 
      Joseph T Tolliver
- Associate Professor, Philosophy
- Member of the Graduate Faculty
            Contact
          
          - (520) 626-0590
- SOCIAL SCIENCES, Rm. 213
- TUCSON, AZ 85721-0027
- tolliver@arizona.edu
Bio
No activities entered.
Interests
No activities entered.
Courses
2025-26 Courses
- 
  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Fall 2025)
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  Independent StudyPHIL 599 (Fall 2025)
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  Philosophy at the MoviesPHIL 112 (Fall 2025)
2024-25 Courses
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  Independent StudyPHIL 599 (Summer I 2025)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Spring 2025)
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  Philosophy at the MoviesPHIL 112 (Spring 2025)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Fall 2024)
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  Philosophy of SciencePHIL 305 (Fall 2024)
2023-24 Courses
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Spring 2024)
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  Early Modern PhilosophyPHIL 262 (Fall 2023)
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  Philosophy Of MindPHIL 450 (Fall 2023)
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  Philosophy of MindCOGS 550 (Fall 2023)
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  Philosophy of MindPHIL 550 (Fall 2023)
2022-23 Courses
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  Early Modern PhilosophyPHIL 262 (Spring 2023)
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  Intro to Philosophy Thru FilmPHIL 112 (Spring 2023)
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  MetaphysicsPHIL 596B (Fall 2022)
2021-22 Courses
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  AestheticsPHIL 433 (Spring 2022)
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  AestheticsPHIL 533 (Spring 2022)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Spring 2022)
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  Environmental EthicsPA 323 (Spring 2022)
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  Environmental EthicsPHIL 323 (Spring 2022)
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  Environmental EthicsPPEL 323 (Spring 2022)
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  AestheticsPHIL 433 (Fall 2021)
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  AestheticsPHIL 533 (Fall 2021)
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  Independent StudyPHIL 499 (Fall 2021)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicLING 202 (Fall 2021)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicMATH 202 (Fall 2021)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicPHIL 202 (Fall 2021)
2020-21 Courses
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  AestheticsPHIL 433 (Spring 2021)
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  AestheticsPHIL 533 (Spring 2021)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Spring 2021)
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  Honors Independent StudyPHIL 499H (Fall 2020)
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  Philosophy of MindPHIL 596K (Fall 2020)
2019-20 Courses
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  Honors Independent StudyPHIL 499H (Spring 2020)
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  Isu+Meth Analytic PhilPHIL 344 (Spring 2020)
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  Rationalism + EmpiricismPHIL 471A (Spring 2020)
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  Rationalism + EmpiricismPHIL 571A (Spring 2020)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Fall 2019)
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  Early Modern PhilosophyPHIL 262 (Fall 2019)
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  Honors Independent StudyPHIL 499H (Fall 2019)
2018-19 Courses
- 
  Intro to Symbolic LogicLING 202 (Spring 2019)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicMATH 202 (Spring 2019)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicPHIL 202 (Spring 2019)
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  MetaphysicsPHIL 440 (Spring 2019)
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  MetaphysicsPHIL 540 (Spring 2019)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Fall 2018)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPSY 241 (Fall 2018)
- 
  Early Modern PhilosophyPHIL 262 (Fall 2018)
- 
  Independent StudyPHIL 499 (Fall 2018)
2017-18 Courses
- 
  Early Modern PhilosophyPHIL 262 (Spring 2018)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicLING 202 (Spring 2018)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicMATH 202 (Spring 2018)
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  Intro to Symbolic LogicPHIL 202 (Spring 2018)
2016-17 Courses
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  AestheticsPHIL 433 (Spring 2017)
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  AestheticsPHIL 533 (Spring 2017)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Fall 2016)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPSY 241 (Fall 2016)
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  Honors PreceptorshipPHIL 491H (Fall 2016)
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  Intro to Philosophy Thru FilmPHIL 112 (Fall 2016)
2015-16 Courses
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  Consciousness & CognitionPHIL 241 (Spring 2016)
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  Consciousness & CognitionPSY 241 (Spring 2016)
- 
  Isu+Meth Analytic PhilPHIL 344 (Spring 2016)
- 
  Phil Perspective on IndividualPHIL 150A1 (Spring 2016)
Scholarly Contributions
Chapters
- Tolliver, J. T., & Lehrer, K. (2012). Truth and Tropes. Springer.More infoMind, values and metaphysics: Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan", volume 1 and 2.;Your Role: Co-author;Collaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes;
- Tolliver, J. T. (1989). The St. Elizabethan World. In The Current State of the Coherence Theory(pp 289–309). Springer, Dordrecht. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_14More infoI take the following to be a platitude about knowledge: there would be no problem of knowledge if everything always had been, were, and always would be just as we believe it to be. In one way or another the problem of knowledge is motivated by of our familiarity with the gap between appearance and reality. So it is an intuition that survives our reflections on knowledge that what we might call “an incorrigible world,” any world ω where for all propositions p, if S believes that p at ω, then p at ω, is a world where one knows to be true everything one believes to be true. One might hope that our best account of the nature of knowledge might explain why this platitude is platitudinous. If not, one would at least hope for the preferred account to be compatible with it. Unfortunately, coherence accounts of knowledge do not fulfill this hope, for they imply that there are some incorrigible worlds that are epistemically inaccessible. I will consider the coherence analysis offered in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, by Laurence Bonjour as a representative case, showing why that analysis is inconsistent with the above platitude, and suggest why this is general problem for coherence theories. I end by suggesting that a solution to the problem is to abandon the presupposition present in many coherence theories that coherence properties are world-invariant.
Journals/Publications
- Tolliver, J. T. (2012). Tales of the ineffable: crafting concepts in aesthetic experience. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.More info;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Tales of the ineffable: crafting concepts in aesthetic experienceJoseph Thomas TolliverPhilosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic TraditionVol. 161, No. 1, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KEITH LEHRER (October 2012), pp. 153-162Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23261447;

