
Joseph T Tolliver
- Associate Professor, Philosophy
- Member of the Graduate Faculty
Contact
- (520) 626-0590
- SOCIAL SCIENCES, Rm. 213
- TUCSON, AZ 85721-0027
- tolliver@arizona.edu
Bio
No activities entered.
Interests
No activities entered.
Courses
2025-26 Courses
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Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Fall 2025) -
Philosophy at the Movies
PHIL 112 (Fall 2025)
2024-25 Courses
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Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Spring 2025) -
Philosophy at the Movies
PHIL 112 (Spring 2025) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Fall 2024) -
Philosophy of Science
PHIL 305 (Fall 2024)
2023-24 Courses
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Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Spring 2024) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2023) -
Philosophy Of Mind
PHIL 450 (Fall 2023) -
Philosophy of Mind
COGS 550 (Fall 2023) -
Philosophy of Mind
PHIL 550 (Fall 2023)
2022-23 Courses
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Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Spring 2023) -
Intro to Philosophy Thru Film
PHIL 112 (Spring 2023) -
Metaphysics
PHIL 596B (Fall 2022)
2021-22 Courses
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Aesthetics
PHIL 433 (Spring 2022) -
Aesthetics
PHIL 533 (Spring 2022) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Spring 2022) -
Environmental Ethics
PA 323 (Spring 2022) -
Environmental Ethics
PHIL 323 (Spring 2022) -
Environmental Ethics
PPEL 323 (Spring 2022) -
Aesthetics
PHIL 433 (Fall 2021) -
Aesthetics
PHIL 533 (Fall 2021) -
Independent Study
PHIL 499 (Fall 2021) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
LING 202 (Fall 2021) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
MATH 202 (Fall 2021) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
PHIL 202 (Fall 2021)
2020-21 Courses
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Aesthetics
PHIL 433 (Spring 2021) -
Aesthetics
PHIL 533 (Spring 2021) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Spring 2021) -
Honors Independent Study
PHIL 499H (Fall 2020) -
Philosophy of Mind
PHIL 596K (Fall 2020)
2019-20 Courses
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Honors Independent Study
PHIL 499H (Spring 2020) -
Isu+Meth Analytic Phil
PHIL 344 (Spring 2020) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 471A (Spring 2020) -
Rationalism + Empiricism
PHIL 571A (Spring 2020) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Fall 2019) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2019) -
Honors Independent Study
PHIL 499H (Fall 2019)
2018-19 Courses
-
Intro to Symbolic Logic
LING 202 (Spring 2019) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
MATH 202 (Spring 2019) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
PHIL 202 (Spring 2019) -
Metaphysics
PHIL 440 (Spring 2019) -
Metaphysics
PHIL 540 (Spring 2019) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Fall 2018) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PSY 241 (Fall 2018) -
Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Fall 2018) -
Independent Study
PHIL 499 (Fall 2018)
2017-18 Courses
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Early Modern Philosophy
PHIL 262 (Spring 2018) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
LING 202 (Spring 2018) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
MATH 202 (Spring 2018) -
Intro to Symbolic Logic
PHIL 202 (Spring 2018)
2016-17 Courses
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Aesthetics
PHIL 433 (Spring 2017) -
Aesthetics
PHIL 533 (Spring 2017) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Fall 2016) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PSY 241 (Fall 2016) -
Honors Preceptorship
PHIL 491H (Fall 2016) -
Intro to Philosophy Thru Film
PHIL 112 (Fall 2016)
2015-16 Courses
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Consciousness & Cognition
PHIL 241 (Spring 2016) -
Consciousness & Cognition
PSY 241 (Spring 2016) -
Isu+Meth Analytic Phil
PHIL 344 (Spring 2016) -
Phil Perspective on Individual
PHIL 150A1 (Spring 2016)
Scholarly Contributions
Chapters
- Tolliver, J. T., & Lehrer, K. (2012). Truth and Tropes. Springer.More infoMind, values and metaphysics: Philosophical papers dedicated to Kevin Mulligan", volume 1 and 2.;Your Role: Co-author;Collaborative with faculty member in unit: Yes;
- Tolliver, J. T. (1989). The St. Elizabethan World. In The Current State of the Coherence Theory(pp 289–309). Springer, Dordrecht. doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2360-7_14More infoI take the following to be a platitude about knowledge: there would be no problem of knowledge if everything always had been, were, and always would be just as we believe it to be. In one way or another the problem of knowledge is motivated by of our familiarity with the gap between appearance and reality. So it is an intuition that survives our reflections on knowledge that what we might call “an incorrigible world,” any world ω where for all propositions p, if S believes that p at ω, then p at ω, is a world where one knows to be true everything one believes to be true. One might hope that our best account of the nature of knowledge might explain why this platitude is platitudinous. If not, one would at least hope for the preferred account to be compatible with it. Unfortunately, coherence accounts of knowledge do not fulfill this hope, for they imply that there are some incorrigible worlds that are epistemically inaccessible. I will consider the coherence analysis offered in The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, by Laurence Bonjour as a representative case, showing why that analysis is inconsistent with the above platitude, and suggest why this is general problem for coherence theories. I end by suggesting that a solution to the problem is to abandon the presupposition present in many coherence theories that coherence properties are world-invariant.
Journals/Publications
- Tolliver, J. T. (2012). Tales of the ineffable: crafting concepts in aesthetic experience. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition.More info;Your Role: Author;Full Citation: Tales of the ineffable: crafting concepts in aesthetic experienceJoseph Thomas TolliverPhilosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic TraditionVol. 161, No. 1, THE PHILOSOPHY OF KEITH LEHRER (October 2012), pp. 153-162Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23261447;