Terence E Horgan

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• Horgan, T. E. (2017). Essays on Paradoxes. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2011). The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2008). Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. MIT Press.
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  This book was completed in 2006.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: _Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology_ (with M. Potrc), MIT, 2008.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: M. Potrc is a professor of philosophy at the University of Ljubljana.;

Chapters

• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2018). The Phenomenology of Moral Authority. In Moral Skepticism: New Essays (ed. D. Machuca).
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2017). Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry. In ETHICAL SENTIMENTALISM (eds. R. Debes & K. Steuber)(pp 86-106).
• Horgan, T. E., & Nichols, S. B. (2016). The Zero Point and I. In Pre-reflective Consciousness.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015). Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. In Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility(pp 34-61).
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2015). What's the Point?. In Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology(pp 87-114). Oxford.
• Horgan, T. E., & Nichols, S. (2015). The Zero Point and I. In Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind(pp 143-175). Routledge.
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2015). Blobjectivism and Art. In Realism and Materialism Art(pp 145-149). Sternberg Press.
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2015). Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error. In Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn(pp 190-209). Oxford.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014). Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color. In Does Perception Have Content? (ed. B. Brogaard), Oxford(pp 329-350). Oxford & New York: Oxford.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014). Virtue and the Fitting Culturing of the Human Critter (with D. Henderson). In Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue (eds A. Fairweather & O. Flanagan), Cambridge(pp 197-222). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge.
• Horgan, T. E., & Barnard, R. (2012). The Synthetic Unity of Truth. Oxford.
  More info

  The Synthetic Unity of Truth (with B. Barnard), in C. Wright and N. Pederson (eds.), Truth and Pluralism, Oxford (2013), 157-179.;Your Role: Co-author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of Philosophy, University of Missippi;
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2012). On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths. Oxford.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2012). Twin Earth, Moral. Blackwell.
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  Twin Earth, Moral (with M. Timmons). International Encyclopedia of Ethics (2013), 5242-5249.;Your Role: Co-author;Collaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012). Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation. Oxford.
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  ;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation. In E. Machery, W. Hinzen, and M. Werning (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality. Oxford (2012), 557-573.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012). Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. Oxford.
  More info

  ;Full Citation: Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. In D. Smythies and D. Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford (2012), 405-422.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Graham, G. (2012). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. De Gruyter.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Full Citation: Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy (with G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. de Gruyter (2012), 321-344. In Spanish translation as "Intencionalidad fenoménica y determinación del contenido," in D. Pérez y L. Fernández Moreno (comps.) Cuestiones filosóficas. Ensayos en honor de Eduardo Rabossi, Editorial Catálogos, Buenos Aires (2008).;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of Philosophy, Georgia State University;
• Horgan, T. E., & PotrÄŤ, M. (2012). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Full Citation: Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism (with M. Potrc). In P. Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave Macmillan (2012), 51-76.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of philosophy, University of Ljubljana;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed.. Oxford.
  More info

  Invited;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Invited for T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford (2011), 57-78.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010). Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. In Supervenience and Mind: Essays in Honor of Jaegwon Kim. MIT Press.
  More info

  In T. Horgan, D. Sosa, and M. Sabates, eds., Supervenience in Mind: A Festschrift for Jaegwon Kim. MIT Press, in press.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010). Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  More info

  ;Full Citation: Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds), The Waning of Materialism. Oxford (2010), 309-329.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2010). Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism. Routledge.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism (with M. Timmons). In I. Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge (2010),105-126.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009). Terence Horgan. Automatic Press.
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  Invited contribution, together with those of 19 other philosophers.;Full Citation: Terence Horgan. In P.Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions (Automatic Press, 2009), 105-106.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2009). Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions. DeGruyter.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions (with D. Henderson), in K. Steuber, G. Damschen, and R. Schnepf eds.), Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind. DeGruyter (2009), 296-319;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: David Henderson is a philosopher at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln, and a longtime collaborator of mine.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2009). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Oxford University Press.
  More info

  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press (2009), 221-236.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., Graham, G., & Tienson, J. (2009). Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann and S. Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press (2009), 512-537.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Graham and Tienson are philosophers at Georgia State University and the University of Memphis, respectively;
• Horgan, T. E., Maslen, C., & Daly, H. (2009). Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Mental Causation (with C. Maslen and H. Daly). In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press (2009), 523-553.;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Cei Maslen is a philosopher at Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand; Helen Daly is a graduate student at the University of Arizona;
• Horgan, T. E., & Graham, G. (2008). Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents. MIT Press.
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  This chapter was completed in 2006.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents (with G. Graham). In E. Wright (ed.), _The Case for Qualia_. MIT Press (2008), 89-107.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: George Graham is a philosopher of philosophy and neuroscience at Wake Forest University.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2008). Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism. In Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford.
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  Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism" (with D. Henderson). In S. Goldberg, _Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology_, Oxford, in press.;Your Role: Equal co-authors.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: David Henderson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2008). Would You Really Rather be Lucky than Good? On the Normative Status of Naturalizing Epistemology. Lang Publishing.
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  This chapter was completed in 2006.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: Would You Really Rather be Lucky than Good? On the Normative Status of Naturalizing Epistemology (with D. Henderson). In C. Wrenn (ed.), _Reference and Ontology: Essays in Honor of Roger S. Gibson_. Lang Publishing (2008), 47-76.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: David Henderson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2008). Contextual Semantics and Particularist Semantic Normativity. Routledge.
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  This chapter was completed in 2007.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: Contextual Semantics and Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). In M. Lance, M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik (eds.), _Challenging Moral Particularism_. Routledge (2008), 123-139.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: M. Potrc is a professor of philosophy at the University of Ljubljana.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2008). Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth. Oxford.
  More info

  Full Citation: Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), _Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson_. Oxford, in press.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;

Journals/Publications

• Horgan, T. E. (2019). Pre-Reflective vs. Reflexive Self-Awareness. Protosociology, 36, 298-315.
• Horgan, T. E. (2019). The Soritical Centipede (with B. Fiala and N. Ballantyne). Nous, 52(2), 491-510.
• Horgan, T. E. (2018). Seventy Years in Philosophy of Mind: An Overview, with Emphasis on the Issue of Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China.
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2018). Gripped by Authority. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
• Horgan, T. E., & Wheatley, T. (2018). Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Mental Causation. Frontiers of Philosophy in China.
• Horgan, T. E., Potrc, M., & Strahovnik, V. (2018). Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues. Acta Analytica.
• Horgan, T. E. (2017). Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology. Res Philosophica, 233-255.
• Horgan, T. E., Henderson, D., Potrc, M., & Tierney, H. (2017). Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 194-225.
• Horgan, T. E. (2016). A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis (with M. Balaguer). Analysis.
• Horgan, T. E. (2016). Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources (with D. Henderson). Res Philosophica.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015). Newcomb's Problem Revisited. The Harvard Review of Philosophy, 22, 4-15.
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2015). Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: Reply to Sonderholm. Theoria, 355-375.
• Horgan, T. E. (2012). Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist.
  More info

  Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. The Monist 96 (2013), 232-251.;Your Role: Author;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012). The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding Phenomenology. American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers.
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  ;Your Role: Author;
• Horgan, T. E. (2013). A Dialogue on Free Will. Methode.
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2013). Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: University of Nebraska;Type of Publication: Invited Book-Symposium Contribution;
• Horgan, T. E., & Mahtani, A. (2012). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Erkenntnis.
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  ;Your Role: Co-Author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Oxford University;
• Horgan, T. E., & PotrÄŤ, M. (2012). Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors. Acta Analytica.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs. Philosophical Studies.
  More info

  Invited contribution for book symposium.;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs, Philosophical Studies, in Philosophical Studies 153 (2011): 447-455.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011). The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its Limits.. Humana Mente.
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  Invited;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its Limits. Humana Mente 15 (Jan. 27, 2011), 77-97. Issue: Agency: From Embodied Cognition to Free Will.;Electronic: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., & PotrÄŤ, M. (2011). Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification. Croatian Journal of Philosophy.
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  ;Your Role: Co-author;Full Citation: Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification (with M. Potrc). Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2011), 75-88.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor in Philosophy at University of Ljubljana.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2011). Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
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  Invited;Your Role: Equal co-authorship;Full Citation: Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects (with M. Timmons). Journal of Consciousness Studies 18, 1 (2011), 180-205. Issue topic: Describing Inner Experience: A Symposium Debating Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES).;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010). Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy.
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  ;Full Citation: Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. Invited for Southern Journal of Philosophy, 48 (2010), 67-94. Re-inaugural issue.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2010). The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content. Acta Analytica.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content (with M. Potrc). Acta Analytica 25 (2010), 155-173.;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Matjaz Potrc is a philosopher at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a longtime collaborator of mine.;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2010). Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the 'Paradox' of Supererogation. Social Philosophy and Policy, and Cambridge University Press.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the â€;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2009). Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation. Philosophical Issues.
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  ;Your Role: equal co-author;Full Citation: Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (with M. Timmons). Philosophical Issues 19 (2009), 92-112. Issue on metaethics.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008). Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. Synthese.
  More info

  http://www.springerlink.com/content/x60567258466525n/This article was completed in 2006.;Full Citation: Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. _Synthese_ 160 (2008), 155-159. ;
• Horgan, T. E., & Kriegel, U. (2008). Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind. The Monist.
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  ;Your Role: Equal co-author;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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  http://www.springerlink.com/content/b1467135t30u7n54/This article was completed in 2006.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (2008). Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals. _Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences_ 7 (1):115-131.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2008). What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity?. Social Philosophy & Policy.
  More info

  This journal issue was also published as E. F. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), _Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics_ (Cambridge, 2008).This article was completed in 2006.http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=1596852;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Full Citation: What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity? (with M. Timmons), _Social Philosophy & Policy_ 25, 1 (2008): 267-300.;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;
• Horgan, T. E., Pollock, J., & graduate, 1. (2008). An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism. Analysis.
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  http://oscarhome.soc-sci.arizona.edu/ftp/PAPERS/An%20objectivist%20argument%20for%20thirdism.pdfThis article was completed in 2007.;Your Role: My role was relatively small, since I was only one of many contributors.;Full Citation: An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism (with J. Pollock and 15 other participants in his OSCAR seminar), _Analysis_ 68, 149-155.;Collaborative with graduate student: Yes;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;

Presentations

• Horgan, T. E. (2015, April). Commentary on Galen Strawson, The Primacy of Pan-Psychism. APA Pacific Division. Vancouver.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, February). Epistemic Probability. Arizona State University.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, July). Agentive Phenomenology, Credentive Phenomenology, and the Space of Reasons. Graduate Summer Course on Moral Phenomenology, Central European University. Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, July). Chromatic Rationalism, Moral Judgment and Moral Normativity. Graduate Summer Course on Moral Phenomenology, Central European University. Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, July). Contextual Semantics, Transvaluationism about Vagueness, and Meta-Ontology.. Graduate Summer Course on Meta-Ontology, Central European University. Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, July). Epistemic Probability, Conference on themes in the work of Barry Loewer. Central European University. Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, July). Ontological Monism. Graduate Summer Course on Meta-Ontology, Central European University. Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2015, March). Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. Keynote lecture, Southeastern Philosophy Graduate Philosophy Conference. University of Florida.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, April). Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. Marc Sanders Lecture, American Philosophical Association Pacific DivisionAP.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, April). Ontological Vagueness: Why It's Impossible and Why the Metaphysical and Semantic Consequences are Severe. Meta-Ontology Symposium, American Philosophical Association Pacific Divison.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, April). Phenomenal Intentionality and Holism (with M. Tienson). Conference: Thinking about Consciousness and Conscious Thinking, U. of Mississippi.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, Fall). Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgment and the Phenomenology of Moral Experience. Cognitive Science Masters Seminar, University of Arizona (Invited).
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, February). Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. Colloquium, Cal State Univ Los Angeles.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, November). Phenomenal Intentionality with Compromise. Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality, Central European University, Budapest.
• Horgan, T. E. (2014, October). Illuminating Reasons: An Inquiry into the Phenomenology of Moral Experience (with M. Timmons). Illuminating Reasons (Conference on Moral Phenomenology), U. of ArizonaTempleton Foundation.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, January). Newcomb's Problem: An Antinomy of Practical Reason. Colorado College Colloquium Series.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, June). Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality. Conference on Epistemology. Bled Slovenia.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, June). On the Satisfaction Conditions of Free-Agency Phenomenology: The Self-Sourcehood Aspect, the Alternate-Possibilities Aspect, and the Limits of Introspection.. Workshop on the Phenomenology of Free Agency.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, March). Author meets critics session on D. Henderson and T. Horgan, The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis.. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. San Francisco.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, November). Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, September). Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and its Rationality. Uniuversity of Miami.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, September). Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgment and the Phenomenology of Moral Experience. Cognitive Science Colloquium Series.
• Horgan, T. E. (2013, September). The Self as Zero Point vs. the Represented Self. Workshop on Self-Representationalism. University of Bielefeld.
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-02-01). Comments on "Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism". APA Central Division meeting. Chicago, IL.
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  Invited commentary on Derk Pereboom's “Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism";Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Professional Organization;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-02-01). The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding Phenomenology. APA Central Division meeting. Chicago, IL.
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  ;Submitted: Yes;Type of Presentation: Professional Organization;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-03-01). Let's Make a Deal. John Pollock Conference. Tucson, AZ.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-04-01). Commentary on Robert Howell's “Phenomenal Content and the New Evil Demon”. APA Pacific Division meeting. Seattle, WA.
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  Invited commentary on Robert Howell's “Phenomenal Content and the New Evil Demon.”;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Professional Organization;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-05-01). Implicit Reasons and Doxastic Justification in Iceberg Epistemology. Workshop on Epistemology. College de France, Paris.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-06-01). Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgments. Society for Philosophy and Psychology meeting. Boulder, CO.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Professional Organization;
• Horgan, T. E. (2012, 2012-10-01). Newcomb's Problem and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Cognitive Science Masters Seminar. Tucson, AZ.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Horgan, T. E., & , D. H. (2012, 2012-03-01). The Epistemological Spectrum. Workshop: Reading group on D. Henderson and T. Horgan's The epistemological Spectrum. University of North Florida.
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  ;Your Role: co-author;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor of Philosophy, University of Nebraska-Lincoln;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-03-01). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed.. Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. New Orleans.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-04-01). Comments on L.A. Paul, 'Categorical Parsimony,'. Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference on Arisitotelian Themes in Contemporary Metaphysics.. Boise State University.
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  Corrected date and location from previously submitted review.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-04-01). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. Symposium on fundamentality,. APA Pacific Division. San Diego.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-06-01). Low-Grade A Priori Knowledge.. Conference on the epistemology of philosophy. University of Cologne (Germany).
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-09-01). The Spectrum of Introspection: Why Introspection of Phenomenal Consciousness Runs the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence.. Workshop on consciousness, introspection, and cognitive science.. University of Arizona.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-10-01). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. University of Calgary.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2011, 2011-12-01). Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.. University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E., & PotrÄŤ, M. (2011, 2011-06-01). Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors. Conference on epistemology. Bled, Slovenia.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor in Philosophy at University of Ljubljana.;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E., & PotrÄŤ, M. (2011, 2011-06-01). Metaphysically Lightweight Posits. Conference on John Searle's Making the Social World. San Raffaele University, Milan (Italy).
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  ;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Professor in Philosophy at University of Ljubljana.;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-02-01). The Soritical Centipede. University of Nebraska.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-03-01). 'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility. Workshop on contextualism and free will. Goethe University, Frankfurt.
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  ;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-03-01). Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the 'Paradox' of Supererogation. University of Stockholm.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-03-01). Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the 'Paradox' of Supererogation. University of Uppsala.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-03-01). Vagueness, Ontological Monism, and Weak Emergence. Conference on Part and Whole in Physics. Lorentz Center, University of Leiden, Holland.
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  ;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-04-01). Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference. Tucson, Arizona.
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  ;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-04-01). Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, _Perception and Basic Beliefs_. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, Author-meets-critics session. San Francisco.
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  ;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-04-01). Quantification with Crossed Fingers. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, David K. Lewis Society. San Francisco.
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  ;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-07-01). Cognitivist Expressivism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Negation. University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
  More info

  This presentation was given as part of my Erskine Fellowship.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-07-01). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
  More info

  This presentation was given as part of my Erskine Fellowship.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-07-01). Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. University of Canterbury, New Zealand.
  More info

  This presentation was given as part of my Erskine Fellowship.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-08-01). Blobjectivism versus Priority Monism. Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-09-01). From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Workshop on my recent work in the philosophy of mind. University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2010, 2010-09-01). Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. Chalmers-Sider Seminar on Mind and Language. New York University.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-03-01). Updating the Agenda for the Metaphysics of Mind. Graduate Student Conference on the Metaphysics of Mind. University of Missouri at St. Louis.
  More info

  I was asked to give the keynote address at this conference.;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-04-01). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. Colloquium Series Lecture. Georgia State University.
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  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Colloquium Lecture;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-04-01). a discussion of my ideas regarding: consciousness, intentionality, and phenomenal intentionality. George Graham's philosophy of mind class. Georgia State University.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: guest attendance in a class;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-05-01). Tutorial on my work in philosophy of mind. Fifth International Colloquium on Philosophy of Mind: Physicalism and Its Critics. Joao Pessoa, Brazil.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-05-01). Updating the Agenda for the the Metaphysics of Mind. Fifth International Colloquium on Philosophy of Mind: Physicalism and Its Critics. Joao Pessoa, Brazil.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-07-01). Lectures on phenomenal intentionality. a team-taught, week-long, graduate summer school on philosophy of mind. University of Riga, Latvia.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-09-01). Discussion of my work on truth. Chase Wrenn's seminar on truth. University of Alabama.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: guest attendance in a class on my work;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-09-01). Mind and Brain: Philosophy of Mind in the Twenty-First Century. Colloquium Lecture Series. University of Alabama.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Colloquium Lecture;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-09-01). Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. Colloquium Series Lecture. University of Alabama.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Colloquium Lecture;
• Horgan, T. E. (2009, 2009-12-01). Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. Economic Science Lab Lecture Series. University of Arizona.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Interdisciplinary: Yes;Type of Presentation: Lecture in a Lecture Series;
• Horgan, T. E., & Henderson, D. (2009, 2009-06-01). Epistemic Functional Superpositions. Conference on epistemology. Bled, Slovenia.
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  ;Your Role: We co-authored the paper on which this talk was based, but I gave the talk alone.;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: David Henderson is a philosopher at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2009, 2009-05-01). Attention, Morphological Content, and Epistemic Justification. Conference on attention. Dubrovnik, Croatia.
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  ;Your Role: We co-authored the paper on which this talk was based, but I gave the talk alone.;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Potrc is a philosopher at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, and a longtime collaborator of mine.;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-02-01). Comments on Don Fallis, 'Resolving Horgan's Strengthened Two-Envelope Paradox'. APA Central Division, Annual Meeting. Chicago, IL.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-03-01). Comments on Susanna Schellenberg, 'Perceptual Content, Representation, and Relations'. APA Pacific Division, Annual Meeting. Pasadena, CA.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-04-01). Materialist Naturalism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kansas State University.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-07-01). Lectures on Compatibilism. Central European University, Budapest.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: University;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-07-01). Roads to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Workshop on Phenomenal Consciousness and Intentionality. University of Fribourg.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-07-01). The Two-Envelope Paradox, the Intensionality of Probability, and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Central European University, Budapest.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-10-01). The Sleeping Beauty Problem. Session on my work in Barry Lower's probability seminar. Rutgers University.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-11-01). Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. Workshop on Introspection. Australian National University.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-11-01). Sleeping Sarah, Sleeping Hillary, and Sleeping Beauty. Workshop on the Sleeping Beauty Problem. Australian National University.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008, 2008-11-01). The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. University of Sydney.
  More info

  ;Invited: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;
• Horgan, T. E., & Kriegel, U. (2008, 2008-10-01). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Project. Retirement Conference for Ruth Millikan. University of Connecticut.
  More info

  I also presented this talk at a workshop on the phenomenal intentionality research project, University of Arizona, October 2008; and as an invited colloquium talk at Australian National University, November 2008.;Your Role: Equal co-author.;Invited: Yes;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference/Workshop;
• Horgan, T. E., & Potrc, M. (2008, 2008-08-01). Vague Content in a Non-Vague World. Conference on Consciousness and Thought. Inter-University Center, Dubrovnik, Croatia.
  More info

  ;Your Role: Equal co-authors;Invited: Yes;Other collaborative: Yes;Specify other collaborative: Potrc is a professor of philosophy and longtime collaborator of mine.;Type of Presentation: Academic Conference;
• Horgan, T. E., & Timmons, M. (2008, 2008-12-01). What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity?. Indiana University.
  More info

  ;Your Role: Timmons and I are authoring a paper by this title together; I gave this talk on the subject alone.;Invited: Yes;Collaborative with faculty member at UA: Yes;Type of Presentation: Invited/Plenary Speaker;

Reviews

• Horgan, T. E. (2011. Review of Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the External World.
  More info

  Invited;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Review of Robert Stalnaker, Our Knowledge of the External World, in Mind 120 (2011): 561-65.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008. Review of Amie Thomasson, _Ordinary Objects_.
  More info

  http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=13143This review was completed in 2008.;Full Citation: Review of Amie Thomasson, _Ordinary Objects_, in _Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews_, May 22, 2008.;
• Horgan, T. E. (2008. What Broke the Window? Review of Amie Thomasson, _Ordinary Objects_.
  More info

  This review was completed in 2008.;Full Citation: What Broke the Window? Review of Amie Thomasson, _Ordinary Objects_, in _Times Literary Supplement_, June 6, 2008.;