study their simultaneous determination in a two-equation model. Unlike previous studies, we account for cross-effects between the two pro-market measures. Our findings unveil that both right-wing and left-wing governments implement liberalizations and privatizations, showing a common trend under the so-called neo-liberalism wave. However, although the privatization rate is higher than liberalization in right-wing environments, the opposite occurs under left-wing governments. We argue that ideological cleavages still affect pro-market reforms, particularly the combination of privatization and liberalization policies. We conclude that different deregulation patterns should be expected under governments characterized by different political ideologies. Our results shed new light on the literature investigating the political-economic rationale underpinning pro-market choices. © 2013 Association for Comparative Economic Studies.
• Sepe, S. M. (2013). Intruders in the Boardroom: The Rise of Constituency Directors. 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 311.
• Nicita, A., & Sepe, S. M. (2012). Incomplete contracts and competition: Another look at fisher body/general motors?. European Journal of Law and Economics, 34(3), 495-514.
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  Abstract: In this paper we analyze the problem of the enforcement of incomplete contracts with endogenous outside options. Some of the equilibria we outline may reverse one of the main results presented in the standard literature. We then revisit the literature on the highly debated Fisher Body/General Motors merger and suggest an explanation based on GM's need to control the Fisher brothers' outside options. © 2010 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
• Sepe, S. M. (2012). Regulating Risk and Governance in Banks: A Contractarian Perspective. 62 EMORY L. J. 327.
• Sepe, S. M. (2011). Give ‘Em Enough Rope: A Reply to Professor Fried. 89 TEXAS L. REV. SEE ALSO 143.
• Sepe, S. M. (2011). Making Sense of Executive Compensation. 36 DEL. J. COR. L. 36.
• Sepe, S. M. (2010). Good Faith and Contract Interpretation: A Law and Economics Perspective. SSRN Electronic Journal. doi:10.2139/ssrn.1086323
• Sepe, S. M. (2007). Directors' Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract. 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 553.

Presentations

• Sepe, S. M. (2021, March). Contract Remedies for the New Economy Collaborations. George Mason Law & Economics Center, Research Roundtable on Capitalism and the Rule of Law. Destin, FL: George Mason Law & Economics Center.
• Sepe, S. M. (2022, March). Citizen Corp. George Mason Law & Economics Center, Research Roundtable on Capitalism and the Rule of Law. Destin, FL: George Mason Law & Economics Center.
• Sepe, S. M. (2022, March). Citizen corp.. Tulane Corporate and Securities Roundtable. New Orleans, LA: Tulane Law School.
• Sepe, S. M. (2022, May). Morality and Social Order. Social Philosophy and Policy Conference on Global Crises. Washington, DC.
• Sepe, S. M. (2021). Remedies for the New Economy. 7th Workshop on Relational Contracts, Chicago Law School. Chicago, IL: Chicago Law School.
• Sepe, S. M. (2021, November). Interim Contract Interpretation. Chicago Law School Workshop. Chicago, IL: Chicago Law School Workshop.
• Sepe, S. M. (2021, October). Blood in the Water: The Value of Anti-takeover Provisions During Market Shocks. American Law and Economics Association (ALEA), 31st Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL: Chicago Law School.
• Sepe, S. M. (2021, October). Contract Remedies for New Collaborations. The University of Texas School of Law. Austin, TX: The University of Texas School of Law.
• Acharya, V. V., Litov, L. P., Litov, L. P., Sepe, S. M., & Sepe, S. M. (2014). Seeking Alpha, Taking Risk: Evidence from Non-executive Pay in U.S. Bank Holding Companies. n/aUniversity of Pennsylvania, Wharton School, Weiss Center.
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  We investigate whether incentives provided to non-executives in U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) in 2003-2006 are related to BHC risk and BHC value during the crisis of 2007-2009. To this end, we introduce measures of non-executive incentives based on the elasticity of BHC compensation, net of executive pay, to BHC performance. We find that higher non-executive compensation elasticity is associated with higher subsequent BHC risk and lower subsequent BHC value. These effects are robust to controlling for executive incentives. We also document that the association between non-executive incentives and BHC risk is mainly driven by incentives specific to peer group performance. Overall these findings support the hypothesis that bank competition for non-executives was largely responsible for the distortions in bank compensation and the accumulation of long-term risks that emerged during the crisis.

Reviews

• Sepe, S. M. (2021. Justice in Transactions: A Theory of Contract Law.