Tamar Kugler

Interests

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Courses

Scholarly Contributions

Books

• Kugler, T., Smith, J. C., Son, Y., & Connolly, T. (2008). Decision modeling and behavior in uncertain and complex environments. Springer.

Chapters

• Poonam, A., Kugler, T., & Giardini, F. (2021). Social Dilemmas: from competition to cooperation.. In The Oxford Handbook on the Psychology of Competition.
• Rapoport, A., Kugler, T., Dugar, S., & Gisches, E. J. (2008). Braess paradox in the laboratory: An experimental study of route choice in traffic networks with asymmetric costs. In Decision modeling and behavior in uncertain and complex environments.

Journals/Publications

• Bohm, R., Halevy, N., & Kugler, T. (2021). The Power of Defaults in Intergroup Conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.
• Kugler, T., Noussair, C., & Hatch, D. B. (2021). Does Disgust Increase Unethical Behavior? A Replication of Winterich, Mittal, and Morales (2014). Social Psychological and Personality Science.
• Kugler, T., Ye, B., Motro, D., & Noussair, C. (2020). On Trust and Disgust: Evidence from Face Reading and Virtual Reality. Social Psychological and Personality Science. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550619856302
• Daphna, M. J., Bohan, Y., Kugler, T., & Noussair, C. (2019). Measuring Emotions in the Digital Age. MIT Sloane Management Review, 61, 1-4.
• Goldman, B. M., Cooper, D. A., & Kugler, T. (2019). Crime and punishment: A realistic group conflict theory approach to racial discrimination in hiring convicted felons.. International Journal of Conflict Management, 30, 2-23.
• Kugler, T., Cardella, E., Anderson, J. S., & Connolly, T. (2019). Is Greed Contagious? Evidence from a common pool resource dilemma. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 32, 579-598. doi:https://doi.org/10.1002/ bdm.2134
• Motro, D., Kugler, T., & Connolly, T. (2016). Back to the basics: How feeling of anger affect cooperation.. International Journal of Conflict Management, 27, 523-546.
• Cooper, D. A., Connolly, T., & Kugler, T. (2015). Lay Personality Theories in Interactive Decisions: Strongly Held, Weakly Supported. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 28, 201-213.
• Kugler, T., Neeman, Z., & Vulkan, N. (2014). Personality traits and strategic behavior: Anxiousness and aggressiveness in entry games. Journal of Economic Psychology.
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  Abstract: We demonstrate that personality has a systematic effect on strategic behavior. We focus on two personality traits: anxiousness and aggressiveness, and consider a 2-player entry game, where each player can guarantee a payoff by staying out, a higher payoff if she is the only player to enter, but a lower payoff if both players enter. We find that: anxious players enter less; aggressive players enter more; players are more likely to enter against anxious than non-anxious players; and players are less likely to enter against aggressive than non-aggressive players. We discuss the possible mechanism through which personality affects strategic behavior. © 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Kugler, T., & Bornstein, G. (2013). Social dilemmas between individuals and groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120(2), 191-205.
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  Abstract: Three computer-controlled experiments were conducted to study interactions between individuals and non-cooperative groups in prototypical social-dilemma games. The asymmetric competition between an individual and a group was compared with symmetric control conditions where both competitors were either individuals or groups. All games were played repeatedly with the same players interacting for 120 rounds. The results show that the outcome of the conflict depends both on the type of competing players and on the structure of the competition. Generally, individuals do better than non-cooperative groups, regardless of the type of conflict, and more often than not it is better to have a non-cooperative group rather than an individual as an opponent. The relative advantage is a result of individuals generally cooperating better with other individuals (as compared to cooperation between two groups), and that in mixed competitions the individual takes advantage of the group's difficulties in mobilizing collective-action, and dominates it. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.
• Kugler, T., Connolly, T., & Ordonez, L. D. (2012). Emotion, Decision, and Risk: Betting on Gambles versus Betting on People. JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING, 25(2), 123-134.
• Kugler, T., Kausel, E. E., & Kocher, M. G. (2012). Are groups more rational than individuals? A review of interactive decision making in groups. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science, 3(4), 471-482.
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  Abstract: Many decisions are interactive; the outcome of one party depends not only on its decisions or on acts of nature but also on the decisions of others. Standard game theory assumes that individuals are rational, self-interested decision makers-that is, decision makers are selfish, perfect calculators, and flawless executors of their strategies. A myriad of studies shows that these assumptions are problematic, at least when examining decisions made by individuals. In this article, we review the literature of the last 25 years on decision making by groups. Researchers have compared the strategic behavior of groups and individuals in many games: prisoner's dilemma, dictator, ultimatum, trust, centipede and principal-agent games, among others. Our review suggests that results are quite consistent in revealing that group decisions are closer to the game-theoretic assumption of rationality than individual decisions. Given that many real-world decisions are made by groups, it is possible to argue that standard game theory is a better descriptive model than previously believed by experimental researchers. We conclude by discussing future research avenues in this area. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Kugler, T., Rapoport, A., & Pazy, A. (2010). Public good provision in inter-team conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit-sharing rule. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23(4), 421-438.
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  Abstract: A fundamental problem in organizations is designing mechanisms for eliciting voluntary contributions from individual members of a team who are entrapped in a social dilemma. To solve the problem, we utilize a game-theoretical framework that embeds the traditional within-team social dilemma in a between-team competition for an exogenously determined prize. equilibrium, such competition enhances the incentive to contribute, thereby reducing free-riding. Extending existing literature, we focus on asymmetric competitions between teams of unequal size, and competitions between more than two teams. Comparing two protocols for sharing the prize-egalitarian and proportional profit-sharing rules-we find that (i) free-riding diminishes and (ii) team members contribute more toward their team's effort when they belong to the larger team and when the profit-sharing rule is proportional. (iii) Additionally, under the egalitarian profit-sharing rule team members contribute more than predicted by the equilibrium solution. We discuss implications of our findings for eliciting contributions in competitive environments. © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Crawford, V. P., Kugler, T., Neeman, Z., & Pauzner, A. (2009). Behaviorally optimal auction design: Examples and observations. Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(2-3), 377-387.
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  Abstract: This paper begins to explore behavioral mechanism design, replacing equilibrium by a model based on "level-k" thinking, which has strong support in experiments. In representative examples, we consider optimal sealed-bid auctions with two symmetric bidders who have independent private values, assuming that the designer knows the distribution of level-k bid-ders. We show that in a first-price auction, level-k bidding changes the optimal reserve price and often yields expected revenue that exceeds Myerson's (1981) bound; and that an exotic auction that exploits bidders' non-equilibrium beliefs can far exceed the revenue bound. We close with some general observations about level-k auction design. (JEL: C72, C92) © 2009 by the European Economic Association.
• Kugler, T. (2009). An inter-group conflict and its relation to oligopoly theory. CUBO, Mathematical Journal.
• Kugler, T., Connolly, T., & Kausel, E. E. (2009). The effect of consequential thinking on trust game behavior. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 22(2), 101-119.
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  Abstract: Contrary to rational Expected Monetary Value (EMV) predictions that no money will be transferred in Trust Games, in experiments players make positive transfers. Theorists have proposed modifying the Sender's utility function while retaining utilitymaximization assumptions to account for this behavior. Such accounts assume that Senders can grasp the possible outcomes of their choices, their probabilities, and utilities. In reality, however, Senders' choices are unexpectedly complex, and the assumption that they approximate expected utility maximization is highly implausible. Instead, we suggest that Senders are guided by general propensities to trust others. Two experiments examine the effect of inducing consequential thought on Sender behavior. One induced consequential thought directly; the other did so indirectly. The amount sent was significantly reduced following either manipulation. This suggests that models of Sender behavior in Complex Trust Games should not assume that participants routinely engage in consequential thinking (CT) of the depth that would be required for utility maximization. © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Rapoport, A., Kugler, T., Dugar, S., & Gisches, E. J. (2009). Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox. GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR, 65(2), 538-571.
• Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., Budescu, D. V., & Selten, R. (2008). Repeated price competition between individuals and between teams. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 66(3-4), 808-821.
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  Abstract: We conducted an experimental study of price competition in a duopolistic market. The market was operationalized as a repeated game between two "teams" with one, two, or three players in each team. We found that asking (and winning) prices were significantly higher in competition between individuals than in competition between two- or three-person teams. There were no general effects of team size, but prices increased with time when each team member was paid his or her own asking price and decreased when the team's profits were divided equally. This result is consistent with a simple model of individual learning. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Kugler, T., Bornstein, G., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2007). Trust between individuals and groups: Groups are less trusting than individuals but just as trustworthy. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(6), 646-657.
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  Abstract: We compare the behavior of groups and individuals in a two-person trust game. The first mover in this game, the sender, receives an endowment and can send any part of it to the responder; the amount sent is tripled, and the responder can then return to the sender any portion of the tripled sum. In a 2 × 2 design, the players in the roles of sender and responder are either individuals or groups of three players (who conduct face-to-face discussions to decide on a collective group strategy). We find that groups in the role of sender send smaller amounts than individuals, and expect lower returns. In particular, groups send nothing more often than individuals do (and are even more likely to do so when the responder is another group). Groups and individuals in the role of responder return on average the same fraction of the amount sent. Hence, we conclude that groups are less trusting than individuals, but just as trustworthy. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
• Kugler, T., Neeman, Z., & Vulkan, N. (2006). Markets versus negotiations: An experimental investigation. Games and Economic Behavior, 56(1), 121-134.
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  Abstract: We consider the consequences of competition between two types of experimental exchange mechanisms, a "decentralized bargaining" market, and a "centralized" market. It is shown that decentralized bargaining is subject to a process of "unraveling" in which relatively high value traders (buyers with a high willingness to pay and sellers with low costs) continuously find trading in the centralized markets more attractive until few opportunities for mutually beneficial trade remain outside the centralized marketplace. © 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
• Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., & Zamir, S. (2005). One team must win, the other need only not lose: An experimental study of an asymmetric participation game. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18(2), 111-123.
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  Abstract: We studied asymmetric competition between two (three-person) groups. Each group member received an initial endowment and had to decide whether or not to contribute it. The group with more contributions won the competition and each of its members received a reward. The members of the losing group received nothing. The asymmetry was created by randomly and publicly selecting one group beforehand to be the winning group in the case of a tie. A theoretical analysis of this asymmetric game generates two qualitatively different solutions, one in which members of the group that wins in the case of a tie are somewhat more likely to contribute than members of the group that loses, and another in which members of the group that loses in the case of a tie are much more likely to contribute than members of the group that wins. The experimental results are clearly in line with the first solution. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
• Frost, R., Kugler, T., Deutsch, A., & Forster, K. I. (2005). Orthographic structure versus morphological structure: Principles of lexical organization in a given language. JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY-LEARNING MEMORY AND COGNITION, 31(6), 1293-1326.
• Baker, T., Harel, A., & Kugler, T. (2004). The Virtues of Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach. Iowa Law Review, 89(2), 443-494.
• Bornstein, G., Kugler, T., & Ziegelmeyer, A. (2004). Individual and group decisions in the centipede game: Are groups more "rational" players?. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40(5), 599-605.
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  Abstract: Two experiments compared the Centipede game played either by 2 individuals or by 2 (3-person) groups. The 2 competitors alternate in deciding whether to take the larger portion of an increasing (or constant) pile of money, and as soon as one "takes" the game ends. Assuming that both sides are concerned only with maximizing their own payoffs (and that this is common knowledge), the game theoretic solution, derived by backward induction, is for the first mover to exit the game at the first decision node. Both experiments found that although neither individuals nor groups fully complied with this solution, groups did exit the game significantly earlier than individuals. The study of experimental games has uncovered many instances in which individuals deviate systematically from the game theoretic solution. This study is in accord with other recent experiments in suggesting that game theory may provide a better description of group behavior. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Presentations

• Kugler, T. (2021). The power of defaults in intergroup conflict. North American ESA meeting.
• Kugler, T. (2021, Spring 2021). On Organizational Cooperation. Cooperation Science Network seminar series. Virtual.
• Goldman, B. M., Kugler, T., & Cooper, D. A. (2018, Fall 2018). Crime and punishment: A realistic group conflict theory approach to racial discrimination in hiring convicted felons. Annual Meeting of the Society of Judgment and Decision Making.
• Hatch, D. B., & Kugler, T. (2018, Fall 2018). From unethical to prosocial behavior: The role of guilt and cognitive processing style. • Annual Meeting of the Society of Judgment and Decision Making.
• Goldman, B. M., Cooper, D., & Kugler, T. (2017, December). A Realistic Group Conflict Approach to Racial Discrimination Involving Convicted Felons. Academy of Management. Atlanta, Georgia: Academy of Management.
• Kugler, T. (2017, August). The Dark Side of Social Capital: Interlock Network, CEO-Board Network, and CEO Overconfidence. SPUDM.
• Kugler, T. (2017, December). On Trust and Disgust: The Emotional Underpinning of Trusting Decisions. UA-ASU Cognitive Science Conclave.
• Kugler, T. (2017, November). On Trust and Disgust: The Emotional Underpinning of Trusting Decisions. Annual Meeting of the Society of Judgment and Decision Making.
• Kugler, T. (2017, November). Three Tales of Trust: How Cognition, Emotion and Group Dynamics Shape Trust Judgments and Behavior. World Bank Development Economics Conference: Governance and the Law.
• Kugler, T., Cardella, E., Anderson, J. S., & Connolly, T. (2017, June). Is Greed Contagious? Evidence from a common pool resource dilemma. 17th International Meeting on Social Dilemmas.
• Cardella, E., Kugler, T., Anderson, J. S., & Connolly, T. (2016, November). Is Greed Contagious? Evidence from a Common Pool Resource Dilemma.. North American ESA meeting. Tucson: Economic Science Association.
• Goldman, B. M., Cooper, D., & Kugler, T. (2016, June). Crime and Punishment: Racial discrimination against convicted felons in the workplace.. International Association of Conflict Management. New York, NY: International Association of Conflict Management.
• Kugler, T., Goldman, B. M., & Cooper, D. (2016, December). Crime and Punishment: Racial discrimination against convicted felons in the workplace. Presented at the Arizona Conclave, December 10, 2016 (Phoenix, AZ).. Arizona Conclave. Phoenix, AZ: Society of Behaviorial Decision Making.